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Plato. ³Philebus

THE PHILEBUS

66

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES.

BY

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P R E F A C E.

NO edition of the works of Plato quite calculated to meet the wants of the student has as yet appeared. This deficiency it is proposed to supply by the joint labours of some members of the University of Oxford. The present edition of the Philebus is therefore to be regarded as one of a series.

The whole series is intended to follow a uniform plan: as, however, each dialogue will be entrusted to a single editor, differences of individual taste or opinion may possibly appear in the execution.

An introduction, indicating the general scope and character of each dialogue, will be prefixed.

Many difficulties in the interpretation of Plato vanish before an insight into the arrangement of parts, or plan of structure, of a dialogue. This arrangement, though always artistic, is often intricate. A running analysis will, therefore, be given in the margin, sufficient, it is hoped, to furnish a clue to the course of the argument through its occasional mazes.

As scholars are generally agreed to refer to the edition of Stephanus in their references to the writings of Plato, the corresponding pages of that edition will be indicated in the margin.

The conceptions unfolded or made the subject of passing allusion in the Philebus have been chiefly elucidated in the notes by a comparison of Plato's with previous or subsequent speculations. Where it was necessary to examine any point at greater length, longer notes, or rather essays, have been appended at the end of the volume.

An English translation, intended to be sufficiently close to perform the office of a philological commentary, is published separately for the use of the English reader, or of such students as may require any further assistance in comprehending the original.

INTRODUCTION.

THOUGH Socrates directed speculation to moral problems, he did not himself construct any definite moral creed. After his death two opposite ethical schools arose. The form that the fundamental problem of morality assumed was : What is the Highest Good, or, the End of life ? This the Megarians maintained to be Knowledge, the Cyrenaics Pleasure. In the *PHILEBUS* these rival doctrines are proposed and examined, and contrasted with Plato's own more comprehensive theory.

It is first inquired whether either Pleasure or Knowledge is the Absolute Good, and fit to be proposed as the End of life.

This question is soon determined. Our preconception of the Highest Good involves three characters. It must be Desirable, Adequate, and Perfect. Neither Pleasure nor Knowledge satisfies these conditions. They are each of them but partial Ends, and a combination of them is clearly a more Perfect Good.

A second problem is next proposed : Which of the two, Pleasure or Knowledge, approaches more nearly to whatever is the Perfect Good.

This problem, like the former, is easily determined by the consideration of three characters assumed to belong to the Perfect Good. These are Truth, Measure, and Beauty, and it is decided with-

out much difficulty that these conditions are satisfied in a higher degree by Knowledge than by Pleasure. This is the whole substance of the dialogue if we only consider the inquiries originally proposed.

Another question, however, though not expressly stated, receives at least a partial solution: What is the exact composition of that Highest Good of which Pleasure and Knowledge are but fractional ingredients? and what kinds of Pleasure and Knowledge are its components?

This question is approached more methodically than the others. At the commencement of the dialogue it is stated, with the solemnity befitting the inauguration of a new Method, that no question can be treated Scientifically without Generalization and Division. To answer, then, the question just proposed we must ascertain the Genera and Species of Pleasure and Knowledge. Accordingly both Pleasures and Sciences are Classified, and this broad distinction is found to run through the species of both, that some are Pure, others Mixed. It is first agreed that the Purest portions of each have the best title to be considered as components of the Highest Good. Besides these, however, all the Mixed kinds of Knowledge, and, even of the Pleasures Mixed with Pain, those that are necessary to life and in allegiance to the virtues, are admitted as elements. The Greatest, however, and the Vicious Pleasures are pronounced to be the Greatest, are thus excluded. So the third ethical problem is solved.

But it is the characteristic of Plato's philosophic

treatment of any subject that it presents the three branches of speculation, Ethical, Logical, Physical inquiries in intimate and organic combination.

The Ethical element we have found in the subject of the problems.

The Dialectical element forms the vestibule of the dialogue, where the doctrine of Method is enunciated in somewhat mystic tones, but with unrivalled impressiveness. The Dialectical Method is afterwards partly exemplified in the Classification of Pleasure and Knowledge.

The Physical or Metaphysical element is introduced by a further application of the Method, the reference of Pleasure and Knowledge to higher Genera. This involves a systematic exposition, with more or less elucidation, of the four great Principles, the Limit, the Infinite, the Product, and the Cause: a list that resumes the highest philosophic abstractions of Plato's predecessors, and was not much varied in subsequent Greek philosophy.

The final comparison, too, of Pleasure and Knowledge assumes a Metaphysical character, as it determines not only their position in respect of the Ethical Good, but, partially at least, in relation to this catholic system of Principles. The highest place in this more general arrangement of things placed in their order of excellence, belongs to nothing within the worldly sphere, but to the Absolute Cause, the Divinity, the Eternal Good and Measure of all perfection. Second is the Perfect Derivative Good, Physical or Moral, the latter of which, the highest End of created life, was the subject of the Ethical problems. The third rank


belongs to the highest kind of Knowledge, Wisdom, or Reason in its apprehension of the highest truth. The fourth rank is assigned to the lower kinds of Knowledge, the Scientific comprehension of truths of a less exalted order. The fifth to the Pure Pleasures. The sixth to such of those Mixed with Pains as are necessary to man's physical existence, and sanctioned by the moral law.

From the wealth of thought which Plato has lavished on this, as indeed on every other subject that he handled, it has been disputed what is the leading idea of the *Philebus*.

It is obvious that the fundamental problem is Ethical, the character of the highest attainable Good. The most distinctive feature of the dialogue, however, is perhaps, not the subject, but the mode of handling the question, the instrument employed for its solution, Classification and Division of the Pleasures and Sciences. That Plato intended to direct the attention to this, we may infer from the emphatic manner in which this is indicated as the true philosophic Method at the commencement of the dialogue. This Classification then, eclipsed as it became in the execution by more striking features, seems to have been the germinal idea of the *Philebus*. It is the portion earliest in development, about which the other members of the organism grow and cluster; the mass in the picture which, though somewhat pale in colour, dominates the composition, as the centre to which the other masses converge or from which they radiate. It is the key applied to determine, partly at least, the elements in the Platonic definition of the Highest Good, or what we

have called, the third Ethical problem. And this again is introduced by a collision of the narrower views of the Cyrenaic and Megarian schools; a collision which assumes the form of the first and second Ethical problems. And the treatment is so broad as to involve a sketch, sufficiently definite to disclose Pythagorean features, of the outlines of a Metaphysical system.

To inquire into the chronology of the *Philebus*, and its connexion with the other dialogues, belongs to a more general consideration of the consecution and relation of Plato's writings. We may observe here that the maturity of views presented by the *Philebus* proves that it is among the latest. Speculations on the End of life, on the Method of Science, on the laws of the Universe, in which we may trace the impulsion of Socrates, of the Megarians, and of the Pythagoreans, are all fused into one philosophic system, and presented in an harmonious artistic form. And, as has been observed, this triple thread of speculation, Ethical, Logical, and Physical, is the badge of Plato's most perfect dialogues. In this respect the *Philebus* may claim to be classed with the *Republic* and *Timæus*. Of this trilogy, however, it is doubtless the least. This is probably due to the subordination in Plato's mind of Ethical to Political philosophy. At all events there is not so full a presentation of Ethical ideas in the *Philebus*, as of Political in the *Republic*, or of Physical in the *Timæus*.



Works by the same Author.

PHILEBUS, a Dialogue of Plato on Pleasure and Knowledge and their relations to the Highest Good, translated into English.

LONDON: J. W. PARKER AND SON, West Strand.

THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE, a translation of the Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Introduction and Notes.

LONDON: FRANCIS MACPHERSON, King William Street.

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ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

Τ. ΙΙ.
ed. Steph.
p. 11.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΟΡΑ δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ’ ήμūν 5
b ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἦ λεγόμενος.
βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα ἐκάτερον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ

4. λόγον...δέχεσθαι] This phrase became a sort of technical term of Dialectic. It appears to have been a custom for one disputant to hand on a thesis to another, who had to defend it, not on his own principles, but on those of the disputant whom he succeeded. *Διὸς οὐ ταῦτα* δόξαν διαφυλάττη ὁ ἀποκριώμενος, δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου διάνοιαν ἀποβλέποντα θετέον ἔκαστα καὶ ἀρνητέον. Ποιοῖσθαι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ παρ’ ἀλλήλων δεχόμενοι τὰς θέσεις στοχάσονται γάρ ὡς ἀν εἴποι ὁ θέμενος. Aristot. Topic. 8, 5. "If the Respondent is defending the opinion of another person, of course he must be guided by the views of that person in the premisses he concedes or denies to the Opponent. And in practice even those who follow another in the defence of a thesis observe this rule, for they are guided by what they

imagine its original advocate would have said.

9. Instead of ἀγαθὸν we should have expected ἄριστον, or τὸ ἀγαθόν. That a Greek might overlook the difference of meaning produced by the article we learn from Aristotle, who thinks it necessary to remind us of the distinction: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὅμοίως θετέον τοὺς ὄρους. Anal. Prior. 1. 40. "To say that Pleasure is a Good and to say that it is The Good are two different propositions, and so must the terms be into which we resolve them." The Stoics, however, would have defended the expression in the text, as they made all Good homogeneous and equal in degree, and recognized no difference between Good and Best or The Good. This view they seem to have

A. Two problems are proposed:
(1) Is Pleasure or Knowledge the Highest Good?

χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ p. 11.
 ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἔστι τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ'
 ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἔστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν
 καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτὸν γενῆ,
 5 δόξαν τε ὁρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε
 ἡδονῆς ἀμείνων καὶ λόγω γίγνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ ε
 αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν
 ὠφελιμώτατον ἀπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ
 ἐσομένοις. Μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὡς Φίληβε,
 10 ἔκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ
 15 καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τάληθες πῃ
 περανθῆναι;

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

d

II. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομόλογησώμεθα

20 καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

(2) If some
other Good
excels both
Pleasure
and Know-

adopted from the Megaric school, whose ethical doctrine is represented by Socrates at the opening of the dialogue. We read in Diogenes Laertius, *οὐτος ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς οὐνομαστι καλούμενον ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θέον, καὶ ἀλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.* 11. 106. “Euclid of Megara said Good was one thing with many names, Wisdom, God, Reason, and the like.” The Cyrenaic school, who identified Good with Pleasure, and allowed of no difference between Pleasures, probably also

would use Good as synonymous with The Good. Possibly, therefore, in omitting the article in the present passage Plato has followed a mode of speaking habitual to the two schools whose opinions are contrasted in the present dialogue with his own.

8. ὠφελιμώτατοι] i. e. not only Better in comparison with Pleasure, but absolutely Best, or the Sovereign Good. This latter proposition is afterwards abandoned.

p. 11. ΣΩ. Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἔξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώπους πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονα παρέχειν. ἀρὸν οὐχ οὔτως;

ledge, is it more nearly allied to Pleasure or to Knowledge?

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὖτὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἀλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῆ; μῶν οὐκ, ἀν μὲν ἡδονῆ μᾶλλον φαίνηται ξυγγενῆς, 10 εἰς ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως p. 12. βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾶ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὔτως ὁμολογούμενά 15 φατε, ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Φιλήβω; τί φῆς;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει. 20

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούσ, ὡς Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἀν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἡ καὶ τούναντίον.

b ΦΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν. 25

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρ-

3. εὐδαιμονα] i. e. the question relates to the theory of Happiness: an intimation that the ensuing dialogue is of an Ethical character.

11. τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως] "That perfectly has this power (of producing happiness)."

20. αὐτὸς γνώσει] "must decide, determine, for yourself;" "must take your own course." So in the Gorgias, with the same expression of impatience: τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; — αὐτὸς γνώσει. Gorgias, p. 505 C.

τυρες ἀν εῖμεν, ώς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἢ λέγεις. Ἀλλὰ δὴ p. 12.
τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔξῆς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ
Φιλήβου ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἀν ἐθέλη πειρώμεθα πε-
ραίνειν.

B. What is
the right
method
of in-
quiry?

Pleasure
is not uni-
form, but
multiform.

5 ΙII. ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἢν
οὐδε 'Αφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαι φησι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθέστα-
τον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν δέος, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ c
ιοτῶν θεῶν ὄνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ
πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν 'Αφροδί-
την, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτη προσαγορεύω τὴν δὲ
ἡδονὴν οἷδα ώς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἴπον, ἀπ'
ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν
15 ἡντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως
ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δίπου παντοίας εἴληφε καὶ
τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ίδε γάρ, ἡδεσθαι
μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἡδεσθαι δὲ d
καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν ἡδεσθαι
20 δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπί-
δων μεστόν, ἡδεσθαι δὲ αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ
φρονεῖν καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκατέρας πῶς ἀν
τις ὄμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαί-
νοιτο ἐνδίκως;

25 ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὡς Σώκρατες,

15. ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς]
"to judge primâ facie from the
singleness of her name." The
meaning of the phrase appears
from Demosth. Lept., quoted
by Stahlbaum: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ-
τωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι λόγου τινὰ ἔχον
εἰ δέ τις ἀκριβῶς ἔξετάσει, ψεῦδος
ἀν δν φανεῖ. A parallel passage

in the Symposium shows that
οὕτως ἀπλῶς must be taken to-
gether: οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ προ-
βεβλῆσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ δπλῶς
οὕτω παρηγγέλθαι ἐγκωμιάζειν "Ἐ-
ρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἦν δῆς "Ἐρως, κα-
λῶς ἀν εἰχε, νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
εἰς. p. 180 C.

p. 12. αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονή μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἀνεῖη, τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἔαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὡς δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸν τοῦτον διοίσει, τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τότε γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιότατον ὃν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταῦτον· γένει μέν ἔστι πᾶν ἔν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντι-

p. 13. ώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητα ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει. καὶ πόλλα ἔτερα οὕτως ἔχονθεν εὐρήσομεν, ὡστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιότατα ἐν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθεν ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἔτε-

12. λόγῳ] “mode, method, of reasoning,” i. e. only regarding the generic element in pleasures. *Λόγος* is sometimes used for the form, principle, or artifice of an argument, or objection to an argument, abstracted from the particular matter. In this sense all arguments that are the application of the same logical canon, that fall under the same head or locus communis, are one and the same *λόγος*. Immediately below *λόγος* seems to mean thesis or original proposition (that all Pleasures are Good). It may however have the same sense as before: “proof,” “argument,” “syllogism,” or rather, “defence” or “enstasis,” (that Pleasures may have a common property, Good, as they have a common genus, Pleasure.) The

Metaphysical principle upon which this Logical method is based is presently discussed, and is also called *λόγος*. See p. 14 c.

17. Ὄτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἔτερῳ, φήσομεν, ὄντοματι] “because the predicate (*ὄνομα*) you apply to them, dissimilar as they are, is distinct (*ἔτερον*) from the subject.” If Pleasures are opposite species of one genus, we can say all Pleasures are Pleasure, i. e. predicate one genus of all of them; but we have a slight presumption against any other general proposition of the form all Pleasures are *X*; because if *X* is connected with the specific difference of one Pleasure it will be excluded by the specific difference of another. The question accordingly will be, in the language of Logicians, whether

ρω, φήσομεν, ὄνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι p. 13. τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδὲις ἀμφισβητεῖ κακὰ δὲ ὅντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως [πάντα] σὺ προσ-
5 αγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὅμοιοιν ἀνόμοια εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ, εἴ τις σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτον ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὅμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἵτινες γάρ τινα
10 συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τάγαθόν, εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινας ἀγαθὰς ε
ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. Ἐλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλή-
λαις εἶναι καὶ τινας ἐναντίας.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὕτι καθ' ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρωταρχε. οὐδὲ ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὄμοιας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισό-
20 μεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἄπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἄμα νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιο-
25 τάτῳ πάντων ὄμοιότατον, ἔξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν,

X is the specific property of one special Pleasure or the generic property of all Pleasures. Protarchus of course must maintain that Goodness is connected with the generic element in Pleasures. In inviting Protarchus to point out this, Socrates, to try his acuteness, attempts what was afterwards

called the fallacy Plurimum Interrogationum, i. e. so frames his question that Protarchus cannot answer it simply without conceding the point in debate.

19. *πεισόμεθα*] A happy emendation of Badham for the *πειρασόμεθα* of the Zurich edition. The Bodleian MS. gives *πειρόμεθα*.

p. 13. καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος
ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οὐχίστεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώ-
μεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἀνιόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἵσως ἀν πως
ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαμεν.

ε ΠΡΩ. Λέγε πῶς;

IV. ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον,
ῳ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ'
όπόστα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἰπον ἀγαθόν, διε- 10
ρωτώμενος ὃ τί ποτέ ἔστι τάγαθόν, ἀρ' οὐ ταῦτὸν
πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλαὶ τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν
εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις. εἰ δὲ καὶ 15

p. 14. ἐναντίαι πη γίγνονται τινες, ἀρα ἄξιος ἀν εἴην τοῦ
διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν
ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμη γίγνεσθαι, κα-
πειθ' ἡμῖν οὖτος ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος
οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζούμεθα ἐπί τινος ἀλογίας; 20

ΠΡΩ. Άλλ' οὐ μήν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ
σωθῆναι. τό γε μήν μοι ἵσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ
λόγου ἀρέσκει πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γι-
γνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

20. ἀλογίας] The “breach of
the laws of disputation” which
Socrates here deprecates, i. e.
refusing to admit an evident
truth, bore in the Dialectical
code the name of Δυσκολία. εἰ
οὖν μήτε ἀντειχειρέν ἔχων μήτε
ἐμιστάσθαι οὐ τίθησι, δῆλον ὅτι
δυσκολαίνει. ἔστι γάρ η ἐν λόγοις
δυσκολία ἀπόκρισις παρὰ τοὺς εἰ-
ρημένους τρόπους συλλογισμοῦ

φθαρτική. Arist. Topic. 8. 7. “A
Respondent who refuses to admit
an Opponent's premiss, though he can neither meet it
by an adverse Syllogism nor by
an adverse Instance, incurs the
reproach of Perversity. For
Perversity in Dialectic is an
answer preventing an adverse
syllogism by any but these two
methods.”

Science
also is not
uniform,
but multi-
form.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τοῦ p. 14. ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, το κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχομένω μηνύσωσι, πότερον ἡδονὴν τάγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἡ φρόνησιν ἡ [τι] τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἡ ταῦθ' ἡ σύ, τῷ δὲ ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

Unity and
Multipli-
city are
sometimes
found to
coincide,
and their
coinci-
dence has
been made
the subject
of certain
celebrated
paradoxes :
and one
case of it
occasions
the funda-
mental
problem of
the philo-
sophy of
Ideas.

10 ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δὶς ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσάμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἔκοντί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.

15 ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὀποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.

20 ΠΡΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρώταρχον, ἔνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

25 ΣΩ. Σὺ μέν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡδη, μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια

3. ἐλεγχομένω (sub. τῷ ἀγαθῷ) was probably altered by the transcriber into ἐλεγχόμενοι, the reading of the MSS. and retained in the Zurich edition,

on account of the plural μηνύσωσι which follows.

20. Ἡρ' οὖν λέγεις, &c.] See Appendix A.

p. 14. καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων ε γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄμα μέρη διελῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἐν ὡς 5 πολλά ἔστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτερα λέγεις, ἀ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;

p. 15. ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων 10 τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς ἐπομεν. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ὅπερ ἐπομεν νῦν δή, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν. ὅταν δέ τις ἔνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἔνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τού- 15 των τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

b ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονά-

10. Ὁπόταν ὦ παῖ, κ.τ.λ.] The Zenonian identity of unity and multiplicity is involved in all Proposition, whether scientific or unscientific, and is the identification of the one individual Subject with its many Predicates. That which forms the motto of Plato's dialectic implies Classification, that is to say, the commencement of science, and is the identity of the one Species with the many Individuals which it comprehends. In Zeno's view Socrates is one as a subject, and at the same time many things—Wise, Brave, Athenian, &c.—in respect of his attributes. In Plato's view

Socrates, Callias, Coriscus are many as individuals, and at the same time one in respect of Man, their common species. In Zeno's paradox the unity is the individual, Protarchus ; in Plato's, Protarchus the individual is part of the multiplicity, and the unity is Man, the universal. Ἐνα ἄνθρωπον therefore is opposed to ἔνα Πρώταρχον above. Διαιρεσίς, logical division, the cause of multiplicity, is the opposite of συναγωγή, generalization, the process which terminates in unity.

18. Πρῶτον μὲν... γίγνεσθαι] This embarrassing passage is satisfactorily explained by Bad-

δας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὕσας· εἴτα πῶς αὖ ταύ- p. 15.
τας, μίαν ἔκαστην οὐσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε
γένεσιν μήτε ὅλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἰναι
βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνο-
μένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ
γεγονοῦντα θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρίς· ὃ δὴ
πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φάνοιτ' αὖ, ταύτον καὶ ἐν ἄμα
ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὡς Πρώ-
τοταρχε, ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα
καὶ εὐπορίας ἀν αὖ καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν
τῷ νῦν πρώτον διαπονήσασθαι;

15 ΣΩ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην αὖ.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγ-
χωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δὲ ἵσως
κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κεί-
μενον.

VI. ΣΩ. Εἰεν. πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται d
20 πολλῆς οὕσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα
μάχης; ἀρ' ἐνθένδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταύτον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων

ham. There are not three problems proposed, as might appear at first sight, but only two. "Ομως refers to nothing in its own clause but to the next, and gives μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο the force of, *and yet*. The first problem, then, is, Have the ideas a real existence? The second, How are we to reconcile their unity with their apparent division or multiplication in the

world of sense?

17. μὴ κινεῖν Φίληβον εὖ κεί-
μενον] is an allusion to the pro-
verb μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον,
and below, πάντα κινεῖ λόγον,
"leaves not a syllogism un-
turned," is an allusion to the
phrase πάντα κινεῖν λίθον.

23. ταύτον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ²
λόγων γιγνόμενα] "dialectical
identifications of Unity and
Plurality;" "conversions by lo-

The discovery of
Unity in
Multiplicity, and
Multiplicity in
Unity, and
the reduction of
Multiplicity to
Number, is
the true
process of
Science.

p. 15. γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἔκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηται ποτε οὔτε ἥρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ 5 ε γενσάμενος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὡς τινα σοφίας εὐρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἥδονῆς ἐνθουσιά τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἀσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἔν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα 10 καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δὲ ἀεὶ τὸν ἔχόμενον, ἢν τε νεώτερος ἢν τε πρεσβύτερος ἢν τε ἥλιξ ὡν τυγχάνῃ,

p. 16. φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς 15 ἢν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἐρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ', ω̄ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου ξυνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῆς; ὅμως δέ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὁ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι 20 καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ b λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο

gic of Unity into Plurality, and Plurality into Unity." Perhaps ὑπὸ λόγων alludes to the "magic words" by which the sorcerers of epic fable effect their transformations. As Plato has already dismissed the Eleatics and Megarici, he seems here to be ridiculing his own disciples for trifling with his Dialectical paradox.

4. τῶν λόγων...πάθος] "an incident of reason." Plato explains in the Sophista that Zeno's paradox is an incident of all reasoning: his own being based on the relation of Universal to Particular belongs chiefly to scientific reasoning. See Appendix A.

22. εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν] as if it were an ἀλάστωρ.

καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ p. 16.
σμικρὸς ὁ παρὸν λόγος, ὥς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὥς παῦδες, ὡς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσ-
αγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὄδος οὐδ’
τὸν γένοιτο, ἡς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἴμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ
με ἥδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὗτη; λέγεσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι ε
δὲ παγχάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἔχόμενα
το ἀνευρέθη πώποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει
δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε κατα-
φαίνεται ἔμοι, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμη-
15 θέως ἄμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί. καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί,
κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην
φήμην παρέδοσαν, ως ἔξ ἐνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν
δοντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἴναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν
ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἔχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων
20 οὗτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδεῖν περὶ παντὸς δ
ἐκάστοτε θεμένους ζῆτεῖν· εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.
ἔαν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί,
σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρεῖς ἡ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ
τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἔκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἄν

16. ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] a fragment of the Niobe of what this means appears from Aeschylus:

Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι,
οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς, δῶν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
Διὸς πατρόφου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,
κοῦπω σφιν ἔξιτηλον αἷμα δαμόνων.

24. τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἔκαστον] This
is ungrammatical. The sense
requires something like τὸν ἐν
ἔκεινων (τῶν ἰδεῶν) ἔκαστη (ἀριθ-
μόν) ορ, τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ (τῷ ἀριθμῷ)

p. 16. τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἵδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπόσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἵδεαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὸν ἄν τις τὸν εἰ ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δὴ δεῖ τὸ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν

p. 17. ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μέν, ὅπως ἀν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ ¹⁰ τὸ ἐν ἀπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

VII. ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μέν πως, ὡς Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἀ λέγεις ¹⁵ ἀκοῦσται.

ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μήν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὁ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸν ἐν τούτοις ^β οἶσπερ καὶ πεπαιδευσται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν [ἡμῖν] ἐστί που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἀπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἔκαστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, ²⁵

9. ἐν μὲν ὅπως ἀν τύχωσι] ἐν καὶ πολλὰ seems equivalent to ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, and to express a single idea, "the Manifold One." See below, περὶ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν. To generalize too rapidly is to suppose what is heterogeneous to be homogeneous; to generalize too slowly to suppose

what is homogeneous to be heterogeneous.

25. Καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμεν] So the Bodleian MS. For the use of ἐν compare ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ παιδείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης πως ἔχειν) ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν. Gorgias, p. 470. The Zurich editors read καὶ οὐδέν, κ. τ. λ.

The theory of Music furnishes an example how Scientific knowledge implies a certain power of Numeration, and a gradual progress by successive Division from Unity through definite Number to Infinity.

οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἵσμεν οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν· ἀλλ' p. 17.
ὅτι πόσα τέ ἔστι καὶ ὡποῖα· τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ γραμμα-
τικὸν ἔκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὁ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν,
τουτ' ἔστι ταῦτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μέν που κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἔστι c
μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὕ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν, βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμό-
τονον. ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕπω σοφὸς ἀν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν
15 εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὡς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς
ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔστι.

9. μία ἐν αὐτῇ] This seems corrupt. The context requires something equivalent to καὶ ἄπειρος ἀν πλήθει.

12. Pitch (*τάσις*) is the degree of acuteness or gravity of a sound. Perhaps to make ὀξὺ and βαρὺ correspond to ὁμότονον, "of the same pitch," we should translate them as if they were comparatives, as Acuter and Graver. Interval (*διάστημα*) is the distance between two sounds of different pitch. "Οροι seems to mean the extreme limits of pitch within which the whole scale of sounds is included. Τόνος, tone, is an interval of a certain length, that through which the voice is naturally raised at one effort. Σύστημα, system, e. g. the Tetrachord or Octachord, is a series or scale of sounds separated from one

another by various intervals. The Genus of a system depends on the magnitude of the intervals between the sounds, e. g. in the Diatonic genus the three intervals between the sounds of the Tetrachord were a semitone, a tone, a tone. In the Chromatic a semitone, a semitone, a tone and a half: in the Enharmonic a quartertone, a quartertone, a double tone. The Species of a genus is the order in which these intervals occur: e. g. in the Diatonic genus of the Tetrachord the order might be semitone, tone, tone: or tone, semitone, tone: or tone, tone, semitone. The Species were also called Modes, or Harmonies, and were named Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Ionic, &c. Plato here uses System as equivalent to Species.

p. 17. ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ', ὡς φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα ἔστι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὁξύτητός τε πέρι δ καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τὸν ὄρους τῶν διαστήμάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἀς κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ήμιν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἀρμονίας, ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτοῦ σώματος ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα, πάθη, γιγνόμενα, ἀ δὴ δὶς ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασὶ ρύθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἄμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὗτω δεῖ περὶ 10 παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῦν· ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτά τε εἰ λάβης ὁὗτω, τότε ἐγένουσι σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων ἐν ὄτιοῦν ταύτη σκοπούμενος ἔλησι, οὗτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας. τὸ δ' ἄπειρον σε ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρου ἐκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ 15 φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγυμον οὐδὲ ἐνάριθμον, ἀτέοντας οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.

VIII. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα, ὡς Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

p. 18. ΦΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε 20 πρὸς ήμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ήμᾶς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἡρώτηκε Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ. 25

ΣΩ. Δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὄτιοῦν εἴ τις ποτε

8. ἐνόντα, πάθη, γιγνόμενα] An asyndeton. The Zurich editors read without interpunctuation: ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα. Perhaps the true reading is, ἐνόντα μάθης

καὶ γιγνόμενα.

16. οὐκ ἐλλόγυμον οὐδὲ ἐναρίθμον] An allusion to an oracle given to the Mégarians:

ἥ μεις δὲ Μεγαρέis οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι οὔτε δυωδέκατοι, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

The Alphabet furnishes an example of a progress by successive Generalization, from Infinity through definite Number to Unity.

λάθοι, τοῦτον, ὡς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρον φύσιν δεῖ p. 18.
 βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπί τινα ἀριθμὸν, οὗτω καὶ τού-
 ναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῆ πρῶτον λαμ-
 βάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὖτις
 5 πλῆθος ἔκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ
 πάντων εἰς ἐν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦν
 λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις
 10 θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ
 Θεύθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ
 φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὅντα ἀλλὰ
 πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἐτέρα φωνῆς μὲν οὕ, φθόγγου δὲ
 μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· ε
 15 τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγό-
 μενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τά τε ἄφθογγα
 καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἔκαστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ
 τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἔως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν

4. μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ'
 ἀριθμὸν αὖτις τινα πλῆθος ἔκαστον
 ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν.] "Ἐχοντα is
 equivalent to βλέποντα, and the
 construction is μὴ ἔχοντα ἐ. τ. ἐ.
 ἐ. ἀ. ἐ. ἀ. τ. κ. π. ἐ. τ. " looking
 not at first for unity, but for
 some number, detect each sepa-
 rate multitude, (i. e. each unit
 of this number.)" Thus in the
 Alphabetic generalization, the
 number of species is (say) 24,
 and each of these 24 is a mul-
 titude or infinity of individual
 sounds.

9. Plato makes a similar
 division of the Letters in the
 Cratylus: ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐτω
 δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διε-
 λέσθαι ἔπειτα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ εἶδο
 τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα· οὐτωσὶ

γάρ που λέγονται οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ¹
 τούτων καὶ τὰ αὖτις φωνήεντα μὲν οὖν
 οὐ μέντος γε ἄφθογγα, p. 421 C.
 In the Theaetetus he uses ψόφος
 for φθόγγος. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σύγμα
 τῶν ἄφωνων ἔστι, ψόφος τις μόνον
 οἰον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ
 δ' αὖ βῆτα οὐτε φωνὴ οὐτε ψόφος,
 οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων, p.
 203 B. What Plato calls ἄφωνα,
 later Grammarians called σύμ-
 φωνα (consonants) reserving the
 name ἄφωνα (mutes) to those
 which he calls ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα,
 (π, β, φ, κ, γ, χ, τ, δ, θ.) What
 he calls μέσα, or, φωνήεντα μὲν
 οὖν, οὐ μέντος γε ἄφθογγα, they
 called ἡμίφωνα, (semivowels, i. e.
 the liquids λ, μ, ν, ρ, and the
 sibilant σ.)

π. 18. λαβὼν ἐνί τε ἐκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχείον ἐπωνόμασε. καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἀνίστητο καθ' αὐτὸν ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὐτὸν λογισάμενος ὡς ὅντα ἔνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν πασι ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

ΦΙ. Ταῦτα ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δὲ αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἐμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

5. μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών] “assuming there was only one over them he called it by name the Grammatical art.” Voltaire complains that no language has a single term to denote the theory of the Alphabet. In Plato's time we see it was called *γραμματική*. In the time of Aristotle *γραμματική* signified the art of Reading and Writing: ἔτι, εἰ πρὸς πλείω λεγομένου τοῦ ὀριζομένου μὴ πρὸς πάντα ἀπέδωκεν· φίλον εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ γράψαι τὸ ὑπαγορευθέν προσδεῖται γάρ, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι οὐδὲν γάρ μᾶλλον τοῦ γράψαι ή τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι διάποδος δριστας· φαστού οὐδέτερος, ἀλλ' διμφω ταῦτα εἰπών, ἐπειδὴ πλείους οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀρισμὸς εἶναι, Topic. 6, 5. “A definition is incorrect if the thing defined relates to several points, and only some of them are mentioned: e.g. if a man defines Grammar to be the art of Writing from dictation; for ‘and of Reading’ requires to be added. For he no more defines it who calls it the art of Writing, than he who calls it the art of Reading. Therefore neither of the two have defined it, but he who mentions both.

For the same thing cannot have more than one definition.” When however the professors of the art of Reading and Writing began to teach the rules of speaking and composing correctly, the name Grammar was consecrated to this latter part of their instruction, thus acquiring its modern signification, while the art of Reading and Writing was designated by the humbler title of Grammatica. When afterwards the Grammatistæ began to teach the rules of Grammar, the Grammatici undertook the interpretation and criticism of the classical literature, and thus Grammatica came to denote a higher kind of science than we now ascribe to the mere Grammarian.

8. The impatience of Logical discussions expressed by Philebus is not without its significance. Aristippus, whose views he represents, rejected Logic and Physics from Philosophy: δοκούστι δὲ κατά τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρίης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἡθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εἰδαιμόνιος βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7, 11.

ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὡς Φιληθε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' p. 18. ἔστιν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γε ἥδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῆς, πάλαι;

ΦΙ. Πῶς;

IX. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἥδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὅπότερον αὐτοῦ αἱρετέον;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῦ εἶναι φαμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἔστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ p. 19. 15 ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἔκαστα γεγονέναι;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὡς Φίληθε, οὐκ οἰδ' ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν 20 ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. οὕτως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελούστερον δ' οἷμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι· σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν. b 25 εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἥδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὅπόσα ἔστὶ καὶ ὅποια· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὡς παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ ὄμοίου καὶ 30 ταῦτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμῆνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἀν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὗτως, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. e

Applying
this me-
thod to the
solution of
the present 10
questions,
we ought to
begin by in-
quiring
how many
and what
are the
various spe-
cies of Plea-
sure and
Science.
The first
problem is
restated.

p. 19. ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. τί δή μοι τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν, ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι 5 τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἀριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ' ὅπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἔστι, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνά ἔστιν, ἀπολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς 10 ἀναμιμήσκομεν ἐκόντες, ὄρθως δρῶντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἐκάτερα βασανίζηται. φῆσ δ' ὡς ἔοικε σὺ τὸ προστρηθησόμενον ὄρθως ἀμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖτα τούτων ξυγγενῆ, ἀπτάσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὴ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκατέρων λεχθέντων 15 ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἡπειλήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἀν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἵκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὴ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἐδῶκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαντόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, 20 εἰ καθάπερ οἱ παιδεῖς, ὅτι τῶν ὄρθως δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔστι. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

p. 20. ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὡν μὴ δυναίμεθ' ἀν ἵκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δι- 25 δόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύον δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἰδῆ σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἡ καὶ ἐατέον, εἰ πῃ καθ' ἔτερόν 30 τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εῖ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ

τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὗτως εἰπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει^b ^{p. 20.}
ρήθεν λύει πάντα φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν
τοῖς μνήμην τιὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ήμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

It may be solved, however, without employing the scientific method, by the consideration that the Highest Good has three attributes: it is Perfect, Sufficient, and Desirable: and that nei-

5. Χ. ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὅναρ
ἡ καὶ ἐγρηγορὸς νῦν ἐννοῶ περὶ τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρο-
νήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο
τι τρίτον, ἔτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καὶ
τοιοῦτό γε ἀν ἐναργῶς ήμῖν φανῆ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται^c
10 μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀν ἔτι ταῦτὸν
αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαιρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐ-
δὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δ' ἔτι
15 σαφέστερον δείξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.

1. τὸν ἐμεῖ] Plato is fond of joining the article to a pronoun as if it were a noun, e. g. ἔδοξέ που, φησι, τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ
ἡ ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ ὃς εἴπε, τὸν ἑαυτὸν
δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς. Phædrus. The effect can hardly be reproduced in another language. In the present instance Socrates speaks of himself as a third person: "An intimidated individual here need no longer fear any danger."

5. λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκού-
σας ὅναρ] The conceptions of the highest Good, and other anticipations of reason that cannot be drawn from experience, Plato sometimes, as in the present passage, in accordance with his doctrine of preexistence and innate ideas, treats as reminiscences (*ἀνάμνησις*). At other times he speaks of them as prophecies or divinations, e. g. (*τάγαθον*) δὴ διώκει μὲν ἀπαστα-

ψυχὴ καὶ τούτον ἔνεκα πάντα πράτ-
τει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀπο-
ροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα λαβεῖν ίκα-
νῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρή-
σασθαι μονίμῳ. Repub. p. 515, e. See also p. 44, c and 67, e of this dialogue. Even Aristotle sometimes makes the divinations of the heart or feelings (*μαντείαι*) grounds of ethical and theological reasoning, e. g. τά-
γαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον
εἶναι μαντεύομεθα. Eth. Nich. 1,
5. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν
θεῶν μόνος ἀν ἔχομεν οὐτως δρο-
λογούμενος ἀποφαίνεσθαι συμφώ-
ντος λόγους. De Cœlo, 2, 1. This
μαντεία was that the Gods live a
blessed life not devoid of wise
repose, ζῶσιν ἀλυτον καὶ μακαρίαν
ποτ ἀσχολον καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγέ-
την ῥάστωντος ἔμφρονος. How this
appeal to μαντείαι can be reconciled with Anal. Post. 2, 19, which
seems to refer all knowledge to
sensation, becomes a question.

p. 20. ΣΩ. Σμίκρον ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;

d ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δή που τελεώτατον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ίκανὸν τάγαθόν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτή-

ther Plea-
sure nor
Know-
ledge, if is-
olated, sa-
tisfies
these con-
ditions;
so that the
life that
combines
them both
is more
Perfect
than the
life that
consists of
either
alone.

12. ἐλεῖν] This verb implies *aipetōn*, which is presently used to denote the third preconception. The three ideas *τέλεον*, *ίκανόν* (= *αἴταρκες*, see section 42) *aipetōn*, are nearly the same, and only one of them, *aipetōn*, is used as the middle term of the syllogism that excludes Pleasure and Wisdom from the rank of supreme Good. *Τέλειον*, *αἴταρκες*, *aipetōtaton*, are three terms selected by Aristotle at the commencement of his ethical inquiry to characterize the highest Good.

(1) *Τέλειον* he thus defines; *τελειότερον* δε λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἔτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο *aipetōn* τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' *aipetōn* καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ *τέλειον* τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ *aipetōn* δεῖ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Eth. Nich. 1, 7. "What is desired for itself is more final than what is desired as a means, and what is never desired as a means than what is desired both as a means and as an end. That is absolutely final which is always desired as an end and never as a means." Perhaps,

however, Plato uses *τέλεον* in the ordinary sense of Perfect rather than in the more technical sense of Final.

(2) Τὸ δὲ *αἴταρκες τίθεμεν* δο μονούμενον *aipetōn* ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεῖ. Ibid. "That is Selfsufficing which by itself alone makes life desirable and free from want."

(3) "Ετι δὲ πάντων *aipetωτάτην* (τὸν εὐδαμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι) μὴ συναριθμουμένην" συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς *aipetωτέραν* μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ibid. [μὴ συναριθμουμένην = μονούμενην, or, in the language of the Philebus, χωρίς, or ἀμικτον οὐσαν] "Happiness is most to be chosen of all single goods: still more to be chosen, of course, when in combination with even the least other good." [Aristotle, unlike the Stoics, made human happiness affected to a certain extent by good and ill fortune, and consequently a variable quantity. When therefore, in consequence of the frowns of fortune, it is at its minimum, or at any degree short of its maximum, of course it is susceptible

σασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν p. 20. ἀποτελουμένων ἡμα ἀγαθοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ ε 5 τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;

ΣΩ. Μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἔστι τάγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· 10 δεόμενον δ' ἀν φανῆ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν.

p. 21.

of augmentation from a return of her favour.] Αἰρετόν, we have seen, enters into the definition both of the Final and of the Satisficing ; but it also has a distinctive technical meaning which may be easily overlooked. In its distinctive sense it expresses what is relatively, rather than what is absolutely, good : what is indispensable at the moment, under the circumstances, or to the individual, rather than what is abstractedly desirable. In the following passage it is opposed to τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας· τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βέλτιω, ἐνύπτε δὲ καὶ αἰρετώτερα... ἐνύπτε δὲ τὰ βέλτιω οὐχὶ καὶ αἰρετώτερα, τὸ γάρ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἰρετώτερον τῷ ἐνδεεῖ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τὸ δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἔστιν ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλα τινὰ προσπαρασκευάζηται τῶν καλῶν. σχεδὸν δὲ ἵστως αἰρετώτερον τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας. Arist. Top. 3, 2. "Superfluities are better and sometimes more to be chosen than necessities. For what is better is not always to be preferred. So philosophic thought is better than money making but not more to be chosen by a man in want of the

necessaries of life. Superfluities are graces of life over and above and additional to its necessities, and generally the necessary is more to be chosen, though the superfluous is better." We must not however suppose that τὸ αἴρετόν always means material goods; for in the next passage τὰ αἴρετα, as implied in αἴρεισθαι, are opposed to τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, i. e. material prosperity : ὁ ἀδικος περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία· ἀ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς δεῖ ἀγαθὰ τινὶ δὲ οὐκ δεῖ· οἱ δὲ ἀνθρωποι ταῦτα εἴχονται καὶ δώκουσι, δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἴχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ είναι, αἴρεισθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά. Eth. Nich. 5, 1. "The goods at which the unjust grasp are those in fortune's power, which though always absolutely good (good, that is, to those who have the virtue to make the right use of them) are not always good relatively to the individual. Men pray for these and choose these, though they ought not, but ought to pray that what is absolutely good may be good relatively to them, and choose the relatively good."

p. 21.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἄν, Πρόταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἀπαντα
τα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῦσι, εἰ
τοῦτ' ἔχοις παντελῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὁρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογί-
ζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὅσσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ
δέοι' ἄν τι;ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαί-
ρειν ἔχων.ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγί-
στας ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ
δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρώτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό,
εἰ ἡ χαίρεις ἡ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δή πού σε ἀγνοεῖν,
κενόν γε ὅντα πάσης φρονήσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

c ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον
ἀνάγκη δήπου μηδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς
τ' ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ'
ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτη-
μένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ
δὲ στερόμενον μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ως χαρή-13. μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι] This is Badham's emendation of μηδὲ
όραν τι, the reading of the MSS.

σεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου p. 21.
βίον ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετ' α
δόστρεῖνων ἔμψυχά ἔστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ
παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλως πως διανοηθῆναι;

5 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐάρ' οὖν αἴρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὡς Σώκρατες,
οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ

The second 10 μεταλαβόντες αὐτὸν βίον ἴδωμεν.

problem is
restated:
Is Pleasure
or Knowledge
more
nearly al-
lied to the
principle of
Goodness
in the Per-
fect life?

XI. ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἀν αὐτὸν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν
καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων
κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμι-
15 κρὸν, μηδ' αὐτὸν λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθῆς πάν-
των τῶν τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τού-
των αἴρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλῳ μή πότε, ως ἐγὼμα, φανῆ. p. 22.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφότερος, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμ-
20 φοῖν συμμιχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δῆπον τοῦτον γε αἴρήσεται πρότερον
ἡ ἔκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε, οὐχ ὁ
25 μέν ὁ δ' οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅ τι νῦν ἡμῖν ἔστι τὸ ξυμ-
βαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προύτεθη- b
σαν, τοῦ δυοῦν δ' οὐδέτερος ἰκανὸς οὐδὲ αἴρετὸς οὔτ'
30 ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζώων οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἥδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ως
οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἀν ἰκανὸς καὶ

p. 22. τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἱρετός, οἵσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἥρειθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἀν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας η τιος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

5

ΠΡΩ. Ἐοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταῦτὸν καὶ τάγαθόν, ίκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔστι το τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἔξει που ταῦτα ἐγκλήματα.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν, ὡς Φίληβε, ὁ γ' ἐμός οὐ μέντοι

3. ἄκων ἀξ ἀγνοίας η τιος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος] A wrong choice may be regarded as involuntary when it proceeds from the blindness (*ἀγνοία*) of a depraved will (*πονηρία*) or the violence (*ἀνάγκη*) of passions overpowering the control of reason (*ἀκρασία*). To apply the term *ἀκούσιον* (involuntary) to this class of actions is a peculiarity of Plato.

7. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν] Aristotle alludes to this argument in the following terms : πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον η μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δῆ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τάγαθον αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι μετὰ φρονήσεως τὸν ἡδονὴν βίου η χωρίς εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρέεῖτον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθόν, οὐδένος γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τάγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, Eth. Nich. 10. 2. "Every Good is better in combination with others than alone, which indeed is the very argument by which Plato proves Pleasure not to be the highest Good. For the Pleasant life is more desirable with Wisdom

than without. But, if the combination is better, Pleasure is not The Good, for no addition can improve The Good." It may be observed that the proposition, οὐδένος προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τάγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, is not to be found in the Philebus, and does not even belong to the train of thought in which the argument proceeds. For the preconception which forms the middle term whereby Socrates proves Pleasure not to be The Good is *aipetón* : *τέλεον* was prepared for use but was not actually used. The proposition given by Aristotle could only have been a premiss, if *τέλεον* had been the middle term. Perhaps, however, it is implied in section 37, where the argument is recapitulated.

12. οὐ μέντοι τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἄμα καὶ θεὸν οἷμαι νοῦν] The explanation of this short allusion to the result of much speculation can be merely sketched in the brief space of a note. Plato generally distinguishes Reason from the Ideas or eter-

τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἄμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' p. 22.
ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν

nal Realities which it apprehends, and which in the Phædrus are represented as objects of beatific contemplation to the Gods. As the Supreme Good is an Idea, how can it, as is intimated in this passage, be identical with Reason? The answer is that there are two kinds even of the divine Reason, one distinct from, the other identical with, eternal Being. We read in the Sophista: *τί δὲ, πρὸς Διὸς, ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἡ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὅντι μὴ παρέιναι ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀγαλμὸν νοῦν οὐν ἔχον ἀκίνητον ἔστος εἶναι; Δεινὸν μέντ' ἀν λόγου συγχωροῦμεν*, p. 248 E. "Shall we be easily convinced that the Absolute Being has neither motion, nor life, nor soul, nor wisdom, but stands, majestic and holy as it is, reasonless and motionless? It cannot be thought." As there is no ground to suppose that Aristotle differed from Plato as to the relation of the divine and human Reason, and as the statements of the former are more explicit, we will avail ourselves of them to solve the difficulty we have proposed. One Reason is Passive, the other Active, and the latter is identical with eternal Being. The Passive Reason is so called not as being devoid of activity or spontaneous power, but as being, like physical causes, a secondary force, dependent for its powers on the Active Reason. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ σπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἔστι τι τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἔκαστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα*

δυνάμει ἔκεινα) ἔτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταῖς τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, δὲ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα, *De Anima*, 3. 5. "As in the rest of nature we everywhere find in every class both a material, which is the class potentially, and a causative and creative agent, which is the class creatively, related to the former as art to what it works upon, so in the mental world analogous elements must exist; the Psychical Reason is manifested by becoming all things, the other by creating them, being itself an actuality, analogous to light in its conversion of potential colours into actual colours." The Passive intellect he calls in another passage more expressly the Psychical intellect. *Οὐ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, λέγω δὲ νοῦν φῶ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐδέν ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὸν νοεῖν*, ib. 3, 4. "The Psychical intellect, I mean the thinking and apprehending power of the Soul, is nothing actually till it thinks." We see then that Aristotle would have objected to the expression of the Sophista so far as it attributes Movement (*κίνησις*) and Soul to the Absolute, as there is an element higher than the Soul and Psychical Reason. It is this latter that we must ascribe to the gods of the Phædrus and

p. 22. κοινὸν βίου οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὄρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῦν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν. τάχα γὰρ ἀν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ' ἀν ἔκατερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ οὗτο τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἀν 5 εἴη, τάχα δ' ἀν αἴτιον τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὁ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἴρετὸς ἄμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγγε- 10 ε νέστερον καὶ ὄμοιότερόν ἔστι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὗτ' ἀν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὐτὸν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορρὸτέρω δέ ἔστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

15

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπτεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη
p. 23. κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν 20

Timaeus. Of the Active intellect he thus speaks: *ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὁ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἴτιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσία. κινεῖ δὲ ὁδε τὸ ὄρεκτόν. καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον. τούτων δὲ τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά...βούλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλὸν, ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ ὅτι δοκεῖ. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται...ώστε ταῦτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν, Met. 11, 7.* "There is an immovable source of motion, eternal, substantive, actual. This is the way the objects of Volition and Reason move, which are ultimately the same, namely, the absolute Beauty. The will is moved by

the (Passive) Reason; the (Passive) Reason is moved by the object of Reason; the object of Reason is the (Active) Reason." Thus, as Socrates suggests in the Philebus, Reason in the sense of the *νοητόν*, or the *νοῦς ποιητικός*, may be identified with the *ὄν καλόν*, or Supreme Good. However, after this passing allusion to his philosophic doctrine, Plato in the remainder of the dialogue treats of the Reason in its usual sense of the Psychical, Subjective, Passive, or Human intellect.

άν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντά- p. 23.
πασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς
ἔραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ’ ἀν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο
καλή.

5 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀμεινον αὐτὴν ἔαν ἥδη καὶ μὴ
τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῆς προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ
ἔξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ^aΑρ’ ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἴπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; b
10 ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς
οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἀν εἰς τέλος ἐπε-
ξέλθης τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαθαὶ ἄρα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου
τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥάδιον πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ
15 γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα
ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἐτερα τῶν
ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἵστως ἔνια καὶ ταῦτα. οὐκ-
οῦν χρῆ;

17. ἔστι δὲ ἵστως ἔνια καὶ ταῦτα]
As “weapons serviceable in both contests” Socrates seems
to refer to the proposition that
all being is a union of Unity
and Multiplicity as well as to
the method of generalization
and division. We may observe
(1) that though this proposition
and this method have been
mentioned, they were really not
the weapons by which the former
contest was decided, for
that was settled by reference to
our preconceptions of The Good.
(2) Though Plato invites us to
connect the Unity and Infinity
of the beginning of the dialogue
with the Limit and Infinite
that he is going to introduce,
and though perhaps they are

really connected, yet they are
certainly distinct, and must not
be immediately identified. They
are attributes of different sub-
jects. For the sake of distinc-
tion we may call the infinity of
Particulars as opposed to the
unity of the Genus a Logical
infinity; and the lawlessness of
Matter as opposed to the cir-
cumscription of the Form, a
Physical infinity, though it ex-
tends also to the æsthetic and
moral worlds and to every
sphere of Being. The Logical
infinity is only found within a
genus, and belongs to the indi-
viduals which it comprehends:
the Physical infinity is found in
an individual, and belongs to the
material elements of which

p. 23. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ε ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλά- 5 βωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὅ τι, φράζοις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἄπτα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι 10 τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

In order to solve this problem by the method that has been delineated, four Unities, or highest genera, are assumed: namely, Infinity, Limit, Product, and Cause: and Infinity is defined.

it is composed. The Physical infinity, as we shall presently see, may be treated as a Logical unity, or sumnum genus, comprehending a multiplicity of individual infinities.

5. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα κ. τ. λ.] This division of Things is really a division of First Principles: δομοίως δὲ ἡγούνσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ἡγούντες πόσα· ἐξ δων γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ ἡγούνσι πρώτων, ταῦτα πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, καὶ, εἰ πολλά, εἰ πεπερασμένη ἡ ἄπειρα· ὅστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ, τὸ στοιχεῖον ἡγούνσι πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, Phys. Ausec. 1, 2. "It is a similar problem to inquire into the number of Things. Are the primal Elements, it is really asked, one or more, and if more than one, finite or infinite? So that it is the Principle and Element which is the subject of inquiry."

10. τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων τὸ δὲ πέρας] For an examination of the meaning of ἄπειρον see Appendix B. The result of this examination is briefly as follows: independently of its analysis into ὑπη-

and στέρησις, (τὸ ἄπειρον and ἡ ἄπειρα) ἄπειρον has two or even three meanings that require to be carefully distinguished.

(1) Its obvious and ordinary meaning, which it would have first suggested to any Greek, is Infinity, i. e. quantity without end: the negation of all quantitative limit. To make τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἡπτον imply this, we must supply a very considerable ellipsis: that which is greater or less (than any finite quantity; or, than any quantity however great or small that can be named or conceived). But, if we except Infinity of number, Infinity of space, or Immensity, and Infinity of time, or Eternity, the existence of Infinity in the world of nature in this sense is perhaps untenable; and this meaning of ἄπειρον, though essential to the early philosophies to which nature is the immeasurable and unfathomable, perhaps does not belong to later speculation.

(2.) A more Platonic meaning of ἄπειρον, and perfectly war-

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

p. 23.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῦ τούτοιν ἐν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ' ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖος τις ικανῶς κατ' εἶδη διυστᾶς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φήσ, ὡς γαθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὄρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου;

ranted by its etymology, is, the Indefinite or Indeterminate. Indeterminateness is the negation, not of *all* determination, [Infinity] but, of a *single* determination. The Indeterminate is that which admits of a plurality or multiplicity of determinations, or even an infinity, between, however, certain definite limits. *Tὸ μᾶλλον* and *τὸ ἡττον* can express this, i. e. excess or defect above or below a certain single finite quantity, multiplicity of gradation, or divisibility of extension, without any violent ellipsis. This is the *ἀπειρον* that we find in nature. There are many gradations of colour; but we cannot get beyond pure blue, pure red, pure yellow. Nothing is whiter than pure white, nor blacker than pure black. There are many gradations in the pitch of sounds, but a few octaves bring us to the extremes.

(3) Why does Indeterminateness, as we find it does in the

Philebus, imply Imperfection? Because, if we assume with Plato that Perfection is a Mean, i. e. some single quantitative determination, even if some one gradation of the *ἀπειρον* coincides with this, all the remainder must be either excessive or defective. *Tὸ ἀπειρον* in this sense is that which violates a Standard: that which falls on this side or that side of the line traced by the Right: the elements, or their state, before they are arranged by the organizing Law, or after they have broken from its control. The Limit (*πέρας*) of which it is the violation, is *τὸ μέτρον*, Due Measure, Due Proportion, the condition of goodness and beauty. *Tὸ μᾶλλον* and *τὸ ἡττον* now signify Exorbitance and Inadequacy, and may be translated, the Too Much, and the Too Little.

12. Μῶν οὖν σοι κ. τ. λ.] The readiness with which Protarchus proposes to add to the list of principles an agent of decom-

p. 23. ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἀν· οὐ μὴν οἷμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἐὰν ε δέ τι δέη, συγγνώσει πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον].

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελό-
μενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα πολλὰ ἐκάτερον
p. 24. ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἴδοντες, εἰς ἐν πάλιν
ἐκάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτὲ ἦν αὐτῶν ἐν
καὶ πολλὰ ἐκάτερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἀν ἐποίμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἢ προτίθεμαι, ταῦτ'
εἶναι ἄπερ νῦν δή, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον.

position, besides the agent of combination, may be attributed to his familiarity with the poem of Empedocles, where all pheno-

mena are explained by two antagonistic forces, Love, the cause of union, and Hate, the cause of separation :

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λίγει,
ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἐν ἄπαντα,
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἔκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

Socrates rejects it as unnecessary, because the Cause (*aitia*) of which he speaks is not a blind elementary principle with a single necessary operation, but of an intelligent, artistic, nature, and therefore possesses both powers, that of separation as well as that of combination. In the Timaeus Causation (*aitia*) is only ascribed to rational agents.

5. Πρῶτον μὲν κ. τ. λ.] The reason of this separation first of three, then of two, from the list of principles seems to be this : the Cause is especially characterized by its ultimate unity, and therefore is not divided into species. The Limit again has but few divisions as compared with the other two, the

Infinite and the Generated class. It therefore is principally the latter that need division and generalization. Accordingly τὸ πέρας ἔχον will denote not τὸ πέρας, but τὸ μικτόν ; for it is said to have many species (πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον), which suits the μικτόν, (τὸ πλήθος σε ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως), but not the πέρας, (τὸ γε πέρας οὐ πολλὰ εἰχεν.) The only objection is, that τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων is presently used in a different sense, as equivalent to τῶν περάτων. See below : τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων συμμιχθέντων : and, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχόντων ἔθετο. In § 6, however, πέρας ἔχόντων was used of τὰ μικτά.

ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἅπειρον πολλά ἔστι πειράσομαι p. 24.
φράξειν· τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον δὲ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερμοτέρους καὶ ψυχροτέρους πέρι πρῶτον ὥρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσας ἄν, ἡ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε τοῖς γένεσιν, ἔωσπερ ἀν ἐνοικήτον, τέλος οὐκ ἀν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι γενομένης γὰρ b 10 τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτήκατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ τῷ ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον ἔνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

15 ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τούννυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελῆ δ' ὅντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ γε, ὡς φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες, 20 καὶ ἀνέμυησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο δὲ σὺ νῦν εἶφθεγξω καὶ τό γε ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον. ὅπου γὰρ ἀν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ εἴατον εἶναι ποσὸν ἔκαστον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρους καὶ τούναντίον ἔκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποι- 25 οῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. δὲ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἔασαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα d ἔδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν 30 χώρας ἐν ἥ ἐνῆν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἀν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον

p. 24. ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο.
κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπειρον γίγνοιτ’ ἀν τὸ
θερμότερον καὶ τούναντίον ἄμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὡς Σώκρατες ἔστι δ’, ὅπερ
εἶπες, οὐ ράδια ταῦτα ξυνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰσαῦθίς τε
ε καὶ αὐθις ἵσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν
ἐρωτώμενον ἰκανῶς ἀν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω
ποιεῖν· νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ
τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ’ ἐπεξιόντες οἱ
μηκύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόστ’ ἀν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ
ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα
p. 25. καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου 15
γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν
ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ
διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν
ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

20

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ
ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἵσον καὶ
ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἵσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί
περ ἀν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἡ μέτρον ἡ πρὸς μέ-
τρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι 25
καλῶς ἀν δοκοῦμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἡ πῶς σὺ φής;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε, ὡς Σώκρατες.

XIII. ΣΩ. Εἰεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τού-
τοιν ἀμφοῦν τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

Limit and
Product
are defined.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἴμαι.

30

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἀν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπή-
κοος γίγνεται τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν p. 25. φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; καὶ τινι τεκμηρίῳ χρῆ; ο

5 ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι. σὺν δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Δέεγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἢ γάρ;

10 ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ύγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, καὶ ὅπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥπτον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἐν 15 φύσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

d

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γέννναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

20 ΣΩ. Ἡν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἔν, οὗτο καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἵσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτὸν δράσει τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανῆς κάκείνη γενήσεται.

25 ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἵσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὅπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τάνατία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα ο δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.

27. The idea of *συμμετρία* is well developed by Paley under the name of Relation: "When several different parts contribute to one effect; or, which is the same thing, when an ef-

fect is produced by the joint action of different instruments; the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another, for the purpose of producing, by their united action, the effect,

p. 25. ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μηγνύστι ταῦτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἐκάστων συμβαίνειν.

is what I call Relation : and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intelligence, art."

—*Natural Theology*, chap. 15. The word *συμμετρία* will express those Correlations that belong to the category of Quantity : e. g., " Throughout the universe there is a wonderful *proportioning* of one thing to another ; the size of animals, of the human animal especially, when considered with respect to other animals, or to the plants which grow around him, is such as a regard to his convenience would have pointed out. A giant or a pygmy could not have milked goats, reaped corn, or mowed grass ; we may add, could not have rode a horse, trained a vine, shorn a sheep, with the same bodily ease as we do, if at all. A pygmy would have been lost among rushes, or carried off by birds of prey," ib. chap. 17.

Τὸ σύμμετρον is defined by τὸ μέσον in the following passage, where the perfection of natural and artificial products is said to depend on the due proportion (*συμμετρία*) of their efficient and material causes : οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δεῖ συμμετρίας πρὸς ἀλληλα πάντα γὰρ τὰ γυγνόμενα κατὰ τέχνην ἡ φύσιν λόγῳ τινὶ ἔστι τὸ δὲ θερμὸν λίαν μὲν κρατοῦν ἔηραινε τὰ ὑγρά, πολὺ δὲ ἀλλεῖπον οὐ συνίστησιν ἀλλὰ δεῖ πρὸς τὸ δημιουργόμενον ἔχειν τὸν τοῦ μέσου λόγον. De Gen. An. 4. 2. " The forces of the efficient and material causes should be proportionate. For the

goodness of every product of Art or Nature depends on a ratio between these terms. Too powerful a heat solidifies entirely where too weak a heat produces no condensation. The efficient therefore ought to bear a Mean proportion to the material on which it operates." *Συμμετρία*, like *μεσότης*, is opposed to excess and defect. Ή δὲ θερμότης ἐνυπάρχει τοσαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην ἔχουσα τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὅση σύμμετρος εἰς ἐκαστὸν τῶν μορίων, καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἀν ἀλλείπη ἡ ὑπερβάλλη ἡ χείρον ποιεῖ ἡ ἀνάπτηρον τὸ γιγνόμενον. ib. 2. 6. " The heat is provided by nature in quality and quantity duly proportioned to the organs that have to be formed. Excess or defect mars the product or makes a monstrous birth." Γίγνεται δὲ ἀτέλεια δι' ἐνδειαν τοῦ φυσικοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀσυμμετρία πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ πεπανόμενον. Meteor. 3. 3. " The fruit is imperfectly matured from the deficiency of the natural heat and its want of proportion to the juices to be ripened." The moral mean is always determined by some given term to which our act or emotion stands in relation : it is therefore always a symmetry or proportion. It seems therefore to have been chiefly a desire to have a term distinctive of his own philosophy that made Aristotle prefer *μεσότης* to the more concrete and intelligible *συμμετρία* in his definitions of moral and physical goodness.

1. μηγνύστι. So Klitsch reads for *μηγνύς*, which is retained by the Zurich editors.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

p. 25.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἡρός οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὁρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγένησεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

p. 26.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπέροις οὖσιν, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα ἀμαρτέας τε ἀπειργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο;

10 ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἀπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἀμαρτέα σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὥραι τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἔχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἴσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἔτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὑβριν γάρ που καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ωκαλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχόντων

12. τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἀπειρον ἀφείλετο] The Aristotelian analysis of τὸ ἀπειρον into Matter (ὕλη) and Privation (στέρησις) is here necessary to prevent confusion. How can the ἀπειρον be an element in all things that exist if it is destroyed before they come into being? The answer is, that the word ἀπειρον denotes two objects, the Elements or Matter, and the nega-

tion of Law, or Privation. The Privation is the true opposite of Limit. Matter is not the opposite of either Limit or Privation, but is indifferently receptive of either. It is the Privation or disorder that is exterminated; the Matter remains as an element of the Cosmos.

19. νόμον καὶ τάξιν] This is the reading of the Bodleian MS.

p. 26. ^ε θετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναισαι φῆς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τούναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. Σοὶ δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἰρηκα, εἰ ξυννοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ’ οἵμαι κατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πλῆθός σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γένεσεως. καὶ τοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο γένη, ὅμως δὲ ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ’ ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν

Badham inserts ἔχοντων after αὐτοῖς and omits it after πέρας. Other MSS. read πέρας ἔχοντ' θετο.

19. τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἀπαν]

In the Timaeus we have the Limit, Product (γεγονημένη οὐσία) and Infinite, under the names of παράδειγμα, μίμημα, and ὑποδοχή. Τότε μὲν γάρ δύο εἴδη διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τρίτον ἀλλο γένος ἡμῖν δηλωτέον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἴκανα ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεχθείσιν, ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἴδος ὑποτεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δυ, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ δρατὸν, τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίσαντες τὰ δύο

ἔξειν ἴκανῶς, νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσκεν εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἴδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι τίνα οὖν ἔχοι δύναμιν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸν ὑποληπτέον; τοιάδε μάλιστα, πάσης εἴναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὸν τιθῆνη. p. 48 E. “We first divided things into two classes, now we must point out a third. Two were enough on the former occasion; first a pattern, the object of reason and possessed of eternal being; second a copy of the pattern, generated and the object of sense. No third was then added because we thought that two would suffice, but now the investigation forces us to try to show a sort

τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἄπαν, γένεσιν εἰς p. 26.
οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων
μέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

Nature of
the fourth
class or
Cause.
The most
excellent
human life

5 XIV. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτον τι ετότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον. κοινὴ δὲ οὐ σκέψις· ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

of thing hard to explain and dim. What is its natural function? This: of all generation to be the receptacle and nurse." Afterwards the term *ἔκγονον*, as in the present passage, is applied to the sensible world. "Ἐν δὲ οὐν τῷ πάροντι χρὴ γένη διανοήθηται τριτά, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ φύεται, τὸ δὲ δύνεται αἴφοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάται πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρὶ, τὸ δὲ δύνεται πατρὶ, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἔκγονον. p. 50 c. "Now we must assume three classes, first a product, next a material, thirdly an archetype in whose image the product is; and we may liken the recipient material to a mother, the archetypal cause to a father, and the intermediate nature to their progeny."

1. γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν] We should have expected γεγενημένην οὐσίαν which occurs afterwards. The expression however is not accidental, nor merely an inaccuracy, but is a mode of speaking of temporal or phænomenal existence borrowed from the Megarians, an idealistic school, congenial to Plato. Their controversy with Democritus and the Materialists is alluded to in the Sophista. Τοιχαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα

εἰδαβῶς ἀνωθεν ἐξ ἀράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ συμκρὰ διαθραύνοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένη τινὰ προσαγορεύοντες... Γένεσιν τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς πον διελόμενοι λέγετε; —ναι. —καὶ σώματα μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δὲ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, δὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν δὲι κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσάντως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἀλλοτε ἀλλως. p. 246 B. "Their opponents defend themselves with very cautious tactics from a sort of invisible citadel, contending that real Being is certain conceived and bodiless Ideas, and breaking to pieces by their logic the Body and so called reality of the others, instead of Being, they call it a rapid stream of Becoming... You distinguish Being and Becoming? —Yes. —And you say we apprehend Becoming with the body by the faculty of sensation, Being with the soul by the faculty of Reason, and that the one is unchanging, the other unresting."

7. πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι] Plato confines Causation to intelligent, voluntary agents. Blind, elementary,

p. 26. ΠΡΩ. Ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἀν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὄρθως ἀν εἴη λεγόμενον ἐν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

p. 27. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δῆ, διαφέρον εὐρήσομεν. ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἀκολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταῦτὸν αἰτία τὸ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.

is composed of various ingredients, and therefore is a member of the third or Composite class.

10

15

material principles he calls *συναίτια*. Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἔστι τῶν συναίτιών οἰς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ιδέαν ἀποτελῶν δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναίτια ἀλλ' αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα πηγάντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργάζομενα, λόγον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδὲν δυνατὰ ἔχειν ἔστι... τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐραστὴν ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδικεῖν, ὅσα δὲ ὑπὸ ἀλλων μὲν κινούμεναν ἔτερα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινούντων γίγνονται, δευτέρας. ποιητέον δῆ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡμῖν λεκτέα μὲν ἀμφότερα τὰ τῶν αἰτιῶν γένη, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα μετὰ νοῦ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δημιουργοὶ καὶ ὅσα μονοθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχὸν ἀτακτὸν ἔκαστοτε ἐξεργάζονται. Τιμᾶς, p. 46 c. "These are the Necessary Conditions (secondary causes) that minister to the divine power when it produces

the Best that is possible under given circumstances. Most people think them to be not Conditions but Causes, heating and cooling, contracting and expanding, and the like, without plan or reason ... Whosoever loves reason and knowledge must first investigate the rational causes, afterwards the necessary chain of those that are both cause and effect. So we must do now. We must indicate both kinds of cause but distinguish the intelligent cause of what is fair and good from the unintelligent and planless." When the Efficient cause is assumed to be intelligent, of course it is intimately connected with what Aristotle called the Final cause. For an intelligence always acts with the design of accomplishing some End.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν ;

p. 27.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν ἢ τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ικανῶς ἔτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, 10 ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μνήμης ἔνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον

13. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρον λέγω] The best comment on this list will be a comparison with the four principles or four methods of explanation that Aristotle considers to exhaust every problem. "Ἐνα μὲν οὐν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὐ γίνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. Ἀλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δὲ στὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τι ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη· οἷον τοῦ διὰ πατῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἐν καὶ δλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὁθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἡ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως· οἷον ὁ βασιλεύσας αἴτιος καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ δλως τὸ ποιῶν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δὲ στὸ οὐ ἔνεκα· οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγεία· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. Phys. Aus. 2. 3. "One kind of Cause is the Material

of which a thing is made ; in which sense brass is cause of a statue, or silver of a cup, or the genera of brass and silver. Another is the Form and pattern, or definition, and its genera ; in which sense the double number of vibrations in an equal time is the cause of an octave, and, generically, number or the elements of the definition. Another is the Origin of motion or rest ; in which sense the planner is the cause of an action, the father of the child, the producer of the product, and the changer of the change. Another is the End or motive ; in which sense health is the cause of a man's walking. Why does he walk ? For the sake of health, we answer ; and consider we have assigned the cause." The three first of these are clearly identical with three on Plato's list. The μικτὸν may seem to be rather Aristotle's σύνολον or ὁ σὸν τῇ ὑλῇ συνειλημ-

p. 27. δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αὐτίαν καὶ γενέσεως ε τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἀρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἔζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτ' ἄν ἡ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα, ο

μένος λόγος. Metaph. 6. 15. (the concretion of matter and form,) that is, the *καθ ἔκαστον* or Individual of the sensible world, than the *τέλος* or Final cause. The living and acting Individual, however, is the Final cause of the elementary matter and the efficient processes. The close connexion of the End with an intelligent Efficient cause was perhaps the reason why Plato does not mention it here more distinctly as a separate principle, for he has fully developed the conception in the Phaedo. Indeed the whole of the Philebus, as discussing the highest Good, may be regarded as an investigation of the Final cause of human life. In the Timaeus it is contrasted with the Material cause in nearly the same manner as we saw the Efficient cause contrasted in the preceding note. Ταῦτα δὴ τάντα τότε ταύτη πεφυκότα ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ τοῦ καλλίστον τε καὶ ἀρίστου δημιουργὸς ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρελάμβανεν ἡνίκα τὸν αὐτάρκη τε καὶ τὸν τελεώτατον θεόν ἐγέννα, χράμενος μὲν ταῖς περὶ

ταῦτα αἰτίαις ἵπητούσας, τὸ δὲ εὐ τεκταινόμενος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτός. διὸ δὴ χρὴ δύ' αἰτίας εἴδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἀπασι ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἐνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου καθ ὅσον ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνων χάριν, λογιζομένους ὡς ἄνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν μόνα κανανοεῖν οὐδὲ αὐλαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἄλλως πῶς μετασχεῖν. p. 68 E. "The artist of the best and fairest work pressed into service all these elements with their necessary laws at his creation of the absolute and most perfect God, using their subservient agencies but himself contriving the good. Wherefore two kinds of cause are to be distinguished, the Necessary (Material) and the Divine (Final), and we must seek the divine cause in order to attain to happiness so far as our nature allows; and the necessary cause as a means; regarding it as indispensable towards contemplating, grasping, or in any other way attaining, that other object that we prize."

κάλλιον ἀν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσταίμεθα πρώτου p. 27. πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμφισβητή- σαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. ⁷Ισως.

ΣΩ. ⁵Ιθι δή, νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν δ βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. ⁸Ην.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὄρθωμέν που τίς τέ ἔστι καὶ ὅποιον γένους;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἷμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἔστι μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δε- δεμένων, ὥστε ὄρθως ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος 15 ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. ⁹Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰεν. Τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὁ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς ε καὶ ἀμικτὸς ὧν ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὄρθως ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὥδε δ' ἀπόκριναι μοι πρὶν 20 ἀποφήνασθαι.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἡ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένων ἔστον;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες οὐ γὰρ ἄν 25 ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυ- κὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἄν, ὁ Φίληβε, λύπη πᾶν κακόν· ὥστ' p. 28. ἄλλο τι νῷν σκεπτέον ἡ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὁ παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δή 30 σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονὸς ἔστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὁ

p. 28. Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἀστεβοῖ-
μεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος
κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

b ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὡς ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ τὸ δ⁵
ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτῷ
πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προήρησαι
λέγειν; 10

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ
δέομαι γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προ-
φήτην, ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξα-
μαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.

c ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὡς Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ¹⁵
οὐδὲν ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλ’ ὅντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε
Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παιζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν
καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὅποιον γένους εἴεν;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασί γε, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥάδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν ²⁰
οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὅντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοὺς ἐστὶ²⁵
βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἵστως εὐ λέ-
γουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν
αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

d ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπο- ²⁵
λογιζόμενος, ὡς Σώκρατες, ως οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

XVI. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὡδὲ
ἐπανερωτῶντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τὰ ἔνυπαντα καὶ ³⁰
τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ
ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπη ἔτυχεν. ἡ τάνα-

Reason is
akin to the
Spirit that
animates
the Uni-
verse, and
belongs to
family of
Cause.

τία καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον νοῦν καὶ φρό- p. 28.
νησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες. ε
ὅ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαί-
σνεται· τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ
τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ
ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ
ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἀν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδὲν ἀν δο-
ξάσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμο-
λογούμενον ἔυμφήσωμεν, ώς ταῦθ' οὗτος ἔχει, καὶ μὴ p. 29.
μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν τάλλοτρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν,
ἄλλα καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου,
ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῆ ταῦτα μὴ οὗτος ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως
ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀν βουλοίμην;

ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν
λόγον ἀθρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων
τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορῶμέν που,
καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοί φασιν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ b
συστάσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ'
ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβεῖ
τὸ τοιόνδε.

3. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] The same phrase occurs in the epistles of Plato. "Χτερον δὲ καὶ ἀκούω γεγραφένα αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν τότε ἥκουσε, συνθέντα ώς αὐτὸν τέχνην, οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὡν ἀκούοι. p. 341 B.

It therefore seems to mean, "We will not merely re-echo what others have said;"—"We will not rest on authority;"—"Without iteration;"—"On our own responsibility."

p. 29. ΠΡΩ Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι σμικρόν τε τούτων ἔκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν
ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὃν
καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἐνὶ⁵
δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταῦτον. οἶνον πῦρ μὲν
ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῷ παντί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ε ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ
ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυ-
μαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ₁₀
οὕση.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ
ἀρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός,
ἢ τούναντίον ὑπὲκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ ₁₅
τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἅπαντ' ἵσχει ταῦτα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἀξιον ἐρωτᾶς.

δ ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. ταῦτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἷμαι, περί τε τῆς
ἐν τοῖς ζώοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἡρώτησα ὀλίγονον ἔμπρο-₂₀
σθεν, οὔτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἀν
ποτε φανείη;

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲ ὄστισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἔξῆς ἔπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λε-₂₅
χθέντα ἀρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομά-
σαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ε ΣΩ. Ταῦτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον
λέγομεν. διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἀν εἴη που σῶμα, ₃₀
σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως p. 29.
τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἡ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεται
τε καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ
ἴσχει;

5 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἔτερον, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον
ἐρωτήσεως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε ἄρα ἄξιον; ἡ πῶς ἐρεῖς; p. 30.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἄρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν
ιο ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὡς φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ
τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἐμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγχανε, ταῦτα
γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

15 ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὡς Σώ-
κρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τὰ
τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἅπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ
τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν b
20 μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχὴν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν

20. ψυχὴν τε παρέχον] In the Timaeus the Soul is composed of three elements corresponding to the πέρας, ἅπειρον, and μικτὸν of the Philebus. Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντος οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοιν ἐν μέσω συνεκεράστατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταῦτον φύσεως αὖ περὶ καὶ τῆς θάτέρουν, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦν. καὶ τρία λαβόν αὐτὰ ὅπτα συνεκεράστατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρουν φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ. μαγνὺς δὲ μετὰ

τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἐν, πάλιν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμε. p. 34 c. "Between Indivisible and immutable substance and what is Divisible among bodies the divine power made a third kind of substance composed of Identity and Diversity and set it between the Indivisible and the Divisible. He then took the three and moulded them into one, forcing reluctant Diversity into harmony with Identity. And when he had mixed them with the other substance and wrought the three into one he divided

p. 30. ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.

the whole into such parts as behoved." Here the Indivisible, Divisible and Compound clearly correspond to the *πέρας*, *ἀπειρον* and *μικρὸν* of the Philebus; though it is not quite clear whether the elements of the Compound substance, Identity and Diversity, should be regarded as the same with the elements of the Indivisible and Divisible. Whether these elements of the Soul, the Indivisible and Divisible, or Identity and Diversity, are the same with the elements of the Material world, the *πέρας* and *ἀπειρον* of the Philebus, or with the elements of the Ideal world, the One and the Infinite Dyad, of which we hear elsewhere, Plato does not intimate. If we trust Aristotle, they are to be regarded as the same; for he even assigns as a reason why they must be the same the necessity that a cognizant power should be identical with the objects of cognition. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐν τῷ Τίμαιῳ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γνώσκεσθαι γάρ ὁμοιός ὁμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰναι. *De Anima*, 1. 2. "So Plato in the *Timaeus* composes the soul of the elements because the cognizant faculty must resemble the objects of cognition, and these are composed of the elements."

5. ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι...φύσιν] It is difficult to trace the reasoning in this passage. Plato perhaps is intentionally obscure because he meant to excite a curiosity, the satisfaction of which he reserved for another dialogue. However, even with the clue furnished by the *Timaeus* it is not easy to thread our way.

μεμηχανῆσθαι is active and emphatic: "is an intelligent designer:"—"has contrived in the form of Art—in the guise of an Artist."

τὴν τῶν καλλίστων...φύσιν, governed by *μεμηχανῆσθαι*, is not the Soul, for that is first introduced presently, but the Cosmos or visible World. Thus *μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμωτάτων φύσιν* may be paraphrased in the words of the next sentence, *κεκοσμηκέναι τε καὶ συντεταχέναι ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν λεγόμενον δικαιότατ' ἄν.*

The result of the whole passage is that the Human Reason, as derived from the Soul of the Universe, is akin to that supramundane Cause to which the Soul of the Universe is akin. There is an obscurity in the train of thought, because it seems all along assumed [*τοῦτο τὸ αἴτιον*] ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν...πᾶσαν

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἀν λόγου ἔχοι. P. 30.
c

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὶ μὴ τοῦτο μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἀν
ἐπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἀ πολλάκις εἰ-
ρήκαμεν, ἅπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ καὶ πέρας ικα-
νόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε
καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας,
σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Δικαιότατα δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε
ιο γενοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασι-
λικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ
τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά,
15 καθ' ὃ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι]
that the Human Reason belongs
to the Causative class, so that
we seem to have made no ad-
vance when we make the pro-
position stated above. An ad-
vance, however, has been made,
as the Cause is invested with a
new and grander character so
soon as it appears as the origin
of the Soul of the Universe.

In the words μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν
τῶν καλλιστῶν καὶ τιμωτάτων φύ-
σιν, the supramundane Cause is
said to perform what is imme-
diately the function of Zeus, or
the Soul of the World. Simi-
larly above (ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα ξυ-
τιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον... σοφίαν ἐπι-
καλεῖσθαι) artificial constructions
and reparations are attributed
to the Cause which are properly
the functions of the Human
Soul when created by the Cause.
This confusion of the physical
agent with the extramundane

Cause to which it owes its being
is characteristic of the Ideal
theory which leaves undeter-
mined the amount of identity
between the Idea and that which
derives its existence from the
Idea.

9. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυ-
χῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην] From
this and a similar passage in
the Timaeus it might be inferred
that Plato denies the existence
of Reason apart from the Soul.
Δογμάτων οὐν εὑρισκεν (ό θεός)
ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὅρατῶν οὐδὲν
ἀνόρτιον τοῦ νοῦ ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλον
καλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτ' ἔργον, νοῦν δὲ
αὐτὸς ψυχῆς ἀδυνάτον παραγενέ-
σθαι τῷ. p. 30 A. It may be
observed however in both these
passages that the terms em-
ployed (γενοίσθην, παραγενέσθαι
τῷ) exclude from consideration
the Eternal Reason, or extra-
mundane Cause.

p. 30. ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξης, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ως ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἀρχεὶ ἔνυμμαχος ἐκείνοις. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικῶς ἀπόκρισιν, εἴ τι νοῦς ἔστι γενούστης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος τῶν τεττάρων, ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο. ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἡδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. 10

ΠΡΩ. Ἐχω καὶ μάλα ίκανῶς καί τοί με ἀποκρι- νάμενος ἔλαθες.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἰπεις. 15

p. 31. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ νοῦς, ὡς ἔταιρε, οὖ μὲν γένους ἔστι καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος 20 ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῦ, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενῆς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἀπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν 25 μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξοντός ποτε γένους.

b ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

XVII. ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ D. Division of (a) Pleasure, and (b) Science, into various ἔστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τί πάθος, γίγνεσθον, 30

9. τῶν τεττάρων, δν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο τεττάρων δ' ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο. τῶν τεττάρων δ' ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο. τοῦτο] For this, which is unintelligible, Stallbaum proposes :

kinds or classes.
(a) Pleasures may be divided into two great classes, the Mixed and the Un-mixed. The former are subdivided into three subordinate kinds.

One kind of Mixed ^{to} Pleasure is the Restoration of violated Limit to its ascendancy in the animal world.

ὅπόταν γίγνησθον, ἵδεν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· p. 31. ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δ' αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἰκανῶς βασανίσαι.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' εὶ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.

ΣΩ. ³Αρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ὅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γε, ὡς φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμησκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

15 ΣΩ. ⁴Εσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὡς θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. ⁵Ο μετὰ τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν τῷ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἷμα δὲ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἡδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν

22. τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης, &c.] This definition of Pleasure may be illustrated by what is said on the same subject in the Timaeus. Τὸ δὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὅδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γνησμένον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δὲ φύσιν ἀπὸν πάντιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἡρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως. τὸ δὲ μετ' εὐπετείας γρήγορμενον ἄπαν αἰσθητὸν μὲν ὅτι μά-

λιστα, λυπῆς δὲ καὶ ἡδονῆς οὐ μέτεχον, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν παθήματα, ἡ δὴ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθετον ἐρρήθη καθ' ἡμέραν συμφυὲς ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι. ταύτη γὰρ τομὰὶ μὲν καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα πάσχει λύπας οὐκ ἐμποιούσιν οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς πάλιν ἐπὶ ταῦτὸν ἀπιούσης εἴδος, μέγισται δὲ αἰσθήσεις καὶ σαφέσταται καθ' ὅτι τὸν πάθη καὶ δσῶν δὲν αὐτή πη προσβαλοῦσα ἐφάπτηται. βίᾳ γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔν τῇ διακρίσει τε αὐτῆς καὶ συγ-

p. 31. ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἀμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀληθηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

κρίσει. τὰ δὲ ἐκ μειόνων μερῶν σώματα μόγις ἔκοπτα τῷ δρῶντι, διαδίδοντα δὲ εἰς ὅλον τὰς κινήσεις, ἥδονάς ἵσχει καὶ λύπας, ἀλλοτριούμενα μὲν λύπας, καθιστάμενα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν πᾶντας ἥδονάς· ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις ἐλληφε τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἀθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα, κενώσεως μὲν ἀναίσθητα πληρώσεως δὲ αἰσθητικὰ γεγνόμενα, λύπας μὲν οὐ παρέχει τῷ θυητῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μεγίστας δὲ ἥδονάς ἔστι δὲ ἔνδηλα περὶ τὰς εὐωδίας. ὅσα δὲ ἀπαλλοτριοῦνται μὲν ἀθρόα, κατὰ σμικρὰ δὲ μόγις τε εἰς ταῦτὸν πάλιν ἑαυτοῖς καθίσταται, τούναντίον τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πάντα ἀποδίδωσι· ταῦτα δὲ αὖ περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γεγνόμενά ἔστι κατάδηλα. p. 64 c. "Pleasure and Pain are thus to be explained. A violent and sudden derangement of nature is painful, and a sudden return to the natural state is pleasant. A gentle and gradual affection is not attended with sensation; the opposite is. A rapid and facile affection is attended with keen sensation, but not with pleasure or pain. This is instanced in vision which we said was our incorporation by day with external nature. For the incision and combustion and other concomitant affections cause no pain, nor the re-establishment of the natural state pleasure, but the strongest and clearest perception of the objects touching or touched by the visual organ, because there is no violence in the concomitant compositions and decompositions. But the organs of grosser texture by resisting the action

of the sensible object, and disseminating the shock far and wide, produce pleasure and pain, the latter from the disturbance, the former from the reascendency of the natural state. When the decrements and deperition of the organ are gradual, and its renovation sudden and by great increments, it will be insensible to the process of inanition but sensible of the renovation, and impart to the mortal part of the soul no pains but much pleasure. This is instanced in fragrant smells. But when an organ is deranged suddenly and returns to its former condition gradually and slowly, it presents the opposite phenomena. This is instanced in burns and wounds." The particular senses are afterwards examined in detail, and the pleasant to Taste is thus defined: Ξύμπασι δὲ τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα εἰρημένοις πάθος ἐναντίον ἀπ' ἐναντίας ἔστι προφάσεως, δύσταν ἡ τῶν εἰσιόντων ξύστασις ἐν ὑγροῖς οἰκείᾳ τῇ τῆς γλώττης ἔξει πεφυκυῖα λειαίη μὲν ἐπαλείφουσα τὰ τραχυθέντα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ξυνεστότα ἡ κεχυμένα τὰ μὲν ξυνάγῃ τὰ δὲ χαλᾶς καὶ πάνθ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἰδρύῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ἥδη καὶ προσφιλές παντὶ πάν τὸ τοιούτον ἵαμα τῶν βιαίων παθημάτων γεγνόμενον κέκληται γλυκύ. p. 66 b. "There is an opposite feeling produced by an opposite cause. When the entering liquids are congenial to the constitution of the tongue, and smooth with oily influence its corrugations, and separate what has been unnaturally joined, or join what has been unnaturally se-

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.

p. 31.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι’ ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅ τι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.

5 ΠΡΩ. Οὕμαι μέν σε ὄρθως λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴμι φανέστερον δὲ ἔτι ταῦτα ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσια που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾶστον συννοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

10 ΣΩ. Πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

15 ΣΩ. Δίψος δ’ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύνα- p. 32. μις ἡδονή. διάκρισις δέ γ’ αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ή παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη; κατὰ φύσιν δ’ ή πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.

20 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

parated, and re-establish the normal disposition of the organ, this medicinal counteraction of violent affections is always pleasant and welcome, and is called by the name of Sweetness." Similarly what is pleasant to the other senses is shown to attend the restoration of φύσις or τὸ μέτριον, which are equivalent to τὸ πέρας, and are different names for the normal condition of the sensitive organ.

12. ἐδωδὴ δὲ πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν ἡδονή] The inaccuracy of this expression is pointed out by Aristotle: Καὶ λέγουντι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἔστι πάθη· εἰ

δή ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἐν φῷ ή ἀναπλήρωσις τοῦτ’ ἀν καὶ ἡδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἀραιοῦ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐκ ἔστιν ἀραι ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή· ἀλλὰ γνομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοιτο ἀν τις καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "They say Pain is the want of the normal quantity of elements, and Pleasure the supply. But these are bodily affections. If then Pleasure is the completion of the normal quantity, the recipient of the completion, that is, the Body, will be the recipient of Pleasure; which all deny. Replenishment, then, is not Pleasure, though it may be an antecedent condition of Pleasure, as incision is of Pain."

p. 32. ΣΩ. Καὶ ρίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη πάλιν δὲ εἰς ταῦτον ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἐν λόγῳ σκόπει εἴς σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἀν φῆ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμφυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἴναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν. 10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκατέροις;

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

11. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος, τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς] This definition only professes to apply to one kind of Pleasure. In the Republic however an equivalent definition is extended to all kinds of Pleasure, including intellectual. Οὕκουν δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἡττον ἀλληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;—πολὺ γε.—Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὔτος;—ἔγωγε.—Οὕκουν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον, καὶ αὐτὸν μᾶλλον δν, ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦνται ἡ τὸ τῶν ἡττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸν ἡττον δν;—πῶς γάρ οὖ;—εἴ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδὺ ἔστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἀν ποιοῦ ἡδονῆ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἡττον μεταλαμβάνον ἡττόν τε ἀν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἀν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἡττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι, 9. p. 585. “Has not the aliment of the body compared with the

aliment of the soul less truth and reality? By far. And has not the body itself compared with the soul likewise? It has. Is not that which more real things fill and which itself is more real, more really filled than that which less real things fill, and which itself is less real? It must be. If therefore to be filled with things requisite for our nature is pleasant, that which is more really filled, and with more real things will more really and truly cause us to be delighted with true pleasure, and that which is filled by less real things will be less really and substantially filled, and receive less solid and true Pleasure.” If we did not suppose the definition had been thus extended, we could hardly understand statements like the following: δὲ διατάξει φασὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὅτι πάσα ἡδονή γένεσις ἔστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμίᾳ δὲ γένεσις συγγενής τοῖς τέλεσι, Eth. Nic. 7, 11.

A second kind is the Expectancy of this restoration. The neutral state, or the absence of both Pleasure and Pain, may attend a life of pure Knowledge, and is perhaps a diviner condition than that of these kinds of Pleasure.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς p. 32. κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν εἰ πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἔτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἷμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέστι τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ως δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμύκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτέρῳ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ως ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη πῃ δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξυνίδωμεν, ως εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν εἰ ἀλγηδών, ἀνασωζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτε ἀνασωζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἔξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἵσχῃ. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νὸσον εἰπέ· ἂρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῶον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι, μήτε ἡδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ p. 33. λυπουμένου;

ρ. 33. ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἀγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ συμκρὸν μεμνησθαι ταύτην ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἡ μή. Βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἰσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

b ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν ^{ιο} βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε συμκρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα οὕτως ερρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος ἀν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκούν εἰκός γε οὕτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὕτε τὸ ἐναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἀσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον ^{το} τι ἦ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

16. Οὐκούν εἰκός γε οὕτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὕτε τὸ ἐναντίον] The Peripatetics differed from Plato on this point. We read in the Nicomachean Ethics: εἴ τον ἡ φύσις ἀπλῆ ἐīη ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδοστὴ ἐσται, διὸ δὲ θεός ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν, 7, 14. "A being whose nature is not complex will always take the greatest pleasure in the same activity. Therefore the Divinity has the fruition of an incomplex and unchanging pleasure." In the Metaphysics human

Pleasure is said to be a reflex of the Divine activity: ἐκ τοιάτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἥρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οία τε ἡ ἀριστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν... ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον, 11, 7. "Such then is the principle on which hang the heavens and earth. Its life is like the best of ours momentarily. Pleasure is its activity, and hence consciousness, sensation, intellect, are the highest Pleasures."

XIX. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἔτερον εἶδος τῶν p. 33.
ἡδονῶν, ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης
πᾶν ἔστι γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ τί ποτ’ ἔστι, πρότερον
ἀναληπτέον. καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσ-
θησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ’ ήμῶν κατὰ
τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι. d

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

10 ΣΩ. Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ήμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθη-
μάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν
ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῇ ἐκείνην ἔσαντα, τὰ
δὲ δι’ ἀμφοῖν ιόντα καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα
ἴδιον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἔκατέρῳ.

15 ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι’ ἀμφοῖν ιόντα ἐὰν τὴν
ψυχὴν ήμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀμφοῖν μὴ
λανθάνειν, ἀρ’ ὥρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

20 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβης ὡς
λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθα που γένεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ λήθη
μνήμης ἔξοδος· ή δὲ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὕπω γέ-
γονε τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνε-
σθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἀποπον. ἢ γάρ;

25 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὄνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν
ἀπαθὴς αὐτῇ γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος,
30 ἡν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς, ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

p. 34.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔμαθον.

24. πω] So Stallbaum reads instead of πῶς which is retained in the Zurich edition.

ρ. 34. ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὐτὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ηδη μανθάνομεν ὁ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὄρθως ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

β ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἀρ' οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

12. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἀρ' οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν] The two cases of Reminiscence that follow are not very distinctly contrasted. In the Phædo, however, we have the same division: ἔάν τις τι ἔτερον ηδῶν η ἀκούσας η τινα ἀλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἔκεινον γνῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτερον ἔννοήσῃ οὐδ μὴ η αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἀλλη ἀρ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη οὐ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν;—πῶς λέγεις;—οἰον τὰ τοιάδε ἀλλη πον ἐπιστήμην ἀνθρώπους καὶ λύρας—πῶς γὰρ οὐ;— οὐκοῦν οἰσθα ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται ὅταν ἔδωσι λύραν η ἴματιν η ἀλλο τι οἴς τὰ παιδικὰ αἰτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι πάσχουσι τοῦτο, ἔγωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐτῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὐ ην η λύρα τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις...μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἔκεινα ἄ νπδ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μη

ἐπισκοπεῖν ηδη ἐπιλέληστο. "When the sight or hearing, or any other sensation of an object, besides giving a perception of that, awakens the thought of something else which is the object of a different perception, is not the thought of the second object a reminiscence? Explain your meaning. Are not a man and a lyre objects of different perceptions? True. When a lover sees the lyre or garment, or any thing else that the person he loves is wont to use, this happens: he no sooner sees the lyre than his fancy presents to him the form of the person to whom it belonged, and this is Reminiscence...Particularly if the object which thus recurs is one which time or inattention had effaced from memory." See Appendix C.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν ἀ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἡ p. 34.
ψυχή, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅ τι
μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνη τότε ἀναμιμήσκεσθαι που
λέγομεν. ἡ γάρ;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάντι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε
αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος αὐθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ
πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις
καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ χάριν ἀπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἰνα δὴ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώμα-
τος ὅ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἄμα
15 ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα
ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

ΧΧ. ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἡδη
τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν
20 τὴν μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας δ
σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον
ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς Πρώ-
25 ταρχε, εὐρόντες ὁ νῦν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ
αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς ἡμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώ-
μεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλ'
30 ἐτέρα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναι τίνας ἐπιθυμίας;

ε

29. νῦν δὴ ἔφαμεν] Nothing of the kind has as yet been said. This is one of the passages that

strengthen the hypothesis suggested in the note on §§ 33, p. 53 c.

It accom-
panies De-
sire which
is a mental
affection
involving
the Me-
mory of the
Opposite of
a certain
bodily af-
fection.

p. 34. ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταῦτὸν βλέψαντες οὗτοι πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὄνόματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ ράδιον ἵσως εἰπεῖν, ω̄ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅμως λεκτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δή;

ΣΩ. Διψῆ γέ που λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματός γε.

p. 35. ΣΩ. Πώματος, ἡ πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ω̄ς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ πάσχει. κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾶ πληροῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἐστιν ὅποιος θεν εἴτ' αὐσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἀν εἴτε μνήμη, τούτου ὁ μῆτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μῆτ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθε πώποτε ἐπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

b ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν ὁ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.

8. Διψῆ που λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε τι. "You know the meaning of the word Thirst :"—"You use the word Thirst with a definite signification." So in the Meno: ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι; τὸ τοίονθε βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.——ἀλλὰ καλῶ καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὁ

λέγεις. p. 75 D. " You, no doubt, use the words Termination and End in a certain acceptation. That is the sort of thing I mean—nothing recondite.—I attach a sense to the terms, and I think I know what you mean by them."

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οῦ;

p. 35.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψή
γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πληρώσεως γ' ἄρα πή τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος
ἄν ἐφάπτοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ
που.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι
λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γάρ ἄν ἔτ' ἄλλῳ
ἐφάψαιτο;

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὁ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν
ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οῦ φησιν ἡμῖν οὐτος ὁ
λόγος γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ¹⁵
παντὸς ζώου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὄρμή γε ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἄγουσα ἡ τὰ
25 παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθή-
μασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀ
ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν τε
30 ὄρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζώου παντὸς
ἀπέφηνεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

The second 15 kind of
Pleasure is
therefore
always
Mixed with
Pain.
These plea-
sures may
be False.
Various
proofs are
attempted.

p. 35. ΣΩ. Διψήν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ πεινῆν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῆ ὁ λόγος αἴρει.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἰδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι⁵ δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

e ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου περὶ βίου φράζεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἔστι τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἐκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ,¹⁰ τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν¹⁵ ἡδέων ὡν γενομένων παύοιτ' ἀν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω τί τότε; φῶμεν ἡ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν

p. 36. ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἡ χαίροντα;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δι', ἀλλὰ διπλῆ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἴπεις; ἀρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν²⁵ ἐλπίδι φανερᾶ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τούναντίον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος³⁰ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρα ἀνθρωπος καὶ τἄλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται p. 36.
τε ἄμα καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύ-
ξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἄρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ'
ἀν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν φήθης
ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων
τόδε χρησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ
ἡδονὰς ἡ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἡ τὰς μέν τινας
ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ οὐ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀν εἶν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ
ἢ λύπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὡς Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἀν ἀληθεῖς ἡ
ψευδεῖς, ἡ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἡ μὴ, ἡ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς
ἢ ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἀν πον συγχωροίην, τὰ δὲ
ἔτερα ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φήσ; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν
οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπιγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

12. *Πότερον ἀληθεῖς, &c.]* The inquiry into the truth or falseness of Pleasure is necessary for the solution of two problems. First, we have to ascertain whether Pleasure or Reason is more akin to the cause of goodness in the chief Good. Three attributes of the chief Good, Truth, Beauty, and Symmetry will be indicated; and we must see whether they are

more to be found in Pleasure or Reason. Secondly, we have to determine the composition of the mixed life and the Pleasures that involve most falsehood will be excluded. This second problem has not yet been expressly proposed, but it is in the solution of this that the distinction of Pleasures, as true and false, has its chief application.

p. 36. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὶ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὡς παῖ' κείνου τάνδρος, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως τοῦτο γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἥ καὶ ὀτφοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ε ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἣ νῦν δὴ προύθεμεθα ἀπορήματα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ φῆς;

10

ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὕτε δὴ ὅναρ οὕθ' ὑπαρ, ὡς φῆς, ἔστιν οὕτ' ἐν μανίαις οὕτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὃς τίς ποτε δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὐτὸς δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτ', ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν ὥρθως, ἡ σκεπτέον εἴτ' ὥρθως εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

20

p. 37. ΧΧΙΙ. ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίνην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νῦν δὴ

Pleasures
may at
least be

ι. ὡς παῖ' κείνου τάνδρος] An allusion to the title Philebus usually gave his companions, and to his queries as to the relevancy of part of the discussion. See §§ 6 and 8. If any allusion to the character of the natural father of Protarchus had preceded or immediately followed, as in Rep. 2. p. 368 A, the words might have applied to him; but they have no point here, unless they apply to Philebus. Plato appears

to have been censured by contemporary critics for the wearisome length of some of his discussions. He answers in the Politicus, p. 286, that his Dialogues are not intended to amuse, or to charm by their artistic form, but to teach the art of reasoning. To justify the whole of the following discussion perhaps we ought to have before us the writings of Aristippus, to which it is an answer.

Right or
Wrong, as
they are
produced
indifferent-
ly by Right
and Wrong
Opinions ;
and is not
Wrong
synony-
mous with
False ?

λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γάρ που p. 37.
δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡδεσθαι;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενόν ἔστι τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε φῶ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἡδεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἀν τε ὄρθως ἀν τε μὴ ὄρθως δοξάσῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλ- b
λυσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἀν τε ὄρθως ἀν τε
μὴ ὄρθως ἡδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἡδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς
οὐδέποτε ἀπολεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, καὶ τοῦθος οὐτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τῷ ποτὲ οὐν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδῆς τε καὶ
ἀληθῆς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον
ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δὲ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα
όμοίως εἴληχεν;

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὅτι δόξη μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψευδός τε
καὶ ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ε
25 ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῆς τοῦτο εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν
τὰ μέν ἔστι ποιὸν ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἄπερ

28. ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον seem to have denied the possi-
ἄπερ ἔστι, &c.] This is an al-
lusion to the doctrine of Antis-
thenes and the Megarians, who
-

ρ. 37. ἐστί, ποιώ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἐκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαι τε καὶ ἥδοναι.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὡς Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηται τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἥδονήν ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἀν ὄρθότης ἢ τούναυτίον ὄρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται ; μῶν οὐκ ὄρθην μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἀν ὄρθότητα ἵσχῃ ; ταῦτὸν δὲ ἥδονήν ;

ΠΡΩ. Αναγκαῖον.

ε ΣΩ. Ἀν δέ γε ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἥ, τὴν δόξαν τότε ἀμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὄρθην ὁμολογητέον οὐδὲ ὄρθως δοξάζουσαν ;

τ8. τὴν δόξαν τότε ἀμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὄρθην ὁμολογητέον] ἀμαρτάνουσαν, though without the article must be taken as part of the subject, not the predicate. Ὁρθή and ἀμαρτάνουσα, or ἀμαρτανόμενη, are contrasted in Greek as Right and Wrong. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δὲ μὲν κακῶς βουλεύμενος ἀμαρτάνει δὲ εὐ ὄρθως βουλεύεται δῆλον ὅτι ὄρθητης ἡ εὐβούλια ἐστίν οὐτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐτε δόξης. ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἐστιν ὄρθητης, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία, δόξης δὲ ὄρθητης ἡ ἀλήθεια, Eth. Nicom. 6. 9. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις φέγγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον

ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφο τῆς ἀρετῆς.. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστι.. τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν· ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν, ib. 2. 6. We see that ἀμαρτία and ὄρθητης have a generic meaning, and as applied to the intellect, express truth or falsehood, as applied to actions or feelings express conformity or nonconformity to the moral law. The last passage shows the image that they conveyed to the fancy. It would therefore be a fallacy to infer falsehood from ἀμαρτία, as Socrates seems to propose.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

p. 37.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἀν αὐλ λύπην ἡ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ὃ λυπεῖται ἡ τούμαντίον ἀμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὁρθὴν ἡ χρηστὴν ἡ τί τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γε ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔουκέ γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν ψευδῆ, p. 38. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφερει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὡς ἔταιρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὁρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

20 ΠΡΩ. Εἴκος γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν

XXIII. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε δὴ ἄγω;

25 ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδῆς, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν,

The nature
of Opinion,
Speech,
Imagina-
tion, Hope.

15. ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω] "I as-
sert that this is the ordinary
use of language." This is per-

haps better than, "I speak as I
am prompted by my compa-
nions."

ρ. 38. ήδονή καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ⁵ εἰ ήμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρέν γίγνεθ' ἐκάστοτε;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ήμᾶς ὥδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ήγούμεθα ἔτσειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ ¹⁰ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἀν ταῦθ' ἄπερ ὄρᾳ;

ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτ' ἄν ὥδε. ¹⁵

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ²⁰ ἀεστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; Ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα κατιδῶν φαντασθέντα ἑαυτῷ ποτέ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκριόμενος ἀν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε. ²⁵

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθείσις γ' αὖ τάχ' ἀν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

5. *διαδοξάζειν* only occurs in this passage. It seems to be formed on the analogy of *διαλέγεσθαι*, or *διανοεῖσθαι*, and ex- presses either the dialogue with one's self that is presently described, or syllogism from probable premisses.

ΣΩ. Καν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν p. 38.
ρῆθεντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ
ταῦτ' ἀν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν
οὗτως ὁ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ⁸Αν δὲ ἄρα μόνος ἦ τοῦτο ταῦτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν
διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ
πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων
γιγνόμενον ὅπερ ἐμοί;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσ-
εικέναι.

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτουσα εἰς p. 39.
ταῦτόν, κάκενα ἀ περὶ ταῦτά ἔστι τὰ παθήματα,
φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν οἶον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ
20 τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, δόξα τε ἀληθῆς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνοντις ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι·
ψευδῆ δὲ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς
γράψῃ, τάνατία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ b
25 ρῆθεντα οὗτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἔτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν
ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

17. κάκενα ἀ περὶ ταῦτά ἔστι τὰ παθήματα] i. e. τὸ δοξαστικὸν, the judgment as concerned with sensuous perceptions. Below,

because of its association with sense, it is called τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα. See Appendix D.

ρ. 39. ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὃς μέτα τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. "Οταν ἀπ' ὅψεως ἢ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς 5 εἰκόνες δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὄρᾳ πως. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς; 10

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὄρθως εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψφώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων 15 ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὐ;

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὠσαύτως.

d ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ 20 καὶ λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοντ' ἄν, ὥσθ' ἡμῖν ἔνυμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

25

1. Ζωγράφον κ. τ. λ.] As every act of the intellect is accompanied by Imagination, if Opinion is compared to Writing it must be to Picture-writing.

16. ταῦθ' οὕτω πάσχειν] This must refer to ἔνυμβαίνει βούλεσθαι κρίνειν above, not to the γράμ-

ματα and ζωγραφίματα, which will be mentioned presently; or else the same question would be asked twice. Ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, refers to τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπῆρῶν φοβερόν καὶ ἀλγειόν, §. 18.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφή- p.39.
ματα, ἢ σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι,
περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἔστι, ε
περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἔστι ταῦτα
ἔλπιδες εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτὰ
παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἔλπιδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

10 ΙΧΙΔ. ΣΩ. Ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις
καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως
ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλής ἔστιν;

15 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἄρ'
οὐ τούναντίον ἐκείνῳ;

p. 40.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὲ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μήν εἰπεν ἔλπιδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς
20 ἄνθρωπος γέμει;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἀς ἔλπι-
δας ὀνομάζομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

25 ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἔζωγραφημένα,
καὶ τις ὅρᾳ πολλάκις ἐαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφ-
θονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνε-

25. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα
ἔζωγραφημένα] The meaning of
this and the previous sentence
is: "What we call Hopes are
Propositions and Pictures." As
the text stands, ἔζωγραφημένα is

the predicate of φαντάσματα.
Perhaps we express this suffi-
ciently if we translate: "And
the images painted:" i.e. "and
paintings of the images."

As the
Hopes of
the vicious,
i. e. their
Imagina-
tions and
Opinions of
future
Pleasures,
are Real
but False,
by parity
of reason
the present
Pleasures
that those
hopes occa-
sion may
be False
though
Real.

p.40. ζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα
ἢ καθορᾶ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς
ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθὴ διὰ 5
τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ τὸ πολὺ τού-
ναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἡπτον
πάρειστιν ἔζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗται που. 10

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ε ΣΩ. Ψευδέστιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ¹²
χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν 15
ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι
μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦπαι δὲ
ώσαύτως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ 20
παραπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι
μηδὲ ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

δ ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα γε ἦν, οἷμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα
δοξαν ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ; 25

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε

12. The falsely anticipated
Pleasure in mistaken Hope may
be called, as here, False Plea-
sure. This is, however, an
inaccurate expression. It is
not the Pleasure, but the anti-
cipation of it, i. e. the Imagi-
nation or Opinion, that is False.
Socrates therefore does not
dwell upon this point, although
Protarchus allows the expres-
sion to pass.

27. οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύ-
παις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀν-

καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις ; p. 40.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὅντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὄπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι 5 μηδὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίστε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἵσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι. e

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὗτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε 10 καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίστε ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρήστας ἄλλως ἦ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ;

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονάς γ', οἷμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς p. 41. ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηρὰὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, ὡς Σώκρατες, 20 εἴρηκας. σχεδὸν γάρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἀν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὖσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον υστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἀν 25 ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνο-

τίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις ;] Comparing ἐν ἐκείνοις with ἐν τοιούτοις τισί in the next section, we must suppose that it refers to : ὅντως μὲν, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδὲ ἐπ' ἐσομένοις (not merely to τοῖς μὴ οὖσι κ.τ.λ.) and translate : "in respect of those

predicates," i. e. reality and groundlessness. The ἀντίστροφος ἔξις, corresponding condition, will be, that Pleasure and Pain, as well as Opinions, (*τούτων*) are susceptible of these predicates.

ρ. 41. μένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἵσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς
b κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὡς Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶ κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἔως ἀν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον 5
ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

XXV. ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθλητὰ
πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον
c ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν
ἡμῖν ὥστι, δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς
ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.

The Jux-
ta-position
of Pleasure
and Pain
in Desire
occasions
False Opin-
ion, Im-
agination,
and Plea-
sure.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν
τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἔξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἡ
τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

20

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

d ΣΩ. Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὅπόταν ἡ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρ-
κεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις
ἅμα παρ' ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ
νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

25

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

5. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα κ. τ. λ.]
“As long as I hold this opinion
(or, you hold the opposite op-
inion) of course it has a claim
to be examined :” or, giving
with Badham a different sense

to ἔως, “Until this question is
settled, of course it must not
cease to be examined.”

25. ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη] i. e. in
§ 21, when Hope or the second
kind of Pleasure was discussed.

ΣΩ. Ούκον καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογη- p. 41.
μένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται ;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἡττον ἄμφω τούτω
δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων
εἴτην.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ’ ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν
τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἔκάστοτε, τίς τού-
των πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς
μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδοτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ
λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ’ ἔστι ταῦτα τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις
τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύ-
θεν ὄρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ p. 42.
ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι
τοταῦτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον ;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε
γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς
αὐτὰι γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμα τοῦ
παρ’ αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασταν.

10. ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι] “to determine such problems, questions, about them:” “to judge of them in respect of

such predicates, attributes, relations.” ‘Ἐν indicates the predicate of a proposition of which Pleasure or Pain is the subject.

p. 42. b ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἔγγυθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἂμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δὲ αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς τούναντίον ἐκείναις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἐκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν οὔτε αὐτὸς ὄρθως φαινόμενον τοῦτο ἔρεις, οὐδὲ αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὄρθον τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμῆσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἔξῆς ὀψόμεθα, εὖν τῆδε ἀπαντῶμεν, ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΧΧVI. ΣΩ. Εἴρηται που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαι τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὁδύναι καὶ πάνθ, ὅπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὄνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται,

The Absence of both Pleasure and Pain, a state which the disciples of Heraclitus may admit to be possible, is

το. Τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν must mean the apparent pleasure, therefore τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς γιγνόμενον means another pleasure occasioned by the former, as in Memory or Hope.

17. φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας] οὔσας is added because he has

allowed that a False pleasure may be Real. In the sentence above, τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν referred to an imagined future or past pleasure which had never been enjoyed or never would be, and therefore was Unreal as well as False.

sometimes
mistaken
for Plea-
sure ; an-
other argu-
ment that
a Pleasure
may be
False.

ταύτην αὐτὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' p. 42.
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγ-
νόμενον ἡμῶν ἦ;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἀν γένοιτο, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ ε
νῦν ἔρρου τὸ ἔρωτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἔρωτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέ-
σθαι σε πάλιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὡς Πρώταρχε, φήσω,
τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν
ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἐκάτερα
φῆσ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε
ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἀν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἀν τις
λύπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἴμαι, τόδε p. 43.
λέγεις, ὡς ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνειν, ὡς
οἱ σοφοί φασιν ἀεὶ γάρ ἄπαντα ἀνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.

1. *κατάστασιν*] This term is used by Aristotle to define Pleasure in his treatise on Rhetoric: ὑποκείσθω δέ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τούναντιον. I. XI. He defines it differently in his Ethics and Psychology.

24. *ἀεὶ γάρ ἄπαντα ἀνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ*] Heraclitus taught that nature is perpetually

changing in a recurrent cycle, all things gradually passing into their opposites and being reproduced in turn from their decay. If we imagine the plane of the circle of revolution to be perpendicular, we shall understand why the change is spoken of as an ascending and descending, or movement up and down (όδος ἀνω κάτω). That this was the image we

p. 43. ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἀν μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδε οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφευγε. 5

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπη.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὔτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους. σὺ δὲ ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα ὄπόσα
b πάσχει τι τῶν ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον,
καὶ οὗτ' αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ήμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὕτε 10
τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον;
ολίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ήμᾶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀπαν δήπου τούναντίον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ήμῶν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ
ρήθεν ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι 15
λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

may gather from the following passage of Diogenes Laertius, from whence we may also learn that the transmutation of elements, which we find in the physical theories of Plato and Aristotle, was originally an idea of Heraclitus. Καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὅδὸν ἄνω κάτω, τὸν τε κόσμον γίγνεσθαι κατὰ ταύτην. πυκνούμενον γάρ τὸ πῦρ ἔξυγραίνεσθαι συνιστάμενόν τε γίγνεσθαι ὑδωρ, πηγανόμενον δὲ τὸ ὑδωρ εἰς γῆν τρέπεσθαι καὶ ταύτην ὅδὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω είναι. πάλιν τε αὐτήν τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι, ἐξ ἡς τὸ ὑδωρ γίγνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ, σχεδὸν πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἀνάγων τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης αὔητη δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ὅδος. ix. 7. "Change he called a road upwards and downwards, and Nature a movement along such a path. Fire liquefies by condensation and compression

into Water, and Water solidifies into Earth; and this is the downward road. Earth dissolves into Water, and from Water the rest is reproduced, evaporation from the ocean being the process by which the reproduction is explained; and this is the upward road." Air is not mentioned here, but we find it in another passage, from whence we may infer that the Heraclitean elements were the four afterwards received. Ψυχῆσι θάνατος ὑδωρ γενέσθαι, ὑδατος δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐξ γῆς δὲ ὑδωρ γίγνεται, ἐξ ὑδατος δὲ ψυχή. Clem. Al. Strom. 6, p. 624 C. "The death of Air is the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Earth, the death of Earth the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Air."

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

p. 43.

ΣΩ. Ὡδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀμεπιληπτότερον τὸ εἰ λεγόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἥδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δὲ αὖ μέτριαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότερον οὗτως ἡ κείνως, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὗτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ρήθεις βίος ἀν ἥκοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ὁν ἀλυπόν τε καὶ ἀνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Αληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριτοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἔνα μὲν ἥδυν, τὸν δὲ αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δὲ ἔνα μηδέτερα. ἡ πῶς ἀν φαῖς σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἡ ταύτη, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἀν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἔστιν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν διντων ἡμῖν, ὀντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δὲ εἰ ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.

5. αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι, &c. See the passage from the Timaeus quoted in the note, p. 31, d.

p. 43. ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ημῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ' αὖ, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς αὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ηδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγό- 5 μενος ὄρθως αὖ ποτε οὕτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὕτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὄρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ αὖ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὡς ἔταιρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ p. 44. δοξάζοντων αὐσθανόμεθα.

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ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἰονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;

7. κατά γε τὸν ὄρθὸν λόγον] ὄρθὸς λόγος generally means "right reason," but here, as there is an evident allusion to the antithesis established above between λόγος and δόξα, it is used by a sort of play upon words for "right speech." The thought that the absence of Pain is mistaken for Pleasure, and that which is expressed below, that the intensest Pleasures are alloyed with Pain, and, in general, the Falseness of these Pleasures, is developed in the Republic, the same definition of Pleasure being assumed as was given above. The intermediate state, the absence of Pleasure and Pain, is compared to a middle point, the ascending from which is true Pleasure, and descending true Pain: but the rising to the middle from a lower point, or the renovation of the impaired bodily frame, is not genuine or true, but only apparent Pleasure. "Ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἔστιν ἡ τῶν ἀλλων ἥδονή πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου, οὐδὲ καθερά ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἔγώ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηρόεναι... ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἴπον, αἱ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνονται καὶ λεγόμεναι ἥδοναι, σχέδον αἱ πλεῖσται τε καὶ μέγισται, τούτον τοῦ εἴδους εἰσὶ, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαὶ... ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἥδοναῖς συνεῖναι μεμγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἥδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχρανομέναις ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἐκατέρας φαινεσθαι; 9, p. 583. "No Pleasures but those of the wise are quite true or pure, but painted imitations, as I think I have heard from some Philosopher... For the Pleasures, so called, that come to the soul from the body, the most numerous and greatest, are of this sort, deliverances from Pain... Does it not follow that they are mixed with Pain, and merely phantoms of Pleasure, and painted copies exaggerated by juxtaposition?"

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

P. 44.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν
ἔλεγόν που.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

5 ΣΩ. Ψευδή γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν,
εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις
ἐκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρὶς γε ἦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι,
καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν ἢ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δὲ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὅν, ἡδὺ προσαγορεύεσθαι;

XXVII. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὡς Σώ-
κρατεῖς, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ' ήμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μαν-
15 θάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὁντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὡς Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν,
οἱ τὸ παράπαν ιδονὰς οὐ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὴς ἡ νῦν εἰς περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζονσιν.

22. Καὶ μᾶλα δεινούς λεγομένους κ.τ.λ.] It is not known what school are alluded to. Antisthenes and the Megarici have been suggested, but we have no positive testimony that either defined Pleasure to be the Absence of Pain. Besides, the advocates of this tenet are said to be eminent in Physical science. Now we are expressly told that Antisthenes abstained

from Physical speculation : Ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Κυνικοῖς) τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαρέν... μόνω δὲ προσέχειν τῷ θεμαῷ. Diog. L. 6, 103 : and the affinity of the Megarians to the Eleatics, with their logical subtleties, which procured them the name of Sophists, Ἐριστικοί, makes it improbable that they were addicted even to abstract Physical speculations.

The same school that has defined Pleasure to be the assuagement of Pain, has directed our attention to the fact that the Greatest Pleasures are those which are Morbid and Indecorous.

p. 44. ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαι τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦντις, λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγίεις, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν, γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονὴν, εἶναι. 10
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ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους ὥσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἵχνος. οἷμαι γὰρ τοι-¹⁵ ὄνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὅτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὗτως ἀν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεῖ δή σε, ὡς Πρώταρχε,²⁰ καθάπτερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρώτα μεγέθει.

6. *νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγίεις* does not mean “salubrious” or “salutary,” but “genuine,” “solid,” “real,” as opposed to “hollow,” “counterfeit,” “illusory.”

24. This postulate, as immediately interpreted, is inconsistent with one presently made, p. 53, a, b, c, which must be regarded as Plato's own opinion: that, to discover the true

character of any element, we must examine it, not in its greatest masses, which may possibly be impure, but, in its state of purity, and when all foreign elements have been completely eliminated. This axiom, indeed, is the basis both of induction and of scientific deduction, the one isolating the phenomenon, the other the idea or law.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν p. 44.
ἡντινά ποτε ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολ-
λοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας p. 45.
καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτη συγχωροί τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἡρ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι αἴπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν
ἡδονῶν, ὁ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν
αὗται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

10 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ
τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας;
εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσω-
μέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ ἵστως φαῖμεν ἄν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἢ
ἄν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις
νοσήμασιν ἔχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψώσι καὶ ριγοῦσι, καὶ
20 πάντα ὀπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν,
μᾶλλόν τ' ἐνδείᾳ ἔνγγιγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων
μειζους ἡδονὰς ἵσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀλη-
θὲς εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ρήθεν φαίνεται.

25 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὄρθως ἄν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς εἴς τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν
ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἴόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δέ, μή με ἡγγ
διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρονσιν οἱ σφόδρα
νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλ' οἴον μέγεθός με
30 ζῆτειν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περί τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ
ποτὲ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαμὲν ἡντινα
φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγοντες οἱ φάσκοντες μηδὲ εἶναι δ
τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

p. 45. ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἡττον δεῖξεις. ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρᾳ δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὄρᾶς ἡ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίφ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὄρῳ. τὸν μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμαζόμενος ἐπίσχει λόγος ἑκάστοτε, ὃ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακελευόμενος, φῇ πείθονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων ιστε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι ^{ισ} γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἔχουσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

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p. 46. ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ὃς οὖς εἴπομεν δυσχε- 25 ρεῖς μισοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

5. ὁ παροιμιαζόμενος λόγος]

ἢν Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων σοφός, ὃς τόδ' ἔλεξε,
μηδὲν ἄγαν. καίρῳ πάντα προσέστι καλά.

Theognis has expressed the same :

μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν πάντων μέσ' ἄριστα· καὶ οὕτως
ἔξεις Κύρν ἀρετὴν ἢν τε λαθεῖν χαλεπόν.

If we consider any instance of these we shall see how dependent the Pleasure is upon an antecedent and concomitant Pain, and how Mixed the resultant sensation is.

ΣΩ. Οῖον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ίάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ p. 46.
ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο
γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν
έγγιγνεσθαι; πότερον ἡδονὴν ἡ λύπην;

5 ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γ' ἄρ', ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε
γίγνεσθαι τι κακόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἔνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν ἥ
λόγον ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν
καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἀν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν
το οὐκ ἀν ποτε δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητού-
μενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ούκοῦν ἵτεον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς.

ΣΩ. Τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

15 ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοίνυν μίξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν
αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ, τὰς δὲ αὐτῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρή-
σομεν λύπας ἡδονᾶς μιχθείσας, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ
ξυναμφότερα τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλουμένας.

20 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἡ τῇ διαφ-
θορᾷ τάνατίᾳ ἀμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ρίγῶν θέρηται
καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίστε ψύχηται, ζητῶν, οἷμαι, τὸ μὲν
ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ
25 γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον, μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν,
ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὑστερον ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ. d

24. *ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ* *ξύντασιν* (see *συντίνειν* below) is the reading of the best MSS. Stallbaum prefers *ξύστασιν*, referring to expressions common to Latin and Greek, like Cicero's "ef-*fusio animi in lætitia, in dolore contractio*," metaphors derived from the outward signs of pas-

sion, "vultum, frontem, astrin-
gere, diffundere." But from the
line of Euripides, *τοῦ νῦν σκυθρω-
ποῦ καὶ ξύνεστῶτος φρενῶν*, Alc.
809, it appears that *ξύντασις* ex-
presses a sullen, gloomy, moody,
or pensive state, not excite-
ment, tension, fury, which the
context requires.

p. 46. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἵσων εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

5

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν, ὅπόταν ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ἥ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κυήσει μὴ ἐφικυῆται τις, τὰ δὲ ἐπιπολῆς μόνον δια- 10
ε χέη· τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τούναντίον ἀπορίαις μεταβάλλοντες, ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους ἡδονᾶς τοτὲ δὲ τούναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας, ἡδονᾶς, ξυγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὅπότερ’ ἀν ρέψη, παρέσχοντο, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἥ τὰ 15

p. 47. διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν καὶ ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδονᾶις παρτιθέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ξυμμιχθῆ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμγμένον τῆς 20 λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλείον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα,

8. γαργαλισμῶν] Tingling, internal throbbing or irritation. It is described in the next sentence, but it is not obvious what ailment is meant.

10. κυήσει] Heusde's conjecture for the κυήσει of the MSS.

11. τότε φέροντες—παρέσχοντο] “then, by exposing the external parts to fire, or rushing back for the chance of relief to the extreme of cold, the sufferer occasions to the inner parts excessive plea-

sure, and sometimes the reverse, mixed with pain or pleasure of the outer parts as the balance may incline.” Πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας, ἡδονᾶς, is an asyndeton for πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἥ ἡδονᾶς, of which εἰς ὅπότερ’ ἀν ρέψη is an epexegesis. Of course λύπας corresponds to the preceding ἡδονᾶς, and the second ἡδονᾶς to τούναντίον. Ξυγκερασθείσας agrees with the first ἡδονᾶς.

παντοῖα δὲ σχῆματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἀπέργαζό- p. 47.
μενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης
ἐνεργάζεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

b

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γε, ὡς ἔταιρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου, ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἶον ἀποθυήσκει· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, δσῳ ἀν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὡν τυγχάνη.
ιο καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύταις ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἀεὶ ξῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

c

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν 15 τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάνατία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἄμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὡστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κράσιν ιέναι, ταῦτα ἔμπροσθε μὲν διήλθοθομεν, ὡς ὀπόταν αὖ κενῶται πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς d ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὖσι μίξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς 25 ξυμπίπτει γενομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὁρθότατα λέγειν.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

16. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι] The text is corrupt. The sense requires something like περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν αἷς ψυχῇ, or,

περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅτε ψυχὴ, &c. : “about the Pleasures where the soul,” &c.

p. 47. ΠΡΩ. Ποία, φήσ;

ΣΩ. Ἡν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

ε ΣΩ. Ὁργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον⁵ καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἀρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὐρήσομεν¹⁰ ἀμηχάνων; ἡ δεόμεθα ὑπομιμήσκεσθαι τὸ ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι,

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μελιτος καταλειβομένου,

p. 48. καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὕσας ἀναμεμιγμένας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀν ἔνυμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμιησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὡς ἔστι καν τούτοις μίξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ.

β ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ρᾶδιον, ὥς Πρώταρχε, ἐν²⁵ τούτῳ ξυννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν ὡς γ' ἔοικεν ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ρᾶσον καταμαθεῖν τις οἶστ' τ' ἡ μίξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

Mixed Pleasures : those in which both the Pleasure and the Pain are Corporeal, and those in which one sensation is Corporeal, the other Mental : a third kind of Mixed sensations remains, namely, those which are purely Mental. If we examine as an instance of these the emotion that attends the perception of the Ludicrous we shall find that it always contains a

²⁰ Mixture of contrary feelings.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ ρήθεν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα p. 48.
λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν
5 πέλας ηδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέ-
ραν ἔξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν ;

10 ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἵδε τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν
ἔχει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον
ἔξειν τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὐτῆς πονη-
15 ρίας ἔστι τούναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ^c
τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ γνῶθι σαντόν λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τούναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ d
μηδαμῆ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν [λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμ-
20 ματος] ἀν εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῆ
τέμνειν.

13. Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία, &c. Πο-
νηρία τις ἔξειν τινός, is used for
εἰδός τι πονηρᾶς ἔξειν τινός, “a
subdivision of a species of vice.”
See below : ἢ μὴ φῶμεν τὴν τῶν
φίλων ἔξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν
ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις γελοίαν εἴναι ;
Mischievous self-delusions are
objects of Fear or Hate, harm-
less of Laughter.

Ἐπίκλην expresses a specific
name that distinguishes one

species from another. So in
the Timaeus : ἀέρος τὸ μὲν εὐα-
γέστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθῆρος καλούμενος
δὲ θολερότατος ὀμίλη τε καὶ
σκότος, ἔτερά τε ἀνώνυμα εἴδη. p.
76. Compare below : καὶ ὅσοι
μὲν αὐτῶν μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι
γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἴγαι τά-
ληθῆ φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς
τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβερούς καὶ ἐχθρούς
προσαγορεύων δρόστατον τούτων
σαντῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις.

ρ. 48. ΠΡΩ. Πή φήσ ; οὐ γάρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὁ.
 ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῦν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν ;
 ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαι γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.
 ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρία ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἔκαστον ; 5
 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;
 ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι επλουσιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.
 ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος 10 ἔχοντες.
 ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οἱ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δοξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὐσῆς αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε, οἵμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον 15 εἶδος τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίους έαυτούς, οὐκ ὅντες.
 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
 ρ. 49. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἀρ' οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας 20 ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς ;
 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;
 ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἀν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὄρθως ἀν εἴποι πάθος.
 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε. 25
 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὁ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἴ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἀποπον ἥδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄψεσθαι μίξιν.
 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνωμεν δίχα, λέγεις ;
 b ΣΩ. Πάντες ὅπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ 30 έαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἐπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν

ρώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δέ, οἵμαι, τού- p. 49.
ναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ⁵ μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τάληθῆ φθέγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἔχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τού- e των σαντῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γὰρ ή μὲν τῶν ιοὶσχυρῶν ἔχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσίν· ή δὲ ἀσθενῆς ήμιν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ή τῶν ήδο-

7. τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι] αἰσχρούς is the emendation of Schütz for ισχυρούς.

9. ἄγνοια γὰρ — φύσιν] αἰσχρὸν is here used in its strongest sense and confined to baneful delusions. Harmless self-delusions are objects of mirth (γελοία) not of reprobation (αἰσχρά). Aristotle's definition of the Ridiculous seems to have been suggested by this passage. 'Η δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν μίμησις φαντοτέρων μὲν οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πάσαν κακίαν ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοίον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοίον ἐστιν ὀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν· οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοίον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης. De Arte Poet. chap. 5. "Comedy is the representation of faults, not, indeed, of every degree of badness, for the Unbeautiful is a genus that includes other things besides the Ludicrous. The Ludicrous is a wrongness and want of beauty that causes

no suffering or ruin. A ludicrous mask, for instance, is ugly and distorted, without expressing acute pain." From his definition of Fear (λύπη τις ή ταραχή ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ή λυπηροῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὅστε μέλλειν. Rhet. 2. 5) we see that the last words are added to distinguish, as Plato had done, the objects of Ridicule from the objects of this emotion. They also distinguish them from the objects of Pity: ἐστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φανομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ καὶ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ καν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἀν παθεῖν ή τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. ib. 2. 8.

11. αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς] "both in real life and on the stage." Τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν appear to correspond to this division, and therefore may be translated, "in fiction and in reality."

p. 49. *νῶν καὶ λυπῶν μίξις ἐν τούτοις οὐπώ μοι καταφανής.*

ΣΩ. Τὴν τούνν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἔχθρῶν κακοῖς οὐτ' ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὄρωντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ ἀρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἴδεσι γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὅποσ' ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δὲ ὅποσα ἔρρωμένα. ἡ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἰπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἔξιν ταύτην, ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἄγνοιαν οὖσαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δὲ ἡ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρα ημᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων

γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραυνύντας ἡδονὴν φθόνῳ, p. 50.
λύπη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔνγκεραυνύνται· τὸν γάρ φθόνον
ώμολογῆσθαι λύπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ
γελᾶν ἡδονὴν, ἀμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις τοῖς
χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ
βίου ἔνυπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς
ιοῦμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὄμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὡς Σώ-
κρατεῖς, εἰ καὶ τις φιλονεικοῦ πάνυ πρὸς τάνατία.

XXX. ΣΩ. Ὁργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον
καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προύθέ-
15 μεθα καὶ ὄπόστα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς φαμὲν εὐρῆσειν μηγ-
νύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα, ἡ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου
καὶ ὄργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπερανθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

We have
now exa-
mined the
three kinds
of Mixed
Pleasures,
and inves-
tigating
their attri-
butes have
found them
to be False,
Superla-
tively
Great,
20 (Unmea-
sured) and
Morbid
or Vicious,
(Unbeau-
tiful).

1. *φησὶν ὁ λόγος*] It is unnecessary to point out the premisses in this deduction which can only be admitted with a qualification. It is obvious that the conclusion is false, and that malice is not necessarily involved in the perception of the ludicrous. No doubt there is such a thing as malicious Pleasure: and rejoicing at the misfortunes of our neighbour, (*ἐπιχαιρεκακία*,) and feeling pain at his prosperity, are the two ingredients which compose Envy.

But is this the pleasure legitimately produced by comic scenes? According to Plato's theory a man's susceptibility of being pleased by what is laughable, ought to be in direct proportion to his malignity, but it is rather in an inverse proportion. A certain irritation at the follies of our fellow creatures may enhance the Pleasure we derive from seeing them exposed in Comedy or Satire, but this is not Envy, and is it essential to the Pleasure?

p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαι σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μίξιν; ἀρὸν πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥάδιον κράσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι; λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαντῷ ἀφεῖναι με μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ίόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἄλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίης 10 με ἡ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἷμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων ε αὐριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἡν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

15

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μιχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμύκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἀν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

p. 51. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ὑμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς 25

Unmixed
Pleasures
are also of
three
kinds : (1)
those that
belong to
the sense
of Smell,
(2) those
that belong
to the
senses of
Sight and

3. ἀρὸν πίστεως χάριν] There is a conversational carelessness here: *πίστεως χάριν* followed by *ὅτι ῥάδιον*, must be translated “to convince,” by *ἀφεῖναι*, “to induce :” unless we govern *ἀφεῖναι* by *δεῖν*, as Badham proposes.

11. μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας] “argue till midnight.” Stallbaum quotes from the Antho-

logy : νύκτα μέσην ἐποίησε τρέχων ποτὲ Μάρκος ὀπλίτης, “ran till midnight.”

25. πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς] “that some apparent but unreal pleasures, and others seemingly great and numerous are, for all their appearance, mixtures, &c.” Πρὸς τό must apparently be joined with *εἴναι* δ'

Hearing,
and (3)
those that
belong to
the Intel-
lect.

εῖναι δοκούσας, οὕσας δὲ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας p. 51.
τινὰς ἄμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εῖναι δὲ αὐτὰς
συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν
οὖννων τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς
5 ἀπορίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δὲ αὖτις, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμ- b
βάνων ὄρθως τις διανοοῦτ’ αὖτις;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ
περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὄσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ
ιοτὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους
ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ
ηδείας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὖτις λέγομεν
οὕτως;

15 ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλα ἔστιν ἀλέγω,
πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ε

αὐτάς, though it is an inaccuracy to say that the first set of pleasures, i. e. the relief of pain (*λυπῶν ἀποφυγαῖ*) are mixed with the relief of pain (*ἀναπαύσεσιν οὖννων*). In εἶναι δὲ αὐτάς, δὲ marks the apodosis, and αὐτάς may be translated “nevertheless,” “all the while.” Πολλὰς must be taken not with ἐτέρας, as part of the subject, but with μεγάλας, as part of the predicate. Τὸ πολὺ is an element of the *ἀπειρον*, to which class Pleasure has been referred. The number, quantity (*πλῆθος*) of the pleasures of sense was insisted on by Philebus above, p. 27 e. See also below: τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρίνες, ἢ τὸ πολὺ; and: πῶς οὖν ἀν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ... πλείστον, ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον.

16. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος
κ.τ.λ.] The Beauty of the sphere is referred in the Timaeus to its equality and similarity, species of Unity: which in the discussion of the Limit (*πέρας*) we have already found identified with Goodness. Διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδὲς, ἐκ μέσου πάντη πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἵστη ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸς ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὄμοιότατόν τε αὐτὸς ἔστι τὸ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ καλλιού ὄμοιον ἀνομοίου. p. 52 D. “He gave the universe a spherical form, having a middle point equidistant from every part of the circumference, and perfectly round as if produced by the turning lathe, of all figures the most perfect and self-similar, because he deemed there is ten thousand times more beauty in similarity than in dissimilarity.”

ρ. 51. ὅπερ ἀν υπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἡ ζώων ἡ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίτεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα 5 γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι καὶ τινας ἡδονὰς δ οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κυήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς. ἀλλ' ἄρα μανθάνομεν. ἡ πῶς; 10

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι μέν, ω̄ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τῶν φωνῶν τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν ιείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἔτερον καλὰς ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων 15 ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἐπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

ε ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὄσμὰς ἡττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπη τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημ ἀντίστροφον

8. *κυήσεων*] The emendation of Heusde for *κυήσεων*.

13. Λέγω δὴ τῶν φωνῶν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture. The MSS. give λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, which is unmeaning. It is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of words which express sensations. A smooth sound (*λεία* opposed to *τραχεία*) is said in the Timaeus to be ὁμοία καὶ δμαλή, i. e. produced by a succession of regular and equable pulsations. This is properly the definition of a sweet or musical sound. *λαμπρὰ φωνὴ*,

a clear, brilliant, voice, is said by Aristotle, *de Audibilibus*, to be pure, full, and piercing. *λαμπρὰ* δέ εἰσιν αἱ σαφεῖς καὶ πυκναὶ καὶ καθαραὶ καὶ πόρρω δυνάμεναι διατείνειν. He opposes it to *τυφλή*, a muffled, and *κωφή*, a dying sound.

20. καὶ ὅπη τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει] "The mode and cause of this." The cause of painlessness in these cases is said in the Timaeus to be the gradual and insensible degradation of the organ. See note p. 31, d.

ἀπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἴδη δύο λεγομένων p. 51.
ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ p. 52.
τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται
πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθη-
μάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἔξι ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οὗτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

4. *"Ἐπι δὴ τοίνυν]* So we read in the N. Ethics. Καὶ ἀνεν λυπῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεούσης. 7, 12. "Distress and craving do not precede all pleasures, not intellectual activities for instance, as the natural state is not defective." In another passage Aristotle alludes to the other classes of Unmixed Pleasures : ἡ δόξα δὲ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λιπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν. ἐνδεεῖς γάρ γιγνομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβάνει τὰς ἡδονάς ἀλποι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς δο- φρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ δράματα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδένος γάρ ἐνδειας γεγένηται οὐδὲ γένοιτο διὰ ἀναπλήρωσις. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "The opinion that Pleasure is a process of Becoming seems based on the nutritive Pleasures and Pains, where want and Pain precede, and Pleasure attends the supply. But it is not always so. There is no Pain in intellectual Pleasures ; nor, among the Pleasures of sense, in those of smell, hearing, or

vision ; nor in a great number of memories and hopes. How then can these be processes of Becoming, or where is there a want to be supplied ?" Indeed the whole division of Pleasures given in this dialogue is adopted by Aristotle, and may be traced in the arrangement of his Ethics. In Book 3. c. 10, he divides Pleasures into Bodily or Sensational (*σωματικαὶ*) and Mental (*ψυχικαὶ*). He separates from the Sensational those belonging to Touch and Taste, and makes them subjects of Temperance and Intemperance, (and Book 7. c. 4.) of the principal form of Continence and Incontinence. Here we have Plato's two first classes of Mixed Pleasures. He divides the Mental into Intellectual and Emotional, instanced by the Pleasures of Knowledge (*φιλομάθεια*) and Ambition (*φιλοτιμία*) ; and makes the latter the subjects of the other Virtues and Vices, and of the secondary forms of Continence and Incontinence. These correspond to Plato's third class of Mixed Pleasures. The Intellectual and remaining Sensational Pleasures correspond to Plato's three classes of Unmixed Pleasures.

p. 52. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾶς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς
b τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν 5
χρείαν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὡς μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ
τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ
διαπεραίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης 10
ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἔκαστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς
ἀμίκτους τε εἴναι λύπαις ρήτεον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ρήτεον;

15

c ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἡδη διακεκρί-
μεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν
ἀκαθάρτους ὄρθως ἀν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ

The Pure
or Un-
mixed
Pleasures
possess the

13. οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀν-
θρώπων] This is said because
the abundance (πλῆθος, i. e. ἀπει-
ρία) of sensual Pleasures was
insisted on by Philebus.

18. προσθῶμεν ... ἐμμετρίαν] Here too Aristotle follows
closely the doctrine of the Philebus, using the terms capability or incapability of Excess,
instead of the Platonic Measure
or want of Measure. Thus of
the Unmixed Pleasures he says:
ai ἄκεν λύπης (ἡδοναὶ) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Nic. Eth. 7, 14.
Though he seems to say in
another place that the Unmixed
Sensational Pleasures are susceptible
of Excess though it does
not amount to Vice. Οἱ γὰρ

χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον
χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ,
οὐτε σώφρονες οὐτε ἀκόλαστοι λέ-
γονται· καὶ τοι δόξειεν ἀν εἴναι καὶ
ώς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις καὶ καθ
ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. δμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς
γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέ-
λεσσιν ή ὑποκρίσει οὐδεὶς ἀκολάστους
λέγει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας,
οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὄσμην. ib. 3, 10.
“Delight in objects of vision,
colours, forms, paintings, is not
called Temperance or Intemper-
ance. Yet here too apparently
there is a right degree and ex-
cess and defect. And so with
the objects of hearing. Exces-
sive delight in music or elo-
quence is never called Intem-

ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τού- p. 52.
ναντίον ἐμμετρίαν καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ,
καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς
τοῦ ἀπέιρου γ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἥπτον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε
5 σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς
εἶναι γενεᾶς, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων. d

perance, nor the right degree Temperance. And so of the pleasures of smell." All the Mixed Pleasures on the contrary are susceptible of Excess. Of those of touch and taste he says : τῶν ἔξεων καὶ κυῆσεων ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολὴ, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅσων δὲ ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔστι· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ, καὶ διφύλλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαῖas. ib. 7, 14. "If a moral state or course of action cannot be increased beyond the limit of what is good, no more can the corresponding pleasure : but bodily goods are capable of Excess, and the vicious pursue the Excess instead of the necessary degree." The Emotional Pleasures are susceptible of Excess, but not of so immoral an Excess as the former. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν πιοιύτων ἡδονὴν τὰ δὲ αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δὲ ὑπερβολήν... λέγω δὲ οἷον νίκην, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδεῶν τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ. ib. 7, 4. "Sometimes the causes of pleasure are necessities of life, at others things essentially desirable but capable of Excess,

as superiority, honour, riches, and this class of things good and pleasant. In the latter case when right reason is exceeded in spite of her monitions, the word Incontinence cannot be applied without qualification, but the subject must be added, as Incontinence of anger, of the desire of riches, of gain, of honour." And again : ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαῖων, τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνα φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δὲ ἔναντια τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ... πρὸς ἀπαντα δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (τὰ φύσει αἰρετὰ) καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. ib. "As the causes of appetite and pleasure are sometimes essentially beautiful and good, and naturally desirable, at other times the reverse (the objects of brutal or diseased appetite, θηριότης) - at others again intermediate (the subjects of temperance, above called the necessities of life) ; in the first and third class it is not the emotion or desire or love that is to blame, but the degree of these affections when they are excessive."

6. If, as Badham proposes, we read γενεᾶς for γένους, the reading of the MSS., no other alteration is necessary. Τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρόν is equivalent to

p. 52. ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸ 5 καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς, ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ’ ἄρα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾶς βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων 10 εὸ ήδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ’ αὐτῶν ἐκατέρου καθαρόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἐκάτερον ἴὸν εἰς τὴν κράσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥάῳ παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

15

ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὐτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν προελόμενοι πρώτου

p. 53. ἐν τι διασκοπῶμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελώμεθα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώ- 20 μεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἀν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ήμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρ-

τὰς μεγάλας καὶ τὰς σφοδράς, and αὐτὰς will refer to the whole genus of Pleasure. Socrates thus corrects the statement of Philebus § xv, that the whole genus of Pleasure belongs to the class of Infinites and says that only those which admit of excess belong to this class. This reference to Philebus explains the force of γε after ἀπείρον.

16. κράσιν] This is Badham's proposal for the *κρίσιν* of the MSS. The diversities of purity are forgotten when we come to the *κρίσις* (which thus, indeed, becomes less satisfactory) but are made of great importance in the *κράσις*.

20. διανοηθῶμεν] "inquire," "investigate."

τέστατον, ἐν φῶ χρώματος μηδεμίᾳ μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδε- p. 53.
νὸς ἐνείη;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ω̄
5 Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἄμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων
θήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον; b

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένου
πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἄμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀλη-
10 θέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν
ὁρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐδὲ που πολλῶν δεησόμεθα
παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι
15 λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ω̄ς ἄρα καὶ
ξύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς ε
καθαρὰ λύπης ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων
γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα
20 ικανόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκη-
κόαμεν ω̄ς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν
λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

25 ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ἐπανερωτῶν,
ω̄ Πρώταρχε φίλε. d

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

23. κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ.] The person alluded to is Aristippus: we are told he defined Pleasure to be a smooth movement, Pain a rough movement (in the sen-

tient organ): τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχεῖαν κίνησιν. Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 14, 18. γένεσις is a species of κίνησις.

p. 53. XXXIII. ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δή τινε δύω, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτῳ καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δὲ ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἀμά καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὐσι δύο ἄλλα 10 οἱ ζῆτει κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃ τι λεγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὡς Πρώταρχε ἄλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῷν, λέγει δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐνεκά του 15 τῶν δυτῶν ἔστ' ἀεί, τὸ δὲ οὐ χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἐνεκά γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τάχα δὲ ἵστως, ὡς παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα

p. 54. προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.

20

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὴ τάδε ἔτερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἔτερον ἔν.

25

12. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ] Badham's emendation of the MSS. reading : ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν... ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρο.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον. This might be translated: "Look for two other things related like these two wherever one thing is said to be a third to a second," i. e. "a means to a second," or,

"an end to a second." But this would suppose Protarchus already in explicit possession of the conception of Means and End, the very conception which Socrates wishes to enable him to form by generalization. With κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι compare : ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν δυτῶν τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι § vi.

If we now, by way of parenthesis, reconsider our first problem, we may infer from the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, which makes it a certain Process of Becoming, that no Pleasure can be an absolute End, or, what is synonymous, a Good.

ΠΡΩ. Δύο ἀποδέχομαι σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ p. 54.
γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὄρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἔνεκα ποτέ-
ρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἔνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν
εἶναι γενέσεως ἔνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο ὁ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως
ἔνεκα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἔστι, νῦν πυνθάνει;

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν ἄρ' ἀν ἐπανερωτᾶς με; b

ΣΩ. Τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὡς Πρώταρχέ μοι, πότερα
πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἔνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
πλοΐα ἔνεκα ναυπηγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὅπόσα τοιαῦτ'
ἔστι, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὡς
Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὕτοι σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμ-
μέτεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἔνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ
πάντα ὅργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὑλὴν παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ε
ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκά-
στης ἔνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας
ἔνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάστης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἔστιν, ἔνεκά
τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τό γε μήν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκά του γιγνόμενον
ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἔστι.

9. Πρὸς θεῶν κ. τ. λ.] ἐπανερω-
τῷης seems to be the right
reading, or perhaps the rare

form ἐπανερωτῷς: "Will you
repeat the question?"

p. 54. τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὡς ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατον.

δ ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἡ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὄρθως θήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἰπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδὲ ἡντιωνῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. 10 δῆλον γάρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ε ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάστεται. 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἔξιώμενοι ἡ πείνην ἡ δίψαν ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἔξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀτε ἡδονῆς οὐσῆς αὐτῆς, καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἀν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τάλλα, ἃ 20 τις ἀν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες.

p. 55. ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τούναντίον ἀπαντεῖς τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν. 25

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἴροιτ' ἄν τις

14. τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων] “Who find their τέλος in a productive process,” “who adopt a process of Becoming for their End.” This alludes perhaps to the Cyrenaic definition of the End: τέλος δ

ἀπέφανε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἰσθητοὺς ἀναδιδομένην. The words, δῆλον γάρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾶ, are of course ironical.

23. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν] The text is probably corrupt.

τοῦθ' αἴρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκένον βίον, τὸν ἐν ὥ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δὲ ἡν δυνατὸν ὡς οἶόν τε καθαρώτατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τις, ως ἔοικεν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλογία

4. Πολλή τις — τιθῆται] As the question whether Pleasure is the supreme Good has been long dismissed and a very different problem is now being discussed, this argument about γένεσις and those which immediately follow seem to be misplaced here and we may suspect an interpolation of the whole passage from τί δὲ τὸ τούνδε down to ἀλογώτατα.

If we consider it comes from the hand of Plato we may suppose that an undercurrent of thought somewhat different to that which is expressed is intended to suggest itself to the reflecting reader. We may suppose its real drift is not to overthrow the thesis that Pleasure is the chief Good, but to suggest the narrowness of the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, and ridicule its inconsistency with the favourite tenet of the school. After discussing the lowest kinds of Pleasure which he agrees with the Cyrenaics in defining to be γένεσις, and then enumerating a higher order of Pleasures, Plato might have added, and these require a different definition, for they are neither γένεσις, nor attended with γένεσις. Instead of this he prefers tacitly to ridicule Aristippus, for excluding even these by his faulty definition from the sphere of the Good. Plato himself may have agreed with Aristotle who says, referring perhaps to this passage :

οὐδὲ ἀνάγκη ἔτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γάρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αἱ ἡδοναὶ, οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πάντας, ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος οὐδὲ γιγνομένων συμβαίνοντων ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἔτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν, ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τις εἶναι ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γάρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἔτερον. Nic. Eth. 7, 12. "We need not infer that there is any higher good than Pleasure, because, as they say, an End is better than the productive process. For Pleasure is neither a process of production nor always attended with a process of production, but is sometimes an ultimate function and final activity, accompanying, not a process of formation but, the application of what is perfectly formed to its destined purpose. And the End of pleasures does not always lie beyond them, but beyond those only which attend the progress of our nature to its perfection. So that the true definition of Pleasure is, not a sensible formation of the normal state but, a function of the normal state when formed, and say instead of sensible, unimpeded. It is supposed to be a productive process on account of its finality, because

ρ. 55. ξυμβαίνει γιγνεσθαι, έάν τις την ήδονην ως ἀγαθὸν ήμῖν τιθῆται.

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

b ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἔστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;
μηδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις
πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ήδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν
δὲ ἡ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ
εἴληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ

the ultimate function is confounded by some thinkers with the process of production, widely as they differ."

However, even this interpretation does not account for the last words, *πολλή ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε —ἄλογάτα*, which can only apply to the original thesis, that Pleasure is the chief and sole Good. Shall we suppose that the Philebus is a composition of two distinct fragments, forming a well-proportioned whole, but rather carelessly soldered together in respect of some of the minuter touches? One of the fragments may have consisted of the two Ethical problems, and the solution of each by means of three criteria; the other of the exposition of Dialectical method, the list of Principles, the Classification of Pleasures and Sciences, and the Composition of the Highest Good. In confirmation of this hypothesis it may be observed, that when the criterion of Truth is applied, § 41, to ascertain the degrees of affinity of Pleasure and Knowledge to the Good, no notice is taken of the elaborate arguments of Socrates, § 21–26, to establish the

Falseness of the Mixed Pleasures; but some rather poetical logic is extemporized by Protarchus, who contributes much more to the reasoning on the first problems than to the other portions: and on the other hand no notice is taken of the fact that the Pure Pleasures were allowed, § 32, to possess Truth, Beauty, and Measure. No notice again is taken of the affinity of Reason to the divine Cause, § 16, though it tends to an immediate solution of the point in issue. Again, after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the Philebus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues. It would be interesting to know what theory was advanced by Galen, in his lost work, *περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων*, "On the abrupt transitions of the Philebus."

ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δὲ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι p. 55.
φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κανὸν δὲ ἄριστος
πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἔστι ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν
ἀλογώτατα.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως
ἔξετασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ
ἐπιστήμης οἵον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γεν-
ιοναίως δέ, εἴ πή τι σαθρὸν ἡχεῖ, πᾶν περικρούωμεν,
ἔως ὅτι καθαρώτατόν ἔστ' αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατι-
δόντες εἰς τὴν κράσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε
τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις. d

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μέν, οἷμα, δημιουργικόν ἔστι
τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν
καὶ τροφήν; ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν

12. *κράσιν* is Schleiermacher's correction. It is required for the reason stated in the note, p. 52, e.

15. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν κ. τ. λ.] A four-fold division of Sciences is given. They are Productive or Practical (*δημιουργικαὶ*, *χειροτεχνικαὶ*) and Contemplative or Theoretical. These classes are again subdivided. The Productive are (1) Music with its group, and (2) Architecture with its group. The Contemplative are (3) Mathematics, subdivided into Pure and Applied, and (4) Dialectic or Speculative Philosophy. Physical Science would

make a fifth class, unless it is to be grouped along with Applied Mathematics. If we merge both of them in the Architectural group, we get a division identical with that in the sixth book of the Republic. We there have four classes, *Ἐπιστήμη* or Dialectic, *Διάνοια* or the Mathematical Sciences, and *Πίστις* and *Εἰκασία*. The two last are not exactly defined, but *Πίστις* appears to include, along with other members, Physical Science, and *Εἰκασία* the Mimetic arts.

19. διανοηθῶμεν] "Examine." *Διάνοια* = *ζήτησις*, *Εθ.* Nic. 6, 9.

b. Proceeding now to examine Science, we find that its first division is into Productive and Theoretical. The Productive Sciences are subdivided into two classes, differing like the Pleasures in Purity, and represented by Music and Architecture.

p. 55. πρῶτα, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἔχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ἡπτον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἔκαστων 5 αὐτῶν χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς;

ε. ΣΩ. Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἀν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἔκαστης ἀν γίγνοιτο.

10

ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δή.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἀν καὶ τὰς αὐσθήσεις καταμελετῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν, ἀς

p. 56. πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτη καὶ πόνω τὴν 15 ρώμην ἀπειργασμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμφωνον ἀρμόττονσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική, τὸ μέτρον 20

8. Οἷον πασῶν κ.τ.λ.] So in the Republic: τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν...οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν, φ' πάσαι προσχρῶται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνουσι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι, θ' καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν...λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν. Η δύναμις τούτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; 7. p. 522. "Take some of the sciences of universal application; the common element, for example, that is adopted into all arts, deductions, and sciences, and that must always be mas-

tered first; I mean Arithmetic and the theory of Ratios. Is it not true that every art and science must borrow from these?"

12. εἰκάζειν] This word seems to identify the group under discussion with the fourth class of sciences in the Republic which are called *Εἰκασία*.

20. καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικὴν κιθαριστικὴν and αὐλητικὴν, the theory of stringed and wind instruments, were considered an exhaustive division of instrumental music. Only αὐλητικὴ is expressed, because κιθαριστικὴ is implied in ἀρμόττονσα. The

Theoretical Science is subdivided into Mathematics and Dialectic. The Mathematical sciences are further divided into two classes, the Popular and the Philosophic.

ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, p. 56.
ῶστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν
δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰατρικὴν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυ-
βερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εύρήσομεν
ἔχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις
10 τε καὶ ὄργάνοις χρωμένην, τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ
πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν
παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ
15 ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ἔνδυσις χρωμάτης. κανόνι γάρ,
οἶμαι, καὶ τόρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτῃ καὶ στάθμῃ καί σ
τινι προσαγωγίῳ κεκομψευμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὄρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας,
20 τὰς μὲν μουσικὴν ἔννεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάτ-

words Τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χόρδης τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα compared with μημήσεως, § 38 seem to show that wind instruments were regarded as subordinate to stringed instruments. Instead of αὐλητική, αὐλητική has been proposed. Ἀρμόττονσα would then refer to the tuning an instrument, as opposed to the playing upon it. Μέτρον here must mean pitch, not time or rhythm.

9. πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὄργάνοις χρωμένην] If Plato had foreseen the apparatus of instruments for detecting and

measuring phenomena that would be placed at the command of the student of nature, he must on his own principles have allowed that physical investigation might some day rise to the rank of a tolerably accurate science.

16. καὶ διαβήτῃ κ.τ.λ.] διαβήτης is explained to mean καθιεμένη μολύβδος, a plummet. Στάθμη is σχοινίον λεπτὸν ἐρυθρῷ ἢ μέλανι χρώματι κεχρισμένον, a red line, προσαγώγιον is τὸ τῶν τεκτόνων ὄργανον δι προσάγοντες εὐθύνουσι τὰ στρεβλὰ ἔιλα.

ρ. 56. τονος ἀκριβείας μετισχουσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἀς νῦν δὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δή.

δ ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἀλλ', ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἀρ' οὐ διττὰς αὖ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ή πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις; 10

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἀρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δὲ αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πή ποτε διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἀν ἀριθμητικήν; 15

ΣΩ. Οὐ σμικρὸς ὄρος, ὡς Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμούν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἡ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολούθησειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύνασθαι εἶναι. 25

5. πρώτας, i. e. ἡγεμονικάς]
Mathematical truths are primary because they are presupposed by the Physical sciences as their logical basis; and the study of Mathematics therefore naturally precedes the study of Physical science. The chronological order in which nature

developes the ideas is in harmony with their logical relation, if, at least, it is true that μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτο ἄν, σόφος δὲ ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. Nic. Eth. 6. 8. “A boy may be a Mathematician but is not fit for Speculation or Physical philosophy.”

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτο- p. 56.
νικὴν καὶ κατ’ ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεω-
μετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων; πότερον p. 57.
ώς μία ἐκατέρα λεκτέον ἡ δύο τιθῶμεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἀν δύο κατὰ
τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἐκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. οὖ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα
εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἀν ἀποφήνασθαι
10 τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὐτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἥπτον
ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡρχόμεθα ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζῆτων
ἀντίστροφον ἐνταῦθα προβεβηκέναι, σκοπῶν ἀρά b

1. λογιστικὴ perhaps is that part of the theory of numbers which treats of Ratios (λόγοι). It is somewhat enigmatically contrasted with Arithmetic in the Gorgias. *Tls ἔστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη*; — *τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιον τε καὶ περιττὸν γνώσις ὅσα ἀν ἐκάτερῃ τυγχάνῃ ὅντα... τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην*; — *τὰ μὲν ἀλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἔχει. περὶ τὸ ἀντὸν γάρ ἔστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν διαφέρει δὲ τοσούτον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθυνς ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστικὴ.* p. 451. “Arithmetic is one of the sciences that consider the Even and the Odd, and investigates the amount of either separately. Logistic agrees with Arithmetic up to a certain point, having the same thing, Even and Odd, for its subject. The differentia is that both the internal and external numerical relations of the Even and Odd are investigated by Logistic.”

The writer of the Epinomis after saying that man was divinely taught Arithmetic by the alternations of day and night, and periodic changes of the moon, proceeds apparently to refer to Logistic. Καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτων τε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔνυπαν τὸ δυνατὸν τῶν ζώων μάλα ἀριθμητικὸν γέγονε, τὸ καθ' ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸν σκοποῦν τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἀλληλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι δοκῶ μὲν μείζονος ἔνεκα καὶ τούτον σελήνην αὐξανομένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμποῆσας μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἔνυπαν τὸν ξυνεστήσατο καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἥρξατο ξυνορᾶν εὐδαιμονι τύχη. p. 979. These words are hopelessly corrupt, but we may gather from them that the writer regards the Relation of numbers (μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἔνυπαν, ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν) as the special province of Logistic.

2. *ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζῆτων ἀντίστροφον*] “to find something analogous to pleasures,” i. e. some division of the sciences

ρ. 57. ἐστί τις ἔτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς⁵ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνευρίσκει σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἀρ' οὐ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὅμωνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μᾶς, ¹⁰ επάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ἐπανερωτᾶ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὡς Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ διδῷμεν ἀπό-¹⁵ κρισιν;

analogous to the division of pleasures. Προβεβηκέναι is Schleiermacher's emendation for προβεβληκέναι. It is required to form with ἐνταῦθα an antithesis to ὅτε ἡρχόμεθα.

9. δμώνυμον] “an individual,” or, “an indivisible species.” Ὁμώνυμον in Plato is not equivalent either to δμώνυμον, or συνώνυμον, as defined by Aristotle. According to the latter δμώνυμον is a thing with an equivocal name, i. e. a name with two or more unconnected meanings: συνώνυμον, a thing with a generic name, i. e. a name denoting two or more things essentially related. Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὅν ὄνομα μόνον κοινὸν δὲ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἔτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅτε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον...συνώνυμα δὲ λέ-

γεται ὅν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς. Categ. p. 1. It happens that in speaking of the division of the sciences which Plato mentions in the text, Aristotle uses the word συνώνυμος: σχεδὸν δὲ συνώνυμοί εἰσιν ἔντα τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἀστρολογία ἢ τε μαθηματικὴ καὶ ἡ ναυτική, καὶ ἀρμονικὴ ἢ τε μαθηματικὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν. Anal. Post. 1. 13. “The same name in a nearly univocal sense is sometimes applied to both branches; as astronomy denotes the mathematical science and a branch of the art of navigation, and harmonics both the mathematical and the aesthetic science.” Here συνώνυμος means just the opposite to δμώνυμον in our text.

Of these the Philosophic has the more Exactitude and Purity: Dialectic, however, otherwise called Reason or Wisdom, is the Truest and Purest Knowledge.

ΠΡΩΤΩΣ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγε- p. 57.
θος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾶον;

ΠΡΩΤΩΣ. Τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν
αῦται τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δὲ
αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φιλοσοφούντων ὄρμὴν
ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ τε καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ
ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύ-
οντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινώμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ¹
λόγων ὀλκήν,

ΠΡΩΤΩΣ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικὰ καὶ δύο μετρητικὰ

II. λόγων δλκήν] seems to mean “misunderstanding,” “misrepresentation,” “misinterpretation of a doctrine to be refuted,” “doing violence to the meaning of a formula.” Compare: οὐδεὶς δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς ἀλλ... ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε λέγομεν... καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει... ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐσ συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ δύνομάτων, ἀοὶ πολλοὶ ὅτη διν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι. Theaet. p. 168 c. Plato probably alludes to some of his own adversaries, perhaps the Megarian Eristici. Protagoras, however, appears to have written against the Mathematicians, asserting that nothing in nature corresponded to their definitions. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διν εἴη μεγεθῶν οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ αἰσθηταὶ γραμμαὶ τοιαῦται εἰσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης· οὐδὲν γὰρ εὐθὺν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ

στρογγύλουν. ἀπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ’ ὕσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας. Arist. Metaph. p. 998 A. “On the other hand sensible magnitudes and the visible heavens can hardly be the subjects of astronomy. No sensible lines satisfy the geometrical definitions of straightness or curvature, for a ruler touches a material circle at more points than one, as Protagoras said in his Confutation of Geometry.” This polemic may be alluded to here.

13. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικά κ. τ. λ.] The division of the sciences into two branches, one more practical, the other more theoretical, one dealing with facts, the other with laws, one with rules, the other with principles, is again enforced in the Republic, and appears to have been indicated here for the first time. It implies a consider-

ρ. 57. καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται ἔννεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχονσαι ταύτην, ὄνόματος δὲ ἐνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Διδώμεν τύχη ἀγαθῆ τούτοις, οὓς φὴς δεινοὺς εἶναι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς Σώκρατες. 5

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα εἶναι;

able progress of scientific inquiry, and in fact furnishes a principle for the systematic coordination of the sciences. Ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον διαφέρει τὸ διότι τοῦ ὅτι τῷ δι' ἀλληλης ἐπιστήμης ἔκατέρου θεωρεῖν. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἀλληλα ὡστ' εἶναι θάτερον ὑπὸ θάτερον, οἷον τὰ ὀπτικὰ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ μηχανικὰ πρὸς στερεομετρίαν καὶ τὰ ἀρμονικὰ πρὸς ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πρὸς ἀστρολογικήν... ἐνταῦθα γάρ τὸ μὲν ὅτι τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ διότι τῶν μαθηματικῶν... ἔχει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀπτικὴν ὡς αὐτῇ πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀλληλης πρὸς ταύτην, οἷον τὸ περὶ τῆς ἵριδος τὸ μὲν γάρ ὅτι φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ διότι ὀπτικοῦ. Anal. Post. 1. 13. “Another contrast between law and fact is that they may belong to different sciences, which happens when two classes (or sciences) are related as species and genus. as, for instance, Optics and Geometry, Mechanics and Stereometry, Harmonics and Arithmetic, Celestial Phenomena and Astronomy... Again the same relation that Optics bears to Geometry, another science bears to Optics; as, for instance, the theory of the rainbow. Here the facts belong to Natural Science, the explanation to Optics.” A similar division is traceable in the truths of Poli-

tical philosophy. The *Æsthetics* of Morality are most requisite for individual practice. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως οὐδὲν προσδέχει τοῦ διότι. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. “The first step in moral knowledge is to recognise a particular duty; and where this is sufficiently evident to sense, a man need not know the law on which it depends.” Even in practice, however, we sometimes require the guidance of general ideas. Ὡστε δεῖ ἀμφω ἔχειν (τὴν τε τῶν καθόλου φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν τῶν καθέκαστα) ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. ib. 6. 7. “Both Rational and *Æsthetic* morality are requisite, though more especially the latter.” Ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη ἀνὴρ εἰστα τοῦ καθ' ἕνα καὶ ἵατρὸς καὶ γυμναστῆς καὶ πάντας ὃ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιούσις... τάχα δ' ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτε ὀλίγους νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι. ib. 10. 9. “Rules for the government of an individual would be best laid down by the physician, gymnastic teacher, or other artist who knows the universal or special law; and so a man who has to educate whether many or few should attempt to acquire the general ideas of a legislator.”

6. ἀκριβεῖς] The gradations of severity in method of the

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ήμᾶς, ω̄ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἀν η̄

p. 57.

different sciences, first indicated here, became an established doctrine of Logic, and is often insisted on by Aristotle. It may be interesting to cast a glance at his treatment of this subject. There are degrees of severity, he says, even in the Mathematical sciences. 'Ακριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἡ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι: καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἀρμονικῆς: καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. Anal. Post. I. 27. "Priority and a higher degree of exactitude belong to the science which deals with laws as well as facts compared with another which deals with facts alone: to the science whose subject is abstract compared with another whose subject is concrete, as to Arithmetic compared with Harmonics: and to the science whose subject is relatively incomplex compared with another whose subject is complex, as to Arithmetic compared with Geometry (whose subject combines Space with Quantity)." Less rigorous demonstration is to be expected from the Natural sciences than from the Mathematical. Τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἀπασιν ἀπαιτη τέον ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὑλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος, ἀπασα γάρ ἵστως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὑλην. Met. D. p. 995. "The rigorous demonstration of the Mathematician is not always to be de-

manded, but only when the subject matter of a science is an abstraction. Therefore the Natural sciences have a different modality, for their subjects are always concrete." Again there is less exactitude in the *Æsthetic* than in the Rational branch of Morality. 'Εκείνο δὲ προδιωμολογήσθω ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς διφειλεὶ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπίστουεν, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὑλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι ... τοιούτον δ' ὄντας τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθέκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβές. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. "Let us first postulate that Moral laws are unsusceptible of precise codification, as we said above that the subject matter determines the amount of precision to be required in the propositions. And, vague as is the general theory, the details are still more indeterminate." The consideration of the different modality (*τρόπος*) of the different sciences, sometimes said from a narrower definition of Logic to be extra-logical, was a principal function of the Aristotelian Logic. At least it is generally in reference to this office that he alludes to Logic, viewing it on this account as a general Propædeutic. "Οτα δ' ἐγχειροῦντι τῶν λεγόντων τινες περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, διν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοιοῦ δρῶσιν δεῖ γάρ περὶ τούτων ἡκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. Met. T. 3. p. 1005 B. "The discussions of some Meta-

ρ. 57. τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναμεν.

ρ. 58. ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτιὴ πᾶς ἀν τὴν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰς ταύτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἴμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήργηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί πῶς τοῦτο, ὡς Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἀν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε¹⁰ Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι¹⁵ πασῶν τεχνῶν πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῦτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δὲ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἀν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς ἀπολιπεῖν.

physicians on the modality (degree of rigour) to be required in the proofs, are due to a want of previous training in Logic. For the investigator ought to come antecedently prepared with this knowledge, and not mix up two inquiries." Πεπαιδευμένον γάρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοσούτον τάκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἔκαστον γένος ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ρήτορικὸν ἀποδεῖξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. "He who has had the right preliminary training will measure his demands of exactitude in any province by the nature of the subject matter. For it is as illogical to demand demonstration from an Orator, as to

accept probable reasoning from a Mathematician." Διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἔκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἀποπον ἀμά ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπους ἐπιστήμης. Met. 2, 3: "A preparatory Education should instruct us in the right method of the various sciences, for it is out of place to inquire into the mode of investigation after we have begun to investigate."

4. Δῆλον ὅτιὴ πᾶς ἀν] Thompson's emendation in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No.XI. The reading of the MSS. is δῆλον ὅτι ἡ πᾶσαν, κ. τ. λ.

16. Τὰ ὅπλα, κ. τ. λ.] The phrase of Protarchus is elliptical. He probably meant: ἐναντία τίθεσθαι τὴν ψῆφον, but Socrates suggests that he was going to say: ἐναντία τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα (which

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτη, ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ. p. 58.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὡς φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐξήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἡ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστῃ καὶ ἀρίστῃ καὶ πλείστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, εἰ ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τάκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κανέν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὄντινάστα. Ιο τοῦτ' ἔστιν δὲ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσει Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ἡ δὲ εἰπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε ἔλεγον, κανέν εἰ σμικρὸν καθαρὸν δὲ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ 15 καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν τούτῳ γένος αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεύστατῳ καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ίκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτε εἴς τινας ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ 20 πάντα ἔνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διερευνησάμενοι, τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἀν, ἡ τινα ἐτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπόν, οἷμαι, συγχω- 25 ρῆσαι τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἡ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ταύτην.

we may infer from this passage would have sounded more presumptuous), but checked himself. We may translate: "But now I should not like to break with either of you."—"Break a lance with either, you were going to say, I think, but a sud-

den humility restrained you."

II. *ὑπάρχειν*] Badham proposes *ὑπερέχειν* for *ὑπάρχειν* and *κρατεῖν* δὲ *ἡ εἴπον* for *κρατεῖν* *ἡ δὲ εἴπον*. Perhaps we should read *ὑπερέχειν* with Badham, and change *κρατεῖν* *ἡ δὲ εἴπον* into *πρὸς ἀκριβειαν* δὲ *ἡ εἴπον*.

p. 58. ΣΩ. ³Αρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὁ λέγεις
νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα πεπό-

p. 59. *υηνται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαι χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ*
δόξαν *ζητοῦσι ξυντεταγμένως*; εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως
ἡγεῖται τις ζητεῖν, οὐσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον 5
τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ
ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἀν ταῦτα,
ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Οὔκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ ¹⁰
γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ήμῶν ὁ τοι-
οῦτος ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἀν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκρι-

2. *ὅσαι*] This is an obvious correction for *ὅσαι*. Badham would also change *ταῦτα* into *ταύτας*.

4. *εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.*] No place was expressly allotted to the Physical sciences. Unless we rank them with Practical Mathematics, we must invent a new class for them. We shall then have six altogether.

14. *Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς, κ.τ.λ.*] The belief in the proposition that Nature is uniform and invariable, which is the basis of the inductive sciences, appears to be partly the result of the cultivation of these sciences. At least it hardly seems to be fully realized in the ancient philosophies. Yet we find much more than its germs there, propositions, in fact, that are inconsistent with the text. In the Timaeus the material element is said to be the seat of Necessity, the spiritual world the sphere

of will and freedom. Μεμυ-
μένη γάρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου
γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νῦ συ-
στάσεως ἐγεννήθη. νῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης
ἀρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γι-
γνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλ-
τιστον ἄγειν, ταῦτη κατὰ ταῦτά τε
δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς
ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ξυνίστατο
τόδε τὸ πᾶν. Timaeus, p. 48.
“This world is the result of the
meeting of Necessity and Rea-
son. And as Reason ruled Ne-
cessity and persuaded her to
produce generally the best re-
sults, it was thus, Necessity
yielding to the persuasion of
Wisdom, that this Universe
originally arose.” Aristotle re-
peats the same. When we
reason from an End, he says,
our conclusions are hypotheti-
cally necessary : that is, we
only ascertain the necessary
conditions of that End : but in
reasoning from the material
element the conclusions are ab-

βεστάτη ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὃν μήτε ἔσχε μηδέν p. 59.
πώποτε κατὰ ταῦτα μήθ' ἔξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν
ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὐν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ'
ἡντιοῦν πῶς ἂν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ
ότιοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά
ιο ἔστι τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχονσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε.

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γορ-
γίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔαν, τόδε δὲ
διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ
τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὁ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές,

E. We
are now
prepared
to deter-
mine the
Composi-
tion of the
Perfect
human life,
and to
solve our
15

solutely necessary. Φανερὸν δῆ
ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς
τὸ ὡς ὑλὴ λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις
αἱ ταῦτης. Physic. Ause. 2. 9.
"Absolute necessity in the phys-
ical world is due to the mate-
rial element and its operations."
And yet, after truly criticizing
the doctrine of Heraclitus, that
nothing in nature is unchange-
able, and pointing out that even
change may obey unchanging
laws, he immediately after-
wards, as if dissatisfied with
this, takes refuge in the mo-
tions of the heavenly bodies, as
an instance of something regu-
lar and uniform. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
παρέντες ἐκεῖνα λέγωμεν, ὅτι οὐ ταῦ-
τον ἔστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ
ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. κατὰ μὲν
οὐν τὸ ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον, ἀλλὰ

κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀπαντα γινώσκομεν.
ἔτι δὲ ἀξίον ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς οὐτως
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν
αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν
ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὐτως ἔχοντα, περὶ
ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δομοίως ἀπεφή-
ναντο. Met. 1, 5. p. 1010 A.
"Waving this we will say, that
there is a difference between
change of quantity and change
of quality. Assume that the
quantity is variable: it is al-
ways the Form that is the ob-
ject of science. And there is
another ground for censuring
those who hold this view; for
even among sensible objects it
is the lesser number that sug-
gest it, and yet all the move-
ments of the celestial bodies
are equally included in their
ban of inconstancy."

τ. 59. περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἡ δευτέρως ἐκείνων ὅ τι μάλιστά ἐστι ἔνγγενες· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλ- 5 λιστα ἄρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εὔκος γε.

δ ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἡ γ' ἀν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὄνόματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἐστιν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὄρθως κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρε- 15 σχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ ταῦτα τὰ ὄνόματα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι ε πρὸς τὴν ἄλλήλων μίξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερὲ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἀν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι. 20

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐ μιγνύναι ἐπιχειρη- τέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν 25 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὄρθότερον ἀν ἔχοι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἀ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὐ δὲ ἡ παροιμία

second problem.
Recapitulation:

The original pretensions of Pleasure and Knowledge were overthrown by the test of Sufficiency.

12. ἀπηκριβωμένα] This word and is equivalent to πάνυ or connected with ὄρθως has the μάλα. ἀπηκριβωμένα ὄρθως=όρθητα; "superlatively right."

δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δῆς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπα- p. 60.
ναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός. οἴμαι γὰρ οὗτο πως τὰ
5 τότε λεχθέντα ρηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὄρθον πᾶσι
ζώοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθὸν τοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι ξύμπαστι, καὶ δύο
10 ὄνόματα, τάγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἐνί τινι καὶ φύσει μᾶτι
τούτων ὄρθως τεθέντες ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δὲ πρῶτον μὲν
οὐ φησι τοῦτον εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὄνόματα, καὶ
τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν
ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας
15 τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι τε καὶ ἦν
τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὥς Πρώταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἀν
ξυνομολογοῦτο;

20 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν
ἀλλων.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνι;

ΣΩ. ^cΩι παρείη τοῦτον ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους
25 πάντως καὶ πάντη, μηδενὸς ἔτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖ-
σθαι, τὸ δὲ ίκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐκάτερον
ἐκάτερον θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων, ἅμικτον μὲν
30 ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ
τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν;

p. 60. ΠΡΩ. ³Ην ταῦτα.

d ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἰκανὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι τῷ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε,⁵ νῦν ὄστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὄρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἄν οἱ καὶ ὄτιοῦν εἶναι ἡ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονήν, εἴθ' ὡς πλείστην εἴθ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην, εἰ μήτε ἀληθῶς ¹⁰ δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε ε πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ' ὄντιοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταῦτὰ δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἄν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετά φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

p. 61. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἴρετὸν καὶ ¹⁰ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἀν τούτων εἴη;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τούννυν ἀγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα

What is the principle of Goodness in the Perfect life? What shall we admit into the Composition of the Perfect life? We will first admit what we have ascertained to be the Truest Pleasures and Sciences, namely, the Purest.

16. ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς] This is not a mere repetition of the first question (*εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.*) Socrates then asked whether Pleasure alone is even desirable (*αἴρετόν*); now, whether it is perfect (*τέλεον*). See the note on the distinction of *τέλεον, ἰκανὸν, αἴρετόν*, p. 20, d.

23. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν is henceforth used to signify the ideal or supramundane Good; and τὸ

τέλεον, i. e. ὁ μικτὸς βίος, the final cause of human life, only holds the second rank. The characteristics of this latter are deduced from the attributes of the ideal Good or the divine nature. In the present dialogue, which is of a somewhat popular character, this is done without much severity of argument: but Plato appears to have pursued the same method

τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵν' ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ p. 61.
δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τάγαθὸν εἰλήφα-
5 μεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τις τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν
οἰκησιν πρῶτον ὄρθως, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, μέγα δὲ
τι δή που πρὸς τὴν εὔρεσιν ἀν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ
καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τάγαθὸν
ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μιχθέντι καλῶς τὸ
ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή;

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραυ-
νύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἡφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ε-
20 ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

in his more scientific ethics. In thus basing his Political philosophy on theological or metaphysical considerations he differs from Aristotle. The latter makes conceptions of the end of practice and production the ultimate premisses of Practical and Productive sciences. The connection of the specific Goods proposed as ends by the practical and productive reason with the transcendent Good or with the general laws of Goodness he ex-

cludes from Art and Moral science and assigns to Speculative philosophy. One of his most tangible reasons for this is, that moral truths are more evident than truths of theology or philosophy, and therefore it would be illogical to base the former on the latter. *"Ισως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμενόν τι δεικνύαι τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτατα.* Magn. Mor. i. 1.

p. 61. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι, μέλιτος μὲν ἀν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως ηγαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς ὕδατος· ἀς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμιγνύναι. 5

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

d ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἄρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάση φρονήσει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ἦ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἀν μιγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινὰ ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἡν ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἐτέρας ἄλλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα; 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

e ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ωσαύτως ὅντα ἀεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς 20 ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εῖναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὄρθως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὶ τάληθέστατα τμήματα ἐκατέρας ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον ἔνυμίξαντες, ἄρα ἵκανὰ ταῦτα ἔνυκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέ- 25 χειν ἡμῖν, ἡ τινος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων;

15. τέχνη] Here τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are used in the Aristotelian sense, the one as ποιητικὴ ἐπιστήμη, the other as θεωρητικὴ. As ἡ ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα κ.τ.λ. refers to applied mathematics and physical science, it seems that

these ought to be considered a third or third and fourth division of theoretical science, and placed between the arts and the other theoretical sciences, so as to make five or six divisions in all.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.

p. 62.

These
alone are
not Suffi-
cient; we
must there-
fore su-
peradd
the Mixed
or Impure
Sciences.

XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐστω δή τις ἡμῶν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς πέρι δικαιοσύνης, ὃ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ἰκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαιρᾶς αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἄνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαιραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τού- 10 τοὺς ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλ- b λοις ὁμοιῶς κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

5. *διανοούμενος* in the Republic is an epithet appropriated to the Mathematician. It appears used designedly here to express with *φρονῶν* the two first divisions of Science.

9. *ταύτην*] *Tauta* and *τάδε* are used in Plato like *τὰ δεῦρο* in Aristotle, to express the present, sensible world.

10. καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις] "Who uses when he builds a house the other rules to the same extent that he uses the circles :" i. e. who, instead of material instruments and measures, has only the ideal or conceptional line, angle, square, &c. to guide his handiwork.

By the divine sphere and divine circle we must apparently understand, not ideas, but the intermediate world (*τὰ μεταξύ*) whose existence, as we learn from Aristotle, was maintained by Plato. As the Mathematical sciences intervene in his arrangement between Natural science and Philosophy, so

he makes a corresponding set of objects, the Mathematical world (*τὰ μαθηματικά*) intervene between Nature and the world of Ideas. We learn this from Aristotle, for we should hardly have discovered it from the writings of Plato, though it harmonises with the following passage of the Republic : *Ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλατα, ἐπει τέρ ἐν ὄρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγείσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν ἃ τὸ δυν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἀλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει. ἀ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτὰ, ὅψει δοῦ.* Z. p. 529. " This celestial mechanism, as after all its material is visible, is doubtless most beautiful and most exact of its kind, but falls far short of the true motions which real velocity and real slowness in true numbers and true configurations perform in due correspondence as they whirl round the veritable spheres : all which things

p.62. ΠΡΩ. Γελοίαν διάθεσιν ήμῶν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φήσ; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς καινόνος ἄμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῆ καὶ συγκρατέον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ήμῶν καὶ τὴν οὐδὸν ἐκάστοτε ἐξευρῆσειν οἴκαδε.

c ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσική, ἣν ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γε ήμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὡθούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν;

d ΠΡΩ. Οὕκουν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅ τι τις

are an object of ratiocination and reflexion, but not of sight." These true motions, &c. are *διανοητά*, not *νοητά*, i. e. mathematical, not ideal.

Aristotle himself admits the objective reality (*ὅτι ἔστω ἀπλῶς*) of the subjects of pure mathematics, but identifies them with the material world, abstraction being made (*ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως*) of its other physical properties (*τὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως*). Δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγεθῶν εἶναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, μὴ ἡ δὲ αἰσθητὰ ἀλλὰ ἡ τουαδί...

ῶστ' ἐπεὶ ἀπλῶς λέγενται ἀληθὲς μὴ μόνον τὰ χωριστὰ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χωριστά...καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοιαῦτά γε οὐα λέγονται...ῶστε διὰ τοῦτο ὄρθως οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγονται

καὶ περὶ ὄντων διαλέγονται καὶ ὄντα ἔστιν. Arist. Met. M. p. 1077 B.

"Sensible quantities then may be subjects of reasoning and demonstration, not as sensible but as quantities...and as objective reality is truly ascribed not only to substances, but also to their attributes, the subjects of mathematics have objective reality and yet satisfy the scientific definitions...So that the language of geometers is correct, and the subjects they reason about are existent realities."

9. *μιμήσεως*] This seems to be an oversight of Plato's, for there has been no mention of *μίμησις*, unless, indeed, it is a synonym of *στοχασμός*. See p. 56, a.

ἀν βλάπτοιτο πασας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, p. 62.
ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιώ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ρέν εἰς τὴν τῆς
Ομήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Μεθεῖνται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἵτεον. ὡς γὰρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς
μιγνύναι, τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἔξεγένεθ’
ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταύ- ε
ιοτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἀθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῷν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδο-
νῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἡ καὶ
τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώ-
τας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δή. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἀρ' οὐκ
εὶ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ξυμμικτέον καὶ
ταύτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ; τὰς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε καὶ καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας p. 63.
ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὡφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου,
καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ

2. *ἔχων τὰς πρώτας*] This expresses a condition. Socrates is made to say in the Republic: 'Ως μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι, οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς, λώβῃ ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τουάντα (τῆς μουσικῆς δῆτη μιμητική) τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδένειν αὐτὰ οὐα τυγχάνει δυτα. I. p. 595. "Between

you and me, as you will not betray me to the tragic poets and other professors of the mimetic arts, serious injury is inflicted by all these imitations on the hearers' souls, unless they possess an antidote in the knowledge of the reality."

4. *μισγαγκείας*.] ὡς ὅτε χείμαρ-
ροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὀρεσφήι ρέοντες ἐς
μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὅρμουν
ἔδωρ. Pliad. 4, 452.

We must also admit the Necessary and the Virtuous Pleasures; but the Greatest Pleasures must be excluded.

ρ. 63. πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἔστι καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας ξυγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὡς Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ⁵ ἡδονὰς δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυνθανο-
b μένους τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλήλων πέρι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ⁷Ω φίλαι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύ-
ειν εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄτωοῦν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἀν δέξαισθε ₁₀
οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἡ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν;
Οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον
εἶναι λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. ⁸Οτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον ¹⁵
καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τι γένος οὕτε πάνυ τι
c δυνατὸν οὔτ' ὡφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα
γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ
γιγνώσκειν τᾶλλα τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν
τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἔκάστην. ²⁰

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. ⁹Ορθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρό-
νησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον. ¹⁰Αρ' ἡδονῶν τι
προσδέεσθε ἐν τῇ ξυγκράσει; φαῖμεν ἀν αὐτὸν νοῦν
τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. Ποίων, φαῖεν ἀν ²⁵
ἴσως, ἡδονῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

d ΣΩ. ¹¹Ο δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν
οὐδε. Πρὸς ταῦς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείνας ἡδονᾶς, φήσομεν,
ἀρ' ἔτι προσδέεσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ξυνοί- ³⁰

^{19.} καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν] Construct ἔκάστην with αὐτήν. The MSS. read αὐ τὴν αὐτήν.

κους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας; Καὶ πῶς, ὡς Σώ- p. 63.
 κρατεῖς; φαῖεν ἄν, αἴ γ' ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν
 ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ
 μανικὰς ἡδονάς, καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ
 5 οἴεισι τά τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολύ, δι' ε-
 ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθεί-
 ρουσιν; ἄλλας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἄς
 εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιμες, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις
 τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμ-
 10 πάσης ἀρετῆς ὅπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὄπαδοὶ γιγνό-
 μεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ-
 τὰς δ' αεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπο-
 μένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μιγνύναι τὸν βουλό-
 μενον ὅ τι καλλίστην ἴδοντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην
 15 μίξιν καὶ κράσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε p. 64.
 ἐν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα
 ἴδεαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον. Ἀρ' οὐκ ἐμφρό-
 νως ταῦτα καὶ ἔχόντως ἔαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν
 ὑπέρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὄρθης ἀποκρί-
 20 νασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἄν ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

25 ΣΩ. Ὡι μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
 ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδὲ ἄν γενόμενον εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

4. ἡδονάς] For this Stallbaum proposes ἐπιθυμίας, and some such correction seems necessary.

8. οἰκείας seems equivalent to συγγενεῖς or δομεῖδες: φανεῖν δ' ἀν τοῦτο (τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν τὰς ἡδονάς) καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφκειῶσθαι

τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔκαστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἦν τελειού...τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔτερα τῷ εἶδει. Eth. Nic. 10. 5.

18. ἔχόντως ἔαυτὸν] for νουνε-
 χόντως: "characteristically," i. e.
 "rationally," "intelligently."

p. 64. XL. ΣΩ. Ούδαμως. ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπέρει κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τούννυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτο λέγε δεδόχθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἥδη προθύροις καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου λέγοντες ἵστως ὄρθως ἀν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν; 16

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ ἔνυμίξει τιμιώτατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἀν ἡμῖν τὸν πᾶσι γεγο-

If we now inquire what is the element of Goodness in this Mixture, we shall find that Goodness always manifests itself in three great characters, Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth.

2. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ — φαίνεται] "An ordering law, unembodied, but fit to govern an embodied soul, seems to be traced in the outline we have drawn." *Kόσμος* and *ἄρξων* are both originally political terms, i. e. express a kind of efficient cause, but are here applied by a natural metaphor to the final cause, i. e. the End we propose and which governs our actions. *Ἄρχη*, however, was applied without a metaphor to signify the End, as soon as it came to mean properly a logical principle or first premiss. Οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἄρχην ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὄν. Eth. Nie. 6. 12. "Practical reasonings have for their ultimate premiss some conception or definition of the End, whatever it may be." The *λόγος* of which Socrates speaks is the definition of the *τέλεον ἀγαθόν*.

13. αἴτιον] This word was

before used in reference to this point: Τάχα γὰρ ἀν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ ἀν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον ὁ δ' ἥδονήν εἶναι. § 11. We must not confuse *αἴτια* in this sense with the *αἴτια* mentioned in chap. 14, as one of the four principles. There *αἴτια* signified the Efficient cause, here, to use Aristotelian terms, the Formal cause; i. e. the definition of an attribute, by which as a middle term its inherence in a given subject may be proved. These ideas are quite as distinct in Plato's Philosophy as in Aristotle's. *Αἴτια* as the Formal cause is identical with the *πέρας* of this dialogue. It is curious that in the Phædo the same transition is made from the Efficient to the Formal cause; only there it is made avowedly, here tacitly. After mentioning that Anaxagoras had disappointed him by promising to explain the Efficient and Final

νέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ p. 64. ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔννεστηκεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ ἔνδειον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἔνδειος γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι’ ἣν ἡ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισ-
οῦν ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέεις που τοῦτο ἀνθρῶπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὄτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ἔνδειος φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ἔνγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ 15 ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις, ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος, ἔνδειος ρημένη ἀληθῶς, ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἔνδειοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

20 ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τάγαθοῦ δύνα-
μις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ἔνδει-

causes of things, and then only indicating Material causes, Socrates is made to say that he then betook himself to the investigation of the Ideas or Formal causes. He then applies the word *aītia* to the Idea or Form : e. g. οὐκ οἶσθα ἀλλως πως ἔκαστον γεγνόμενον ἡ μετασχῆται τῆς ἴδιας οὐσίας ἔκαστου οὖν μετασχῆται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἀλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἡ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν. p. 101.

3. ἐν τῷ παντὶ] = ἐν τῇ ἔνδειος.

16. οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις—ἔνδειος] “for it is no composition, but a

discordant jumble of elements in truly disastrous confusion.” “*Άκρατος* has a double meaning : as connected with *ἔνδειος* in its etymological sense of putting together, it means the negation of *κρᾶσις*, and as connected with *ἔνδειος* in its ordinary sense of calamity, it means unmitigated.

21. μετριότης γάρκ. τ.λ.] Beauty and Measure are identified in the *Timaeus* : πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἀμετρον καὶ ζῶον οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον ἔνδειον θετέον. p. 132. “The good is always beautiful, and

p. 64. μετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμίχθαι. 5

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὶ μὴ μιᾶ δυνάμεθα ἰδέα τὸ ἀγαθὸν

p. 65. θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἶν ἐν ὄρθότατ' ἀν αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἀν τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

XLI. ΣΩ. "Ηδη τούννυ, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἰκανὸς ἡμῶν γένοιτο" ἀν δστίσοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ ἡ φρονήσεως, ὅπότερον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγε- 15 νέστερον τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἔστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον τούννυ τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν 20 ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον ξυγγενὲς ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὡς Πρώταρχε καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀληθειαν καὶ ἡδονὴν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπό-

These are easily seen to be more akin to Reason than to Pleasure ; and we are now in a position to establish a scale of the different gradations of Goodness. The first place belongs to the Eternal Archetype: the second to Derivative Perfection : the third to Reason and Wisdom : the fourth to Science

the beautiful has measure : therefore an animal to be good and beautiful must have symmetry." So in the Sophista : ἀλλ' αἰσχος ἀλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος ; p. 228 a, "want of beauty is nothing but want of measure, which is unsightly wherever it is found." So in Aristotle moral beauty is τὸ μέσον, which is synonymous with τὸ μέτριον.

and True Opinion :
the fifth to
Pleasures
Unmixed
with Pain :
the sixth to
Pleasures
in the train
of Virtue.

κριναι σαντῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ ἔνυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς p. 65.
ἀληθείᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τάφροδίσια, αἱ δὲ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκέν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παιδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων νοῦς δὲ ἡτοὶ ταύτὸν καὶ ἀληθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν ιοτε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται.

ΠΡΩ. Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν

4. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ] It must be confessed that at this point of the dialogue the argument drops a little of its severity. Violent Pleasures of sense were excluded from the best life, and ought to have been from the comparison with Knowledge : and yet it is to these kinds of Pleasure that the answer of Protarchus refers.

When Reason is said to be identical or nearly identical with Truth, we verge very closely upon a fallacy of equivocation. When Truth was adopted as one of the tests of the Highest Good, the word must have been taken in a general sense, including genuineness, reality, substantiality, attributes capable of application to Pleasure. At least if it was taken in the more limited sense in which it is a quality of propositions and

thoughts and nearly identical with right Reason, a Cyrenaic might fairly contend that it was a petitio principii to make it one of the distinctive marks of the Good.

15. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.] The same may be said about the criterions of Measure and Beauty that we observed about the criterion of Truth. Protarchus in his comparison only refers to the Pleasures that ought to have been excluded from the competition : and it was allowed, chapter 32, that the Pure Pleasures possess the attribute of Measuré. Aristotle alludes to this distinction : λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀδριστὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἡπτον... μή ποτε δὲ οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἐὰν δοτιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "The Plato-

¶. 65. τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρότερον εύρειν ἀν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρότερον οὐδὲ ἀν ἐν ποτε.

nists argue that the Good is determinate (measured) and Pleasure indeterminate, because susceptible of gradation. But do they not lay the want of determination (measure) at the wrong door, if (as they own) some Pleasures are mingled with Pain (which may account for the gradation)?” He also denies the tacit assumption of the Philebus that the Mean is a point, and that therefore whatever has extension or intension, even if it has a point of coincidence, must necessarily be excessive or defective in its other gradations. He regards the Mean or normal state as having a certain breadth of range. As the abnormal state is not infinite, but the abnormal variations from the mean have their limits or bounds of possibility ; so the normal state is not a point, but there are normal variations within certain maxima and minima. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἔστι, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷαντῷ μία τις ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ζως τινός. ib. “The proportion of opposite vital forces that constitutes health varies in different persons and in the same individual, and is not destroyed by diminution or augmentation within certain limits.” Καὶ πρῶτον γε εἰς ἀλληλα τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐν δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὄστα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαιρέτον. De Gen. et Cor. 2. 6. “Nature’s first process is the tempering of the elementary ex-

tremes by admixture : next the formation of the animal and other tissues, when the elements have been reduced to a mean ; and the mean has a wide range, and is not an indivisible point.” From Plato’s own definition of Pleasure we see that it is intimately related to the limit (*πέρας*) or normal state (*φύσις*), synonyms of Measure or the law of goodness. In Aristotle’s definition : ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν ἡ τοιαῦτα. De An. 3. 7. “Pleasure and Pain are the action of the Sentient Mean towards what is good or evil in reference to its goodness or evil :” Pleasure is regarded as the subjective emotion corresponding to objective Measure or beauty, just as the sensation of colour corresponds to its material conditions, or the perception of figure to the configurations of external nature. So far, then, from being intrinsically void of Measure, it is Measure passing into consciousness.

It is true that Reason is exclusively related to the most important, dominant, or architectonic Measure (we may call it the moral law), whereas Pleasure, though related to this, is equally related to partial and subordinate laws. In virtue of this supremacy of a certain measure, wherever the inferior measures are in collision with it they cease to be measures.— Pain, the violation of some physical law, may be demanded to restore the balance

ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δὲ ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. p. 65.
νοῦς ἡμῶν κάλλους μετείληφε πλείους ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐ^ε
γένος, ὥστε εἴναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τούμαντίον;

ΠΡΩ. ^τΑρ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὡς Σώ-
κρατεῖς, οὐδεῖς πώποτε οὕθ' ὑπαρ οὕτ' ὅναρ αἰσχρὸν
οὔτε εἰδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνό-
μενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον;

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονὰς δέ γε που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς
το μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὄντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γε-
λοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἰσχιστον ἐπόμενον
ὅρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπ- p. 66.
τομεν ὅ τι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες,
ώς φῶς οὐ δέον ὄραν αὐτά.

15 ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε
ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ώς ἡδονὴ^{κτῆμα} οὐκ ἔστι πρώτον οὐδὲ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρώτον
μέν πη περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ

of the moral scales; and Pleasure, the indication of the Senses that an object presents the due proportions when tried by sensuous weights and standards, may be condemned on a moral mensuration, as violating a more imperative proportion. Reason, then, in virtue of its exclusive relation to the absolute and overruling law, may be said to have a greater affinity to law or Measure than any other faculty or element of the soul.

17. ἀλλὰ πρώτον μέν πη κ. τ. λ.] *Κτῆμα* appears to be understood. Aristotle, indeed, says that the transcendent and eternal Good cannot be *πρακτὸν* or *κτητόν*, i. e. created or called into existence by the act of man. But the

reason for not applying these epithets ceases as soon as we exclude from them the notion of production.

It may seem strange to apply a word like Measure, which essentially implies relation, to the Absolute Being. But Plato connects the idea of Measure with Perfection. 'Αλλὰ μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὅτιον τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μέτριον γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδένος μέτρον. Rep. 6. p. 504. "A measure of such inquiries that wants an iota of the truth is not a true measure: for imperfection is inconsistent with measure." And we must remember that in the Ideal theory the being and goodness of the phenome-

p. 66. πάντα ὅπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν ἀίδιον ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαινεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

b ΣΩ. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν

nal and dependent world consist in an approximation and assimilation to the eternal prototype of being and goodness, which thus acquires the relative character of a Standard or Measure. What is implied in our text is stated explicitly in the Laws. 'Ο δὴ θεὸς ἡμῶν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις δε φασιν ἀνθρωπος. 4. p. 716. "The Divinity is everywhere the Measure, not, as some imagine, Man." Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐπιμεύσθαι δὲ γε θελειν ἄπαντα. Theop. Met. "Plato and the Pythagoreans said that though there is a vast interval between the Divinity and the universe, it is an exemplar which all things strive to imitate."

It is difficult to distinguish *καίριον* from *μέτριον*. It can here express no relation of time. In Hesiod *καιρὸς* is coupled with *μέτρον*, and seems to express what was afterwards called the Golden Mean. *Μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι* *καιρὸς* δ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἄριστος. In the Politicus it is associated with *τὸ μέτριον* and *τὸ μέσον*. Δῆλον δτι διαιροῦμεν ἀν τὴν μετρητικὴν ταῦτη δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὅπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μῆκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας πρὸς τούναντίον μετροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον ὅπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ ὅπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων. p. 384. It was after-

wards limited to expressing the auspicious moment, the mean between too soon and too late, missed alike by precipitation and procrastination.

1. ὅπόσα...φύσιν] It is hard to say whether ὅπόσα or φύσιν is the subject of ἡρῆσθαι. Perhaps it is better to consider ὅπόσα governed by ἡρῆσθαι, and translate: "whatever similar attributes the eternal essence must be deemed to combine."

4. Δεύτερον μὴν κ.τ.λ.] We must not suppose from this that τὸ καλὸν and τὸ τέλεον differ from τὸ μέτριον, in that they are confined to the phenomenal manifestation of the Good. We have just seen that they are attributes of the transcendent Good. This if necessary might be further proved from other passages: e. g. περὶ δὲ κάλλους ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν λὸν δεῦρο τε ἐλθόντες κατειδήφαμεν αὐτό. Phaedrus, p. 250. "We saw Beauty resplendent in the Ideal world, and have found it again when we came into this." Ἀλλ' ἔαν τίς μοι λέγῃ διότι καλόν ἐστιν ὅτιον...τὰ μὲν ἀλλα χαίρειν ἐώ...τοῦτο δ'...ἔχω παρ' ἔμαντρῷ δτι οὐκ ἔλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παροντία εἴτε κοινωνία. Phaed. p. 100. "In any discussions on the cause why any object is beautiful, I disregard all other explanations, and feel sure that nothing makes it beautiful but the presence or communication of that Ideal Beauty."

So in the Timaeus τὸ τέλεον is

καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ίκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὅπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς p. 66.
αὖταντης ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν
καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἀν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας
παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρος οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἀ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς
ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὄρθας
λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς τρισὶ τέταρτα, ε
ἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ' ἀν.

repeatedly applied, not only to the created universe, but to its ideal archetype. e. g. τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοομένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελέφῳ μᾶλιστ' αὐτὸν ὁ θεός ὅμοιώσαι βουληθείς, ζῶν ἐν ὄρατὸν, πάνθ' ὅσα αὐτὸν κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῆ ζῶα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἔαντοῦ, ξυνέστησε. p. 30. "As that of the objects of reason which is most beautiful and all perfect (himself) was proposed by the Divinity as a pattern for his work, he formed the world a living being, single and visible, comprehending within it all living beings of a kindred nature." Of course the natural universe bears the same relation as the perfect human life to the Ideal Good : except that nature is an actual perfection, while the perfect life has to be actualized by the human will, allied in this respect to the divine Cause.

'Αλήθεια is passed over in this enumeration. Of course like τὸ μέτριον, τὸ καλὸν, and τὸ τέλεον, it has its place originally in the first rank, and derivatively in the second and

others. In the Republic Truth is imparted by the Good to the other ideal existences. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τάγαθον ίδεαν φάσι εἶναι...οὗτο δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὅντων, γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἀλλο καὶ καλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὄρθως ἡγήσει. Rep. 6. p. 508. "The source of truth to the objects of knowledge, and of knowledge to the soul, may be identified with the Ideal Good...and beautiful as both of these, truth and knowledge are, it is distinct from both, and still more beautiful."

4. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον] The Reason here mentioned is the human Reason. We have seen before that it is akin to the divine Reason, as being creator or efficient Cause. The divine Reason is identical with the Ideal Good, and is not only the Efficient or transcendent, but the Essential or Formal, i. e. immanent, cause of being and goodness.

p. 66. ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, ἀλύπους ὄρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες, τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἱσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐκτῇ δὲ ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὁρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμου ἀοιδῆς. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἐκτῇ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

XLII. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

Recapitulation.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Φίληβος τάγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ.

15

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἔξι ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῦν λόγον.

e ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ²⁰ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἴπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἀμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ ²⁵

3. ἐπιστήμαις τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπομένας] This is obviously the true reading. The MSS. give, ἐπιστήμας ταῦς δέ. It refers to chapter 31, where some pure Pleasures are said to be sensational, others intellectual.

25. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε κ.τ.λ.] In the Eudemian Ethics we have a

recapitulation of the propositions discussed in the Philebus, and also an indication of the point which prevents it from being regarded as a systematic or exhaustive ethical treatise, viz. the omission of the claims of the active life (*πρᾶξις, ἀρετή*.) τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονέin καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακα-

εἶπον, ὡς εὶ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῦ βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ p. 66.
τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην,
ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

p. 67.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἰκανώτατον τούτων οὐδέτερον ἰκανὸν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τάγαθόν γε αὐτὸι μηδὲ ἔτερον αὐτοῦ εἴναι, στερόμενον αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἰκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον 15 καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἦν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἀν ή τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

ρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἀν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἴναι δοκοῦσιν αἱρετωτάτοις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἴναι φασὶν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνοι περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισθητοῦντι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρους μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν οἱ μὲν ὡς οὖσταν μεζοὺς ἀγαθῶν τὴν φρόνησιν, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δὲ δυοῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἐν ἐνι τινι τούτων εἴναι τὸ ἔγχον εὐδαιμόνως. 1. 1. “Happiness and a blest and beautiful life will depend on three things, which are held to be the highest objects of de-

sire. For Wisdom, Virtuous Action, and Pleasure, are each maintained by different persons to be the greatest Good. And viewed as merely ingredients of happiness, their comparative importance is sometimes disputed, what they contribute to it being variously estimated; some attributing a superiority to Wisdom over Virtue, others to Virtue over Wisdom, others to Pleasure over both. For some think that all of them in conjunction, others that two of them, others that one alone constitutes a happy life.”


p. 67. ΠΡΩ. ⁷Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πρώτον δέ γε οὐδέ ἀν οἱ πάντες βοες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τὰλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαιρειν διώκειν. οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὤρυσιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ήμιν εὖς κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαι σοι νῦν ἥδη φαμὲν ἄπαντες. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὡς Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δή που σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ήμῶν. ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.



APPENDIX A.

*Ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν
λεχθέν.*

§ 1. The paradox that the One is Many and the Many Paradoxes are One was very celebrated in early Greek philosophy, and is often mentioned in the works of Plato, who indeed in a modified sense adopted it as a principle. It was first expressed by Zeno the Eleatic in defence of the tenet of his school, that Being is One and immutable. Kant, in modern times, to demonstrate that the human intellect is only capable of reducing phænomena to their laws, and is utterly unable to comprehend real or spiritual existence, attempted to establish the Antinomies of reason ; that is, to shew that whenever we attempt to reason on any thing but phænomena we are driven by an equal logical necessity to contradictory conclusions, which should be regarded as a symptom that we are attempting a problem beyond the reach of our understandings. Long before this, Zeno had employed a similar *reductio ad impossibile* to establish the opposite doctrine. He attempted to shew that if we believe in the reality of the changing world of nature we must admit that contradictory propositions can be true together: e. g. that what is One is Many and what is Many is One. But as it is the most deep-seated conviction of reason that contradictions cannot be true, he argued that the assumption we started from must have been erroneous, and that the phænomenal world must be an illusion. These seeming existences that involve us in so absurd conclusions are nothing ; only the One and immutable is. In the words of Parmenides

*τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔστιν
ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ διλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκί,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόνον ἀμείβειν.*

“ Wherefore all are but a name
That mortals deem to be realities,
Birth and decay, to be and not to be,
And change of place and loss of brilliant hue.”

The sort of coexistence of opposites that he succeeds in establishing is that which Plato here puts into the mouth of Protarchus. In the language of Platonism it arises from the “participation” of individuals of the sensible world in the ideas. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ δμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια δμοια, τέρας ἀν οἷμαι ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὡς Ζήνων, ἀποπον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἀπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνὸς, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν ἀλλ’ εἰ, ὃ ἔστιν ἐν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδεῖξει, τοῦτο ἥδη θαυμάσομαι. Parm. 129 b. “If a man proved likeness was unlikeness or unlikeness likeness, he would astonish me: but if he only proved that what participates in each of these Ideas has each of these attributes, I should not be astonished, Zeno. Nor should I, if he proved all things One by participation in Unity, and at the same time Many by participation in Multiplicity. But he would surprise me if he could prove Unity to be Multiplicity, or Multiplicity to be Unity.”

The Megarian school who maintained, not the reality of phenomena, but, the Multiplicity of Being, avoided the Eleatic conclusions by supposing the various Ideas, or elements of Being, to exist in complete isolation.

§ 2. The Megarian school, who differed from the Eleatics so far as to allow a multiplicity of Beings or Ideas, seem to have been so far convinced by Zeno's arguments as to deny the power of distinct Ideas to be combined in propositions. They recognised identical propositions such as man is man, but not synthetical propositions, such as man is white. They seem to have thought that the latter would involve the Zenonian absurdity that the Same is One and Many. They accordingly argued against their admissibility by deducing various contradictions from them in the manner of Zeno. They are alluded to in the Sophista. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὅν τινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν...λέγομεν ἀνθρωπὸν δῆπον πόλλ' ἄπτα ἐπονομάζοντες, τάτε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς· ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἐπέροις μηρίοις οὐ μόνον ἀνθρωπὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔτερα ἄπειρα. καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἐκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν...δθεν γε οἷμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον, ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι.

καὶ δίπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρωπον ἀνθρωπον - ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ ὡς ἐγῷμαι πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἔνιοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον ολομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι. 251 A. "Let us indicate in what way this Same has Many names given it. When we speak of man we apply many epithets to him, attributing to him colours, and shapes, and sizes, and virtues, and vices. Whereby, and by ten thousand other words, we call him not only man, but an infinite variety of other things. And other objects in a similar manner we first suppose One, and afterwards call a Multitude of things by a Multitude of names. Whereby no doubt we have prepared a banquet for young philosophers and old men behindhand in their studies. For it is at once easy for any one to object that it is impossible for a Unit to be a Multitude, or a Multitude a Unit. And they rejoice in requiring us not to say a man is good, but a man is a man, and good is good. I have no doubt you often meet with persons devoted to these dogmas, old men sometimes, who from intellectual poverty think these very valuable and profound discoveries." From the contempt expressed in the last words we must suppose they apply not to Plato's friend, Euclid of Megara, but to an assailant of Plato, Antisthenes the founder of Cynicism, who seems to have nearly agreed with the Megarian school. In the same dialogue Socrates asserts that this identity of the One and Many, so far from being impossible, is the necessary condition of thought and reasoning. Τὸ δὲ ταῦτὸν ἔτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῆ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὐτω τάναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς, ἀρτὶ τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενῆς ὡν...καὶ γὰρ τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῦν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς, καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσιον τινὸς καὶ ἀφίλοσόφου. τί δή; τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνιστις τὸ διαλύειν ἔκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων, διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. 259 E. "To prove the Identical to be in some respect Diverse, and the Diverse in some respect Identical, the great to be little, and the like to be unlike, and to delight in thus

reducing an opponent to maintain the union of contraries, is no true refutation, and is clearly the birth of the immature mind of one beginning to philosophize. Such isolation of every idea from every other is not only false, but particularly unphilosophic and a sin against the Muses. For the isolation of the ideas is a complete annihilation of reasoning, as it is the combination of ideas that constitutes reasoning."

Aristotle alludes to the two Eleatic or Megaric arguments indicated in the *Philebus*, and informs us that the first was by some considered so formidable as to make it necessary to alter the form of synthetical propositions. The second argument, that from the Whole and its Parts, was considered to be unanswerable, and the paradox, that contradictories can be true, to be so far established. 'Εθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὑστερον καθάπερ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, μήποτε συμβαίνῃ αὐτοῖς ἂμα τὸ αὐτὸν ἐν εἶναι καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφεύλον ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι δὲ ἀνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἔστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἔστιν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει. ἵνα μὴ τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο. τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μονσικῷ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἄμφω, πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν) ἢ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ τὸ δόλον καὶ τὰ μέρη. ἐνταῦθα δὴ διηπόρουν καὶ ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ αὐτὸν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τὰ ἀντικεμένα δέ. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐν καὶ δινάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ. *Physic.* Ausec. 1. 2. "The later as well as the earlier opponents of the Eleatics were in fear of being reduced to the conclusion that the Same thing could be One and Many: so that some, as Lycophron, omitted the copula of propositions; others altered the form of predication, and said a man walks or has whiteness, instead of is walking or is white, lest the word *is* should prove One Being to Be Many. As if Unity and Being had not various meanings. However, as not only One Subject is Many in respect of the definitions of its Attributes (as to be white and to be musical are, when defined, two different things, and the same man is both, One thing therefore is two), but also One Whole is Many, by division into its Parts; the second consideration perplexed them, and they confessed that Unity was Multiplicity, without seeing that these terms were not contra-

dictory, as the Multiplicity of the Parts is potential, the Unity of the Whole actual."

It is not clear in what way Lycophron and his contemporaries thought they mended the matter by the alterations they proposed. Perhaps they only refused to use *εἰναι* as the copula in synthetical propositions. In Zeno's argument there is obviously an equivocation or rather the logician's fallacia Secundum Quid. Unity in respect of the Subject is confused with Unity in respect of the Predicate. Unity in respect of the Subject and Multiplicity in respect of the Subject, or Unity in respect of the Predicate and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, are contradictory and cannot co-exist: but there is no contradiction between Unity in respect of the Subject, and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, and no reason why they should not co-exist. However, in consequence apparently of this class of fallacy, the principle of Contradiction and definition of Refutation (*ἔλεγχος*) were fenced about with various limitations and provisos. "Οτι μὲν οὐν τοῦ φιλοσόφου...καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι δῆλον...τίς δ' ἔστιν αὕτη μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸῦ ἄμα ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸν, καὶ δσα ἄλλα προσδιορισμέθ' ἀν ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερεῖας. αὕτη δ' ἀπασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν...διὸ πάντες ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταῦτην ἀνάγοντιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν. φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων αὕτη πάντων. Met. 3. 3. "It belongs to Philosophy to investigate the canons of syllogism. Such is the principle that the same predicate cannot be true and not true of the same subject, in the same respect, and with all the other limitations required to meet sophistical objections. This is the most evident principle there is, and is that to which all demonstration ultimately appeals, and is the natural foundation of all the other axioms." Plato seems to have been the author of these distinctions, for he says, describing the Elenchus: *καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τὰς δόξας τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταῦτὸν τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύοντιν αὐτὰς αἵτας ἄμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐναντίας.* Soph. p. 230.

§ 3. The Unity of the Many and Multiplicity of the One was *Plato, afterwards proposed by Plato, not as an absurd conclusion* who maintained the

Multipli-
city of
Being and
its Unity
by means
of Parti-
cipation,
pointed out
the coex-
istence of
Unity and
Multipli-
city in
every Spe-
cies or
realized
Idea.

to which he reduced his opponents, but as the principle of his own Dialectics. The point of view, however, from which this Unity and Multiplicity are regarded differs from that of his predecessors. Their One that is Many was the One individual Subject with a Multiplicity of Predicates ; Plato's is the One Species comprehending a Multiplicity of Individuals. Of course the Platonic point of view is the more important, as it involves Generalization and Specification, that is, Classification or scientific arrangement. Its meaning is sufficiently developed in the *Philebus*.

Participation here as before expresses the relation of the One and the Many. There the One Subject participated in the Many Predicates ; here the Many Individuals participate in the One Species. Indeed in the *Sophista* all affirmative propositions are regarded as expressing a Participation of Ideas, so that as Aristotle defined them to be *συνθέσις νοήματων* Plato might have defined them to be *μετοχὴ νοήματων*. As therefore the reference of an Individual to its Species is a particular kind of proposition, of course it expresses a particular kind of Participation.

Plato's identity of One and Many, though paradoxical in expression, does not pretend to contradict the canon of syllogism. He only considered paradoxes and apparent contradictions as stimulants to inquiry, as when the sensuous faculties are perplexed, we are obliged to appeal to reason. *'Ἐπεχείρονν λέγειν ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔστι, τὰ δ' οὐ· ἀ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἰσθησιν ἀμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἔαντοῖς ἐμπίπτει παρακλητικὰ ὄριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως.* Rep. 2. p. 344. "I meant to say that some sensations stimulate the intellect to inquiry, and others do not ; pronouncing those that are attended with contradictory sensations to be stimulant, and those that are unattended to have no aptitude for awakening the reason."

Hegel, to
reconcile
the Multi-
plicity of
Being with
its Unity,
bases his
method on
their coinci-
dence in

§ 4. In modern times, however, Hegel has put forward as the motto of his philosophy the sameness of One and Many, or rather, in more general terms, the truth of contradic-tories, in the sense in which it contradicts the axiom that underlies syllogism. The principle of contradiction applied in the syllogism, and used as the organ of science, had developed the diversities of Being, and marked very

distinctly the limits between the different spheres of every To-thought. In order to reestablish, as has ever been the aspiration of Philosophy, the Unity of thought and homogeneity of Being, Hegel boldly proposes to adopt as a regulative maxim, the opposite of the principle that had broken up Being and produced the divergence of the sciences: an antinomistic canon belonging to the Reason as the opposite principle belongs to the Understanding. He accordingly professes for his motto: Whatever is is not, or: Only contradictions are true. The function of this principle is to break down the barriers fixed by the Understanding. It is to become an antinomian Dialectic, or method of developing every elementary force or conception into its direct contrary, and of afterwards rising with them out of their hostile, onesided, chaotic condition, to a higher stage in the hierarchy of Being, where they conspire to form a balanced and beautiful Whole. No doubt, if there were such an axiom, and the intellect could use it as a canon of reasoning, as it uses the principle of contradiction, it would be very easy to obliterate the divisions traced by the latter and recognise a Unity of Being. As soon as the latter pronounced A is not B, the former would contradict it and pronounce A is B, and all Being would be seen to be homogeneous. The only wonder would be, if such a principle were within the reach of the human intellect, that there should seem to be such an impassable chasm between Spirit and Matter, the Ego and the Non Ego, Freedom and Necessity, and other opposites whose homogeneity is so difficult to recognise, and whose coexistence even is so difficult to adjust. The spear of Achilles could alone heal the wounds it caused, and probably, if the scattered members of truth and Being can ever be united, it must be by means of the ordinary principles of reasoning which caused their dispersion. This task belongs to Philosophy; and the Hegelian motto is not inaptly chosen, if it is only intended as a paradoxical indication of the end to be realized.

The paradox connected with classification introduced by Plato, the Unity of the Species in the Multiplicity of Individuals, furnished for centuries a topic of speculation to the Nominalists and Realists. The paradoxes that

have been supposed to interfere with the principle of contradiction in modern times have a greater resemblance to those which were agitated before the time of Plato, and which depend on the relation of a Whole to its Parts. The Whole is a Unity and the Parts a Plurality, and yet the Whole and Parts are identical. Nay more: the Parts are not only different from one another, but perhaps essentially contraries (*ἐξ ὅν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι εἶδει διαφέρει*. Arist. Pol. 2. 2. “The elements of an organic unity must be contraries,”), and yet they not only unite in the Whole, but have some bond of identity in their own conceptions. The centre and circumference are Parts of a circle: it is One, they are Plural; they are contraries and yet are mutually implied. Kant had collected similar difficulties, or what he represented as difficulties, under the name of Amphibolies in the sphere of Judgment, and under the name of Paralogisms and Antinomies in the sphere of Reason. Hegel finds them in all the categories of Relation, such as Cause and Effect, Substance and Accident, but removes them from the sphere of Reason, and confines them to the sphere of Judgment or Reflexion. They are contradictions, he would have us believe, which violate the narrow canons of the Understanding, but, like discords in music, may be harmoniously resolved by the more powerful methods employed by Reason. They, however, seem to turn on principles frequently recognised by the Greek speculators who adopted the axioms of the Understanding and reduced them to formulas: e. g. *ἡ ὑλὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς ἐναντίοις*. Met. 10. 4. “The same material is indifferently receptive of contrary forms.”—*Ἄδύνατον τῷ ὕλην ἔχοντι μὴ ὑπάρχειν πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον*. De Long. et Brev. Vitæ. “Wherever matter is governed by a form there must be a presence to a certain extent of the contrary form (i. e. merely potentially, or, in partial actuality).” “*Ἐστι δὲ ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταῦτο*. Met. 8. 6. “The proximate matter and the form are identical.” *Τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν πώς ἐστίν*. ib. “The power and the realisation are in a sense but one.” It is impossible, if we distinguish contradictories from contraries, and attend to the purport of the principle of contradiction, to find any thing here that really violates it, or that requires the admission of an antinomistic canon.

APPENDIX B.

Tὸ Πέρας and τὸ Ἀπειρον.

§ 1. The Antithesis of Limit and Infinity was borrowed by Plato from the Pythagoreans. We read in a fragment of Philolaus, 'Εκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὁ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συνηρμόχθη. "Of Limitants and the Unlimited the world and all its parts are compacted." They considered these to be the elements of Number: Τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων εἶναι ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον τὸ δὲ πεπερασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τούτων, καὶ γὰρ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν. Met. 1. 5. "They made the elements of Number the elements of all things else, and supposed the elements of Number were evenness and oddness, the first Unlimited, the second Limited, and Unity both even and odd." Instead of identifying the Infinite with the even, Plato made it a Duality, and called it the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small. Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ Ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἄρτιόν φασι, Πλάτων δὲ δύο τὰ Ἀπειρα, τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν. Arist. Physic. Ausec. 3. 4. "The Pythagoreans make the Infinite the even, but Plato makes two Infinites, the Great and the Little." Again, while the Pythagoreans identified the world of Numbers and the world of sense, Plato supposed two worlds, a Natural and an Ideal, each resolvable into two elements, a Limit and an Unlimited, the Limiting element of the Natural world being the Ideas. Πλὴν οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τιθέασι τὸ Ἀπειρον οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀριθμόν. Πλάτων δὲ τὸ Ἀπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδέαις εἶναι. Physic. Ausec. 3. 4. "The Pythagoreans confine the Infinite to the world of sense as they give no transcendent existence to Numbers, while Plato makes it an element both of the world of sense and of the Ideal world." Φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαιν ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὰ

Vestiges of the theory of the Limit and the Infinite.

The inorganic world is composed of contraries, elements, determinate but indeterminate in quality and quantity: i. e. measurable out into multidimensional and gradations.

Chaos becomes order when these qualities receive a quantitative determination, restraining them from excess and defect, and impressing on their qualitative diversity and quantitative multiplicity an organic or systematic Unity.

γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἔστιν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ "Εν" καὶ τίς (for *tis* read *ώς*) ἡ ὑλη ἡ ὑποκειμένη καθ' ἡς τὰ εἴδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ δ' "Εν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι λέγεται ὅτι αὕτη (for ὅτι αὕτη read ἡ) Δυάς ἔστι τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν. Metaph. 1. 6. "It is plain from the preceding that Plato has only operated with two causes, the formal and the material; for the Ideas are the formal cause to other things, and the One to the Ideas; and the subject matter, which in the sensible world is informed by the Ideas and in the Ideal world by the One, is the Dyad, the Great and the Little."

The Platonic school were not agreed as to the precise denomination of the triad of principles. Plato himself designated them the One and the Dyad of the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. He called this the indeterminate Dyad to distinguish it from the determinate Dyad, one of the ideal numbers which it generated. 'Ο γὰρ ἀριθμός ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ 'Ενὸς καὶ τῆς Δυάδος τῆς 'Αορίστου. Met. 13. 8. He also identified the One with the Equal, and accordingly named the Infinite the Inequality, or the Unequal Duality. Others headed by Speusippus or Xenocrates made two principles, Unity and Plurality: a third section preferred Unity and Diversity, or Unity and Difference; a fourth in the place of the Great and the Little substituted the Many and the Few, as more akin to Number; a fifth employed the more comprehensive terms Excess and Defect. All these varieties are noticed in the following passages: Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιούσιν ὑλην, οἱ μὲν τῷ "Ισῳ τὸ "Ανισον, οἱ δὲ τῷ 'Ενὶ τὸ Πλήθος' γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 'Ανίσου δυάδος τοῦ Μεγάλου καὶ Μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ Πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ 'Ενὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῦ...ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ στοιχεῖα καλούσιν οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρὸν λέγοντες μετὰ τοῦ 'Ενὸς, τρία ταῦτα, στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν δύο ὑλην τὸ δὲ "Εν τὴν μορφήν, οἱ δὲ τὸ Πολὺ καὶ 'Ολίγον, ὅτι τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρὸν μεγέθους οἰκειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθόλον μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ "Υπερέχον καὶ τὸ "Υπερεχόμενον...οἱ δὲ τὸ "Ετερον καὶ τὸ "Άλλο πρὸς τὸ "Εν ἀντιτίθεσι· οἱ δὲ τὸ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ "Εν. Met. 14. 1. "The Platonists (not perceiving the distinction between matter and privation, the opposite of form) suppose one of the contraries to be the material to the other,

making either Inequality or Plurality the material of Unity; and thus generating Numbers either from the Unequal Duality, the Great and Little, or from Plurality; in both cases by the active agency of Unity...They are not successful in stating the elementary principles, some associating with Unity the Great and Little, so as to make three elements of number, the two latter material, the Unity formal; others the Many and the Few, because the Great and Little are more allied to dimension than to number; others the broader genera of Excess and Defect; others making Diversity and Difference the antithesis of Unity; and others Plurality."

Aristotle considers the last antithesis the most accurate. Εἰ δέ ἔστι, ὡσπερ βούλονται, τὰ δύτα ἐξ ἐναντίων τῷ δὲ Ἐνὶ ἦ οὐθὲν ἐναντίον ἦ, εἰ ἄρα μέλλει, τὸ πλῆθος, τὸ δ' ἄνισον τῷ ἵσῳ καὶ τὸ ἔτερον τῷ ταύτῳ καὶ τὸ ἀλλὸ ταύτῳ, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ τὸ Ἐν τῷ Πλήθει ἀντιτιθέντες ἔχοντας τινος δόξης, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ οὗτοι ἰκανῶς. ib. 14. 1. "Now if, as they all agree, the world is composed of contraries, and Inequality is the contrary of Equality, Diversity of Sameness and Identity, those who make Plurality the antithesis of Unity hold the most tenable position, though even they hardly make it good." Unity and Plurality are contraries and opposed as Positive and Privative. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαιρέτον καὶ διαιρετόν...ἐπεὶ γοῦν, αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τετραχῶς καὶ τούτων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, ἐναντίον ἀν εἴη καὶ οὕτε ὡς ἀντίφασις οὕτε τὰ πρός τι λεγόμενα. Met. 9. 3. "The opposition of Unity and Plurality is that of Indivisible and Divisible. Thus of the four kinds of Opposition they fall under the two of Privation and Contrariety, not of contradiction or Relation." Again, the Plurality itself can be divided into two contrary extremes, the Many and the Few. "Οσα διαιρετά, ἐν τούτοις λέγεται τὰ πολλὰ ἐὰν ἦ πλῆθος ἔχον ὑπεροχήν, καὶ τὸ δλίγον ὡσαύτως πλῆθος ἔχον ἔλλειψιν. ib. 9. 6. "In Plurality Many denotes a Plurality that exceeds, Few a Plurality that is exceeded." Τῷ δὲ δλίγῳ ἐναντίον τὸ πολὺ ὡς ὑπερέχον πλῆθος ὑπερεχομένῳ πλήθει. ib. "Many and Few are contraries and express excess and defect of number." In the other categories the Infinite was composed of analogous extremes, but

there was a diversity of opinion both as to this and the formal principle. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ποιοῦσι τὰ ὑστέρα γένη τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν καὶ βραχέος τὰ μήκη, πλατέος δὲ καὶ στενοῦ τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ βαθέος δὲ καὶ ταπεινοῦ τοὺς ὅγκους· ταῦτα δέ ἔστιν εἶδη τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν ἄλλοι ἄλλως τιθέ-ασι τῶν τοιωτῶν. Met. 12. 9. “ Some employ the species of the Great and Little to construct the categories subsequent to Number, making Length of Long and Short, Breadth of Wide and Narrow, Solidity of Thick and Thin, all subdivisions of Great and Little. As to the principle corresponding to Unity in these categories they are at variance.”

Aristote-
lian ana-
lysis of the
Infinite
into Matter
and Priva-
tion.
The con-
trary of
the quanti-
tative law
or organic
Unity is,
not the
qualities
which it
limits
(Matter)
but, their
excessive
or defect-
ive quanti-
ty (Priva-
tion). So,
if we ex-
clude quan-
tity from
our view
and confine
ourselves to
the cate-
gory of
quality, the
contrary
of the
positive
quality or
elementary
Unity is
not its re-
cipient, the

§ 2. We have seen that Plato constructs the natural world of two principles, the Idea and the Infinite. The main difference of Aristotle's view is that he analyses the Infinite into two elements, Privation (*στέρησις*) the opposite of the Idea, and Matter (*ὕλη*) equally receptive of the Privation or the Idea. Ὁντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὃ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. Phys. Ause. 1, 9. “ One element is divine and good and an object of desire, another is contrary to this, and the nature of a third is to love and desire the first.” Μία μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη, μία δὲ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἡ στέρησις. ib. 17. “ One principle is the Matter, a second the Spirit (Form), a third its contrary, Privation.” Γίγνεται ἀπαν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς...ἔστι δὲ τὸ ὑποκειμένον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἐν, εἴδει δὲ δύο...ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὁ δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς τρεῖς. Phys. Ause. 1, 7. “ The principles of the natural world are Matter and Form, the Matter though numerically one having a twofold character, while the Form is simply one. So that in one sense there are two principles, and in another three.” ὥστε παντελῶς ἔτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κάκεῖνος. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προηλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταῦτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις Δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων Μέγα καὶ Μικρόν, οὐθὲν ἡττον ταῦτὸν ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἔτεραν παρεῖδε, τὴν στέρησιν. Physic. Ause. 1, 9. “ So that ours is a very different triad of principles from that of the Plato-

nists. For they reached the point of perceiving the necessity of a material element, but made it simple in character: since though Plato makes it a Dyad, and calls it the Great and Little, he labours under the same error, for he overlooks the other principle, the Privation." The antithesis of *στέρησις*, which we have seen called *εἶδος*, *λόγος*, and *μορφή*, appears to be properly called *ξεισις*. *πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἔξις καὶ στέρησις ἔστιν.* Met. 10. 4.

The reality of the distinction between the Material and the Privation in the Unlimited, is most important and manifest in the moral world. Here Aristotle adopts the Platonic doctrine in making a Balance of opposite principles, a Due Measure between an Excess and a Defect constitute moral goodness. The will and the affections are the material (*ὕλη*) of virtue. Unless we distinguished this element from the Privation (*στέρησις*) we should have to say that the vices are constituent elements of virtue.

It may be observed that in contrasting his own principles with those of Plato in the passages quoted above, Aristotle has made the difference appear to be greater than it really was by the incompleteness of his list. If, instead of comparing two triads of principles, he had compared two tetrads; if, that is, he had added to Plato's Idea, Excess and Defect, the Recipient (*τὸ δεκτικὸν*) of the Timaeus, and to his own Matter, Positive determination, and Negative, the Mean or Form (*εἶδος*) which occupies such a prominent position in his philosophy, it would have appeared that the two lists are substantially identical. He elsewhere contrasts Plato's list with that of the old Physiologists. They agreed in constructing the world of a Unity and two antagonistic extremes, but differed inasmuch as in the physiological scheme the One was the passive material and the extremes the active and formative principles, in Plato's system the One was active and the extremes passive. In truth, however, Plato as well as Aristotle employed the One in both of these relations; both as the primary Matter or passive substratum of the qualitative extremes, and as the Formative principle or active origin of motion and law. Aristotle seems to have justified himself in omitting this principle from his list,

because as an affirmative determination (*ἔξις*) it is analogous to the positive extreme of the elementary qualities, being a Form of a higher order, or, in the language of Schelling, of a higher power. Τὰ δὲ εἴδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἔξεις τινές. *De gen. et cor.* 1. 7. “The formal and final causes are certain positive determinations.”

A common feature of all these schemes is indicated by Aristotle : ὅτι μὲν οὖν τάνατία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς δῆλον...πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ αὐτῶν καλούμενας ἀρχὰς καίπερ ἀνεν λόγου τιθέντες ὅμως τάνατία λέγουσιν, ἀσπερ ὑπὸ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. *Physic.* Ausec. 1, 5. “All make Contraries first principles...though they assume their elements without proof, they agree as if constrained by the force of truth in making them opposites.” This holds true if we extend our view to modern Philosophies. Schelling finds in the whole universe of matter and spirit the perpetual recurrence of opposite Polar forces with a centre of Indifference, and resumes these phænomena in a formula by proclaiming the universe and every portion of it to be a Magnet. Thus the Limit and the double Infinite of the Platonists are transformed in his system into the Centre of Equilibrium, with the Positive and Negative Poles. Hegel similarly finds the law of the universe to be the existence of opposite forces, first in isolation, then at war, and afterwards in reconciliation as positive and negative factors of a higher and more spiritual life.

What was
meant by
Infinity ?
(a) Quan-
tity with-
out end.

§ 3. We have collected a statement, vague unfortunately, and unfortunately not in the words of Plato, of the doctrine of the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, and have indicated its relation to Aristotle's system, with which the student is probably more familiar. We have still to inquire what was the precise meaning that Plato attached to these words.

The obvious meaning of *ἄπειρον* is Infinite, and this is unquestionably the meaning that Plato intended the word should first suggest. The successive Greek philosophies absorbed into their system their predecessors, and Plato's forerunners, the Physiologists, had adopted Infinity as a first principle and groundwork of Being. If we need any further proof that this is the *prima facie* meaning of the

word, we have a sufficient one in the fact that it is against τὸ ἄπειρον in this sense that Aristotle directs his polemic. 'Αλλ' ἵσως αὕτη μὲν ἔστι καθόλου ἡ ζητησις μᾶλλον, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς μηδὲν ἔχοντι μέγεθος. ήμεις δ' ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ περὶ ὅν ποιούμεθα τὴν μέθοδον, ἀρ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξησιν. Phys. Aus. 3, 5. "It is a wider question than we have now to discuss, whether there is Infinity in the mathematical field, or in thought, or in the spiritual world. We are now inquiring whether any mass is infinitely great in the sensuous and physical world." He then distinguishes Plato's two kinds of Infinity, and admits the existence of the infinitely Small: τὸ ἄπειρον ἔστι μὲν προσθέσει ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει...ἄλλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω δ' ἔστι τὸ ἄπειρον· δυνάμει γὰρ, καὶ ἐπὶ καθαίρεσιν. ib. 3, 6. "Infinity is conceivable either in the line of augmentation or in that of diminution: but the only Infinity that exists is a potential Infinity in the line of diminution :" and potential in the sense of never being actualized, but only perpetually approached. Finite magnitudes, he proceeds to say, may be regarded as infinite, if we adopt a mode of measuring them by which they can never be exhausted: e. g. by first taking half, then half the remainder, and so on; whereby the increment at last becomes infinitely small. This infinite subdivision can be presented in the form of an infinite addition: and this is the only sense in which he allows even a potential infinite in the line of augmentation. But the sum of this infinite series is finite, and this is really only another way of presenting the infinite in the line of diminution; καὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὴ οὕτως ἄπειρον δυνάμει ἔστιν δ ταῦτὸ λέγομεν τρόπον τινὰ εἶναι τῷ κατὰ διαιρέσιν ἀεὶ μὲν γάρ τι αὐτοῦ ἔξω ἔσται λαμβάνειν, οὐ μέντοι ὑπερβάλλει παντὸς ὥρισμένου μεγέθους, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν διαιρέσιν ὑπερβάλλει παντὸς ὥρισμένου καὶ ἔσται ἔλαττον. ὥστε δὴ παντὸς ὑπερβάλλειν κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν...οὐδὲ δυνάμει ἀν εἶη, ἀλλ' ἡ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀντεστραμμένως τῇ διαιρέσει. ib. "The infinite of augmentation exists potentially so far as it is identical with the infinite of diminution, for there is perpetually something to be added: but it will not exceed all finite magnitude, as the

infinite of diminution exceeded every finite degree of smallness. So there is no infinite of augmentation even potential except as the converse of infinite diminution."

He accordingly proposes, if we assume the existence of *τὸ ἄπειρον*, to alter its definition, so that it shall only signify the Unfinished, Incomplete, or Indeterminate. *Συμβαίνει δὲ τούναντίον εἶναι ἄπειρον ἡ ὡς λέγονσιν...οὐ γὰρ οὐ μηθὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ οὐ ἀεὶ τι ἔξω ἔστι, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἔστιν...οὐ δὲ μηθὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ’ ἔστι Τέλειον καὶ "Ολον...Τέλειον δ’ οὐθὲν μὴ ἔχον τελὸς τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας...ἐπεὶ ἐντεῦθέν γε λαμβάνουσι τὴν σεμνότητα κατὰ τοῦ ἄπειρου, τὸ πάντα περιέχουν, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχουν, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ὁμοιότητα τῷ "Ολῷ" ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἄπειρον τῇ στοῦ μεγέθους τελειότητος ὑλη, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὅλον ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ οὐ. ib. "It results that the contrary to what they say is the *ἄπειρον*, and it is not that which is never transcended by any other magnitude, but that which is always transcended; that which is not transcended being the Perfect or Whole; and that is Perfect which has reached the Limit. And the majesty ascribed to the indeterminate (unterminated), "the all comprehending," "the all containing," is due to its proximity to the Perfect; for the indeterminate is the material of Perfect magnitude, or that which approaches, without ever reaching, Totality."*

The last sentiments are very Platonic, and when we consider that in the *Timaeus* the material universe is circumscribed and finite, Plato entertaining the grand conception, with which we are now hardly so familiar, that all that is forms a single perfect whole, [*ἴνα δὲ οὗτοι μάλιστα ζῶν τέλεον ἐκ τελέων τῶν μερῶν εἴη...ἐν δὲ δλον δλων ἐξ ἀπάντων τέλεον αὐτὸν ἐτεκτήνατο*] we are justified in assuming that they coincide with Plato's views, and that the infinity, or quantity without end, of the material element is no essential part of his philosophy. Indeed, Aristotle himself informs us, that it did not reappear in the details of his doctrine: *'Ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦτο ἄπειρα δύο ἐποίησεν οὗτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξῆσιν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν παντὸς ὡρισμένου μεγέθους καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον λέναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαρεσιν ποιήσας μέντοι δύο οὐ χρῆται.* Phys. Ausec. 3. 7. "Plato assumed a double Infinity, because the elements seem to overpass all finite quantity, and to be infinite both in the line of augmenta-

tion and in that of diminution. But after asserting its existence, we do not find him making any use of it as a principle."

§ 4. We come to the same conclusion if we examine the other terms, *τὸ μᾶλλον* and *τὸ ἥπτον*, which Plato proposes as equivalent to *ἀπειρον*. Here again unfortunately we cannot quote from Plato himself, but must have recourse to Aristotle. He uses the words in his Ethical treatise (Eth. Nic. 10. 2.), referring to the doctrine of the Philebus; and he uses them again in the treatise on the Categories in reference to the same question that he discussed in the Ethics. In the Categories the words simply imply Gradation or Intensive quantity. "Substance," he says, "does not admit of a gradation: (*δοκεῖ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥπτον*) One man is not more or less a man either compared with himself at different times or with a different individual. Quantity does not admit of gradation: three is as much three as five is five; one minute is just as much time as another minute; one cubit length is just as much space as another cubit length. Some Relations admit of no gradation; equality and duplicity for instance; others do, as similarity and inequality. Some Qualities admit no gradation; figure, for instance. One circle is just as much a circle as another; and one triangle just as much a triangle as another. The majority of Qualities admit of gradation: white, hot, cold, &c. have different degrees of comparison. Whether abstract states, intellectual, moral, or corporeal, e. g. science, virtue, health, admit of degrees, is controverted: it is certain that the concrete qualities do; one man is more scientific, more virtuous, more healthy than another. Actions and passions, e. g. to heat, to cool, to please, to pain, admit of gradations." The question about the abstract states is in the Ethics answered in the affirmative, at least with respect to one of them, health. It is evident from the whole of this discussion that by things which admit of the More and the Less are denoted those that vary in degree or possess what is sometimes called quantity of intension. Intension, like extension, does not imply Infinity, except so far as even finite quan-

b. Finite extension or intension: or quality existing in variable quantity.

tity involves infinite divisibility. But in respect of the Multiplicity of gradations thus arising, whatever has intension or extension may be called indefinite or indeterminate. In this view the ἀπειρον of Plato amounts to the συνεχὲς καὶ διαιρετόν of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'Εν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ ἵσον τὸ δὲ ἵσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. Eth. Nic. 2. 6. "Whatever is continuous or divisible presents a greater, a less, and an equal, the equal being a mean between excess and defect." Compare: Τὸ δὲ ἀπειρον ἐμφανεῖται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ: διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὅριομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἀπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς δύν. Phys. Ause. 3. 1. "Infinity appears first in the continuous. Hence the definitions of continuity are made to contain Infinity, continuity being defined by infinite divisibility."

(c) The elements regarded as susceptible, but not inherently possessed, of a Mean or quantitative Law.

§ 5. Assuming, then, that τὸ ἀπειρον means only the variable or Indeterminate, we still have to inquire in what point of view the More and Less involve Evil or Imperfection, as they do in the Pythagorean and Platonic systems: (ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὐ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχεοῖς ἀπέδωκεν ἐκατέροις ἐκατέραν. Met. 1. 6.) Plato himself will furnish the answer to this. Perfection always consists in a mean (τὸ μέτριον): the mean is a single determinate quantity: whatever therefore has a plurality of gradations, may happen in one of them to present the normal quantity, but in all the rest will be excessive or defective. It can only enter into the good and beautiful as a material which requires to have its law imposed from without. It cannot itself be an absolute good, or supply a law for action. In the Politicus we are told that the More and Less are all-important in philosophy and art, when the standard to which they are referred is the golden mean. Διττὰς ἄρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον. τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν δὲ αὖ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον... ἡγητέον ἄρα ὅμοιώς τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι καὶ μεῖζόν τι ἄμα καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν... δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῦμεν ἀν τὴν μετρητικὴν ταύτη δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας διέσται τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας

πρὸς τούναντίον μετροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον δύποσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' δύποσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπωκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων...μετρήσεως γὰρ δή τινα τρόπον πάνθ' δύποσα ἔντεχνα μετείληφε. p. 306. “There are two kinds of More and Less, and two modes of appreciating them; one when we compare any greater with any lesser quantity, the other when we compare any quantity with Due Measure...We must consider that the existence of Art depends on the reality of a More and Less, referred not to each other, but to an absolute Right quantity. We must accordingly divide Mensuration into two branches, one embracing the sciences that refer the More or Less in number, length, breadth, depth, and thickness, to one another; the other those that refer them to Due Measure, the Seemly, the Proportionate, the Right, and whatever dwells in the Mean remote from extremes; for a kind of Mensuration is the essence of Art.”

If we waive the question whether infinite quantities exist, and substitute for infinity excess over a certain mean, we may state the theory of Unity and Plurality in the terms of Aristotle: καὶ ἔοικε παλαία εἶναι καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ὅτι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀρχαὶ τῶν δύντων εἰσὶ. Phys. Aus. 1. 6.

In the Philebus, besides the antithesis of Greater and Less, we are presented with a qualitative antithesis of positive and negative extremes, (*θερμότερον, ψυχρότερον, ξηρότερον, ύγρότερον.*) While these are in isolation they are but material elements, and belong to the first stage of Being. They must be gathered together in a certain proportion and measure before they can become the seat of the higher manifestations of nature and life. “*Απαντα δεῖται τῆς ἐναντίας ρόπης ἵνα τυγχάνῃ τοῦ μετρίου καὶ μέσου τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ τὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ ἄκρων ἐκάτερον οὐκ ἔχει χωρίς.* De Part. An. 2, 7. “Every force needs to be balanced by its opposite, in order to attain to the Moderate and the Mean; for these have the Form (Life) and Spirit, which do not dwell in the isolated extremes.” Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω (εἰς ἄλληλα) τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ δστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοι-αῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ,

ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ...όμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ δστά καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. De Gen. et Cor. 2. 7. “Nature’s first process is to subdue the elementary extremes by this partial transformation; the formation of flesh and bone, and other living tissues follows as soon as hot and cold have been tempered and reduced to a mean....Similarly, liquid and solid, and all other opposite conditions, must be reduced to a mean before they can compose the nobler realms of nature.” Thus in the relations of Limit and Infinity, or Unity and Plurality, we have two antitheses: one between Unity and Plurality, and a second between the elements of the Plurality; whether we regard the quantitative antithesis of Excess and Defect, or the qualitative antithesis of the positive and negative extremes. Τρίων δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν, μᾶς δὲ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πάσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται πως. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντλοῦσιν, ή δὲ μέσην τὰς ἄκρας. Eth. Nic. 2, 8.

Examples of Measure as the quantitative Limit. It must be distinguished from Measure as the unit of mensuration: to which it is related as the Final cause to the Material.

§ 6. In the Philebus the Limit is always quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timaeus calls the Vehicle, or Receptacle, (*τὸ δεκτικόν*.) and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter, (*πρώτη ύλη*.) Quality is just as much a limitation or determination of the formless Matter, as specific quantity is of quality; and accordingly Aristotle gives it the same name (*εἶδος*) that he applies to the quantitative law or dominant Form.

The Philebus, however, does not carry the analysis of Being so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due proportions by the quantitative limit. As existing in indeterminate quantity, i. e. as measurable but not yet measured, it is called Infinity: a name open to misconception, for, when subjected to mensuration, its possible maximum is found to be finite. The quantitative Limit is its Measure.

The following illustrations of the conception of Measure

in some of its aspects are taken from Whewell's Astronomy and General Physics.

The solar system might have been so adjusted, that the year should have been longer or shorter than it actually is. The earth might revolve round the sun at a distance greater or less than that which it actually has: the size or density of the central mass, the sun, might be increased or diminished in any proportion: and thus the time of the earth's revolution might have been increased or diminished in any degree. By any such change the working of the botanical world would be thrown into utter disorder. Most of our fruit trees, for example, require the year to be of its present length. If the summer and the autumn were much shorter, the fruit would not ripen: if these seasons were much longer, the tree would put forth a fresh suit of blossoms to be cut down by the winter. Our forest trees need all the seasons of the present year for their perfection; the spring, summer, and autumn for the development of their leaves, and formation of their proper juice, and of wood from this, and the winter for hardening and solidifying the substance thus formed. The processes of the rising of the sap, of the formation of proper juices, of the unfolding of leaves, the opening of flowers, the fecundation of the fruit, the ripening of the seed, its proper deposition in order for the reproduction of a new plant; all these operations require a certain portion of time, and could not be compressed into a space less than a year, or at least could not be abbreviated in any very great degree.

Again: the force of gravity depends upon the mass of the earth, and is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. If the intensity of gravity were to be much increased or much diminished, if every object were to become twice as heavy or only half as heavy as it now is, all the forces both of voluntary and involuntary motion, which produce the present orderly and suitable results by being properly proportioned to the resistance which they experience, would be thrown off their balance, and produce motions too quick or too slow, wrong posi-

tions, jerks and stops, instead of steady well-conducted movements. The force in plants which propels the sap, is part of the economy of the vegetable world, and it is clear that the due operation of this force depends upon its being rightly proportioned to the force of gravity. The weight of the fluid must be counterbalanced, and an excess of force must exist to produce the motion upwards. In the common course of vegetable life, the rate of ascent is regulated on the one hand by the upward pressure of the vegetable power, and on the other by the amount of the gravity of the fluid, along with the other resistances which are to be overcome. If, therefore, we suppose gravity to increase, the rapidity of the vegetable circulation will diminish, and the rate at which this function proceeds, will not correspond either to the course of the seasons, or to the other physiological processes with which this has to cooperate. We might conceive such an increase of gravity as would stop the vital movements of the plant in a short time. In like manner a diminution of the gravity of the vegetable juices would accelerate the rising of the sap, and would probably hurry and overload the leaves and other organs, so as to interfere with their due operation. There is no apparent connexion between the quantity of matter of the earth, and the force of imbibition of the roots of the vine, or the force of propulsion of the vessels of its branches. Yet these things have such a proportion as the well-being of the vine requires.

These are rather instances of symmetry than of Measure. The latter word seems more properly used when the related terms are direct contraries in a single organisation. In all the nobler forms of existence we find antagonistic forces coexisting in harmony. Simplicity of composition, the preponderance of single principles, mark the lower forms of nature and society. The ascending scale of excellence is an ascending scale of complication, the coordination of more and more numerous rival tendencies. The due bounds and limits which are set to the predominance of each force, which restrain it from destroying the rest by which it is checked and counterbalanced, and so far

becoming boundless and infinite, these limits to which the beauty, richness, and grandeur of the Whole are due, are in Plato's language its Measure.

It is necessary to distinguish this from a different meaning of the same word.

Measure is defined by Aristotle as the unit of measurement ; as a moment may be made the unit of time, a span the unit of length, a pound the unit of weight : and, generalizing this conception, he says, Measure is the unit of cognition, i. e. any elementary premiss or atom of thought. Μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι τὸ μέτρον ἐστὶν εἶναι πρῶτον ἐκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον φῶ πρώτῳ ἐκαστον γιγνώσκεται...ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις μέτρον καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν τι καὶ ἀδιαιρέτον...τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἡ τῷ πολῷ ἡ τῷ ποσῷ...οὕτω δὴ πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἐν ὅτι γνωρίζομεν ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦντες ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. Met. 10. p. 1053. "To be One is properly to be the ultimate Measure of any genus, and principally of quantity...secondarily to be the ultimate instrument of cognition in other categories...In every instance the Measure and origin of knowledge is something One and indivisible...that is to say, simple in quantity or quality...The universal Measure, then, is Unity, because we know things by dividing their substances into their Units of quantity and quality." It varies, he observes, with the object to be measured : in solid dimension it is a solid dimension, in musical sounds a quartertone, in articulate sounds a letter, in velocity a standard velocity. Measure or Unity in this sense is an ingredient or element of the Whole to be measured, and therefore falls under the conception of material cause. Accordingly Aristotle seems to identify it with the elementary extremes of Plato's Infinite, or rather, as he attributes a priority to position over privation, with the positive factor alone. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε χρώμασίν ἐστι τὸ ἐν χρώμα, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτου καὶ τοῦ μέλανος φαίνεται γιγνόμενα, τὸ δὲ μέλαν στέρησις λευκοῦ...ῶστ' εἰ τὰ ὅντα ἦν χρώματα, ἦν ἀν ἀριθμός τις τὰ ὅντα, ἄλλα τίνων ; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι χρωμάτων καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦν ἀν τὶ ἐν, οἷον τὸ λευκόν...όμοιώς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθόγγων στοιχείων ἀν ἦν τὰ ὅντα ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ ἐν στοιχείον φωνῆν. ib. p. 1054. "In colours the

Unit is a colour, namely white, assuming that white and black are the elementary colours, and that black is the privation of white. So that if Being was colour, it would be a Number of something, namely of colours, and the Unit would be something specific, namely white. So if Being were articulate sound, it would be a Number of letters, and Unity a vowel." In the same manner, speaking of the theory that the cognizant subject must be of the same substance as the objects of cognition, he says it need only be composed of the positive *συστοιχία*, without the privative. Τοῦτο δὲ λέληθε τὸν οὕτως ὑπειληφότας, εἴπερ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖν ἐξ ἀπάντων ἰκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἔαντό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν κριτῆς γὰρ ἀμφοῦ ὁ κανών τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὕθ' ἔαντον οὕτε τοῦ εὐθέος. De An. 1. 5. "They overlook the fact that, if the soul is to be composed of the elements of Being, it need not be of all, as the positive series reveals both itself and the negative. Straight, for instance, is a criterion or measure of its negative, as well as of itself, as both are equally ascertained by the ruler, though the crooked indicates neither itself nor its opposite." (Straight and crooked are here given as the elementary antithesis in the category of figure: conf. εἰ δέ τι σχήματι ἡ λειότητι καὶ τραχύτητι διαφέρει, πάντα εὐθεῖ καὶ καμπύλῳ. Met. 8. 2. "Differences of figure or smoothness and roughness are all reducible to the antithesis of straight and crooked.") Even in Plato we find Unity used in this sense of Material ingredient or element, instead of totality of Form. For it seems to be such elementary Unities, not the systematic or organic Unity, that we are directed to search for in the commencement of the Philebus. So, too, some of the expressions in Aristotle's own Logic seem only to contemplate deduction from the Material cause. Χρὴ δὲ, ὅταν ὅλον τι πραγματεύηται τις, διελεῖν τὸ γένος εἰς τὰ ἄτομα τῷ εἶδει τὰ πρῶτα...μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ἴδια πάθη θεωρεῖν...τοῖς γὰρ συντιθεμένοις ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν ὄρισμῶν ἔσται δῆλα, διὰ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι πάντων...τὸ ἀπλοῦν, καὶ τοῖς ἀπλοῖς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ὑπάρχειν καθ' αὐτὰ μόνοις, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις κατ' ἔκεīνα. An. Post. 2. 12. "In scientific investi-

gation we should divide the subject matter into its ultimate elementary species, and then trace their properties. And the laws of the Wholes composed of these atoms will be thus ascertained, because they originate in the simple elements, which are the primary subjects of the laws, whereas the compound Wholes are so only secondarily." There is no mention here of the Whole, as a Whole, having any attributes. It is true, that, as contrasted with the ultimate matter, these elementary qualities must be considered as belonging to the Form; still they will only be portions or ingredients of the Form, and, therefore, stand in the relation of materials to the total Form. It is obvious that Measure in this sense is almost the antithesis of the Measure we hear of in the Philebus, and that the two senses are not to be confounded. The method of reasoning from the elementary Measure, incapable of ever arriving at the most organic and dominant laws, seems to be what Hegel intends to designate, when he speaks of the method of Understanding as opposed to the Method of Reason.

If, however, we examine Aristotle's definition either of Measure (φὶ γὰρ πρώτῳ γνωρίζομεν τοῦτο πρώτον μέτρον ἐκάστου γένους. Met. 4. 6.) or of Unity, (ἀρχὴ οὖν τοῦ γνωριστοῦ περὶ ἔκαστον γένος τὸ ἐν. ib.) we find they justify the Platonic acceptation of Measure, and that there is no reason for confining it to signify the Material cause. He himself recognises Form (εἶδος) and Totality as a species of Unity, namely, a systematic or organic Unity (ὡς οὐσῆς τῆς διάτητος ἐνότητός τινος. ib. 26), and it is a leading idea of his Philosophy, that the Formal and Final cause is more truly the basis of cognition than the Material (ἢ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως. De Part. An. i. 1.) The plan of the Whole furnishes the scale of the Parts in every work of nature or art: the End or ideal to be realized impresses a quantitative as well as qualitative law on the elements or means of its realization, and as determining their quantities and proportions may be said to be their Measure. And although the subjective or perceptive Measure of the objective antitheses, it was intimated above, might consist of the positive extreme or elementary Unity, yet beauty and excellence involve a systematic

matic Unity, positive, indeed, in character as opposed to its own negation, but combining both the elementary opposites, the negative as well as the positive. Accordingly Aristotle makes the sentient Measure of the ordered world itself a Mean or systematic Unity. ‘Ως τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶν μεσότητός τινος οὖσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τούτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίγνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάτερον αὐτοῦ θάτερον τῶν ἀκρῶν. De An. 2. 11.

While, however, illustrating the Platonic Measure by the conception of End, we must bear in mind that, whereas the Whole is immanent in its Parts, and the End is realized in the completed circle of means, Plato does not stop here; his ultimate Measure is transcendent, and placed beyond the sphere of the Measurable world.

From Aristotle's criticisms we may gather that the three kinds of Unity or Measure, elementary Unity (*στοιχεῖον*), systematic Unity (*τὸ μέσον, τὸ ὅλον*), transcendent Unity (*τὸ ἄϋλον*), were not always sufficiently distinguished in the Platonic theory of the One and the Infinite.

APPENDIX C.

Memory and Reminiscence.

§ 1. The theory of Memory and Reminiscence is more fully developed in Aristotle than in Plato. In every act of Memory an image presents itself to the consciousness. What distinguishes Memory from mere Fancy or Imagination is the accompanying belief of the previous existence of a corresponding perception; the recognition of the image as representing the object of former attention.

"*Εστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὕτε αἰσθησις οὕτε ὑπόληψις ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἡ ἔξις ἡ πάθος ὅταν γένηται χρόνος...ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἡ ἡκουσιεν ἡ ἔμαθε, προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστί... ὅταν οὖν ἄμα ἡ τε τοῦ πράγματος γένηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ.* ib. "Memory is not the original sensation or intellection, but the retention or excitation of either after a lapse of time...In every act of remembering that we saw, heard, or learnt a thing, there is a concomitant sensation of priority. Now priority and posteriority are relations of time...There must therefore be a joint impression of the object and of time in an act of Memory." *Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν ἐλρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἴκονος οὐ φάντασμα, ἔξις, καὶ τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ φ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα.* Arist. *De Memoriâ.* "We have intimated that Memory and Remembrance are the retention of an image as the copy of an original sensation of which it is the vestige, and that it is seated in the Primary Sense or the faculty whereby we have a sensation of Time." What is here called the Primary Sense is said to be the same as the Common Sense and the Imagination. All thought is the joint work of Intellect and Imagination, the latter supplying definite dimension, shape, and locality

to all our conceptions. These Imaginative or Sensuous elements are the direct object of Memory, and they all belong to the same faculty as the Temporal sensation. Νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐδὲν προσχρώμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγώνου δύως γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως κανὸν μὴ νοῆ ποσόν, τίθεται πρὸ δύματων ποσόν, νοεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥ ποσόν...διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν αλτίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὐδὲ' ἄνευ χρόνου τὰ μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντα, ἄλλος λόγος· μέγεθος δ' ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν καὶ κίνησιν, φῶς καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἔστιν· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων ἡ γνῶσις ἔστι· ἥ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἔστι· ὥστε τοῦ νοούμενον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀν εἴη, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ...τίνος μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν ἡ μνήμη, φανέρον, ὅτι οὐπέρ καὶ ἡ φαντασία, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας. ib. "There is no Intellection without Imagination, for the internal process of thought resembles geometrical demonstration by diagrams. For though we ground nothing on the definite dimension of a triangle, yet our diagram gives it a definite dimension; so in thought when the object of conception has no dimension, the Imagination gives it one which the Reason disregards. Why it is that nothing can be thought out of Space and Time, even though it may have no relation to them, we have not now to inquire. Magnitude and Change, however, are objects of the same faculty as Time, namely the Common or the Primary Sense. As the remembrance of objects of reason is always attended with images, the direct object of Memory is not the intellectual element, but the Images of the Primary Sense...Memory then is the same faculty as Imagination, and its direct objects are images, its indirect the concomitants of the images."

§ 2. Aristotle rejects the definition of Reminiscence given in the Philebus, μνήμης ἀνάληψις, but his own hardly differs. "Οταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἦν πρότερον εἶχεν ἐπιστήμην ἡ αἰσθησιν ἥ οὐ ποτε τὴν ἔξιν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην...ἐνούσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἥ ἔξις ἡς μανθάνουσιν, τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἀναμνήσκεσθαι. τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ.

ib. 2. "The recovery of previously possessed knowledge, or sensation, or whatever it is of which Memory was said to be retentive, when the mind has more materials than it had at the period of original acquisition, is Reminiscence, and Memory and Remembrance are the result." Reminiscence depends on the association of ideas or the law that regulates the train or succession of thoughts and fancies in the mind. Συμβαίνοντι δ' αἱ ἀναμήσεις ἐπεὶ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γίνεσθαι μετὰ τήνδε... ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμησκώμεθα κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων ἔως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ' ἦν ἐκείνη εἰώθε, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἡ ἄλλον τινὸς, καὶ ἀφ' ὅμοίον ἡ ἐναντίου ἡ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. ib. "Reminiscence is produced by the natural sequence of mental impressions... In reminiscence we pass through a series of impressions till we come to the one which is usually followed by the image to be recollected, (for which purpose we try to link on our recollections without a gap from the present moment or any other starting point) the causes of transition being Resemblance, Contrast, and Vicinity."

APPENDIX D.

Imagination.

Imagination contrasted with Opinion in the Sophista and Republic. Each is a kind of Judgment.

§ 1. The relations of *λόγος*, *διάνοια*, *δόξα*, and *φαντασία*, terms which we find in juxtaposition in the *Philebus*, are touched upon by Plato in the *Sophista*.

Λόγος, Speech, is a Proposition, that is, a spoken Opinion, or a combination of Propositions forming a syllogism or a chain of syllogisms. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδὲ ἀν ῥῆμάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων...οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδὲ ἀπρᾶξιν οὐδὲ οὔσιαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῦ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἀν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἥρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρώτος καὶ σμικρότατος—πῶς ἀρ' ὅδε λέγεις;—ὅταν εἴπῃ τις, ἀνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῆς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρώτον;—ἔγωγε.—δηλοῦ γὰρ ἥδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἡ γιγνομένων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλά τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον. p. 262, A. “Nouns alone spoken in succession form no Speech, nor verbs without nouns. No act or inaction or existence of any reality or unreality is indicated by the words in either case; nor till we combine nouns and verbs; then they fit; and their primary combination at once forms a Speech—what we may call a primary or elementary Speech.—Give me an instance.—If anybody says, A man is learning, do you not call this a primary and elementary Speech?—Yes.—For he then indicates that something exists, or is doing, or was done, or will be; and besides naming, he operates on what he names, as soon as

he combines verbs and nouns; and we speak of him as saying and not as merely naming; and call such combination a Speech." A Proposition or elementary Speech is related to Opinion (*δόξα*) as a complex of Propositions is to Reflexion or Reasoning (*διάνοια*).

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτον πλὴν δὲ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια. τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρέῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἀνὴρ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος.—ἀληθῆ.—καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸν ἵσμεν ὅν.—τὸ ποῖον;—φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.—ἵσμεν.—ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπης αὐτό;—καὶ πῶς;—τί δὲ ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος, ἀρ' οἶόν τε ὁρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἔτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;—οὐδέν.—οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δὲ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ δὲ δὲ λέγομεν σύμμαχις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενών ὅντων ψευδή τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνιότε εἶναι. p. 263. E. "Reflexion and Speech are the same; except that the mere internal dialogue of the soul with herself without voice is called Reflexion.—True.—And the sound that proceeds from her in a stream through the lips is called Speech.—True.—And these, too, are involved in Speech.—What? Affirmation and negation.—They are.—When they are internal and the result of silent Reflexion, what would you call them but Opinion?—Nothing else.—And when they are not produced by the soul alone but by Sensation, what else can we call them but Imagination?—Nothing.—Well, as we have agreed that Speech is susceptible of truth and falsehood, and that Reflexion is the soul's interchange of Speech with herself, Opinion the conclusion of Reflexion, and what we denominate Imagination a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, it follows that all of these, being kindred to Speech, are susceptible of falsehood."

The existence of Imagination as a separate critical faculty distinct from Intellect is insisted upon in the Republic. ⁷ Αρ' οὖν τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἵσταναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεόν ἢ βαρύτερον ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ

μετρήσαν ἡ καὶ στῆσαν ;—πῶς γὰρ οὖ ;—ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργου.—τούτον γὰρ οὖν.—τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἴναι ἡ ἐλάττω ἔτερα ἔτέρων ἡ ἔστι, τὰναντία φαίνεται ἀμα περὶ ταῦτα.—ναί.—οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀμα περὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδόνατον εἴναι ;—καὶ δρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν.—τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἀν εἴη ταῦτόν.—οὐ γὰρ οὖν ; p. 602. “Are not measuring and counting and weighing used as excellent protections against these sensuous illusions, whereby we are not guided by sensuous appearances of size, or number, or weight, but by a faculty that counts, measures, or weighs ?—They are.—And it is Intellect that performs this function.—It is.—Sometimes when this has measured an object and pronounced it greater, less, or equal to another, it is contradicted by a simultaneous appearance about the same object.—It is.—Did we not say that to the same faculty contradictory judgments at the same time on the same object were impossible ?—We did, and rightly.—That, then, which judges contrary to the measures cannot be identical with that which judges in accordance with the measures.—It cannot.”

The working of the Imagination is disguised by the idiom of the English language : it enters into all sensuous judgments.

§ 2. We see that *φαντασία* is spoken of as a judgment, susceptible of truth and falsehood. It would not be in accordance with English idioms to call the judgments spontaneously inspired by sensible appearances, Imaginations. When we immerse a straight stick in water, we say that, although we are convinced it is straight, it “ seems,” “ appears,” to be bent. We cannot say we “ Fancy” or “ Imagine” it bent, or use any term cognate to Imagination, as *φαίνεται* is to *φαντασία*. In this respect the Greek language is more philosophic. Dreams and the illusions of a disordered mind are attributed in the English language to the Imagination. But though all optical illusions, and even the soberest operations of the waking senses, are the works of the same faculty, they are expressed in English by terms that give no hint of their kindred to the other phenomena.

All judgments by sensation, whether illusory or well founded, are the work of the Imagination. Since Berkeley

wrote his Theory of Vision, they have been treated of by psychologists as the Secondary perceptions of Sense, though they refer to what are generally called the Primary properties of matter. The sensations received by one organ are regarded by the mind as signs of sensations that will presently be received by the same or another. When we were acquiring the use of our faculties, perhaps something in the nature of syllogism took place in these anticipations: but, after frequent verification of our reasonings, the law of suggestion now acts instantaneously and without our conscious reflexion. For instance, I see a mass of extended colour, which "seems" to me to be a globe: that is, from the visual sensation that I receive, I believe that, if I approach and handle the object, I shall receive certain other sensations of sight and touch and the Common Sense. In common language I am said to see the globular figure, solidity, &c., but in truth I only imagine them; they are only mediately and indirectly objects of sight. They are suggested by the immediate visual sensations, because experience has taught me the connexion of certain visual and tactful sensations. They are really images of the Fancy, awakened by sight, once, perhaps, by the intervention of syllogism, now according to the law of association. Hence we see there is a true instinctive psychology in the Greek idiom which applies the term *φαίνεται* to such perceptions. The English terms, "Seem," "Appear," give no such intimation of the mental process which takes place.

Dugald Stewart has expressed himself so well on this matter, that we cannot do better than quote his words. After defining Conception (by which he means what we have called Imagination) as "that power of the mind which enables it to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt:" he thus proceeds:

"From these principles it is an obvious consequence that the knowledge we obtain by the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies involves the exercise of Conception according to the definition of that power which has already been given. In ordinary discourse, indeed, we ascribe this knowledge, on account of the instantaneousness with which

it is obtained, to the power of Perception ; but if the common doctrine on the subject be just, it is the result of a complex operation of the mind ; comprehending, first, the Perception of those qualities which are the proper and original objects of sight ; and, secondly, the Conception of those tangible qualities of which the original Perceptions of sight are found from experience to be the signs. The notions therefore we form by means of the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies and of the distances of these objects from the organ are mere Conceptions ; strongly, and indeed indissolubly, associated by early and constant habit with the original Perceptions of sight.

“ When we open our eyes on a magnificent prospect, the various distances at which all its different parts are placed from the eye, and the immense extent of the whole scene before us, seem to be perceived as immediately and as instantaneously by the mind as the coloured surface which is painted on the retina. The truth, however, unquestionably is, that this variety of distance and this immensity of extent are not objects of Sense, but of Conception ; and the notions we form of them when our eyes are open differ from those we should form of them with our eyes shut only in this, that they are kept steadily in the view of the mind by being strongly associated with the sensations of colour, and with the original Perceptions of sight. This observation will be the more readily admitted if it is considered, that by a skilful imitation of a natural landscape in a common show-box the mind may be led to form the same notions of variety, of distance, and even of immense extent, as if the original scene were presented to our senses : and that, although in this case we have a speculative conviction that the sphere of our vision only extends to a few inches ; yet so strong is the association between the original Perceptions of sight and the Conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not possible for us by any effort of our will to prevent these Conceptions from taking place.”—*Elements of the Philosophy of the human mind*, chap. 3.

by an imperfection of language we are obliged to use the words "seem" "appear" to express acts of the Imagination. The distinction between Imagination and Opinion, judgment being common to both, is well traced by Aristotle. It is clear that, after Plato's contradistinction of Imagination and Opinion, his definition of Imagination, as a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, must be inaccurate. It accordingly is objected to by Aristotle. Φανερὸν τούννν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασίᾳ ἀν εἴη. *De Anima*, 3. 3. "Neither Opinion and Sensation, nor Opinion from Sensation, nor a synthesis of Opinion and Sensation, are Imagination." His reasons are, that Opinion implies a capacity of Persuasion (*πίστις*) and the faculty of Speech (*λόγος*), neither of which are necessary to Imagination. He then adds that Opinion and Imagination are often in direct antagonism. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ περὶ ὅν ἀμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πέπεισται δὲ ἔναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης. "Imagination (Appearance) is sometimes false where intellectual apprehension (Opinion) is true; for instance, the apparent diameter of the sun is a foot in length, though we are convinced it is larger than the earth." From this he infers, as Plato had done in the Republic, that there is in the mind a tribunal superior to the Imagination. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κρίνειν τό τε κύριον καὶ ἐν φαντάσματα γίνεται τούτον δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἔτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν, καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ φαμεν δύο· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡ ὅψις. εἰ δὲ ἡν ἡ ἀφὴ μόνη, καν ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἐν δύο. *De Somniis* 2. "The reason of our sometimes rejecting appearances is that the ultimate judgment does not belong to the faculty moved by sensuous appearances. For instance, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, but something else contradicts the appearance. And when we cross our fingers one object of touch seems two; yet we do not believe it is two, because sight is a better authority than touch. If the sense of touch was our only informant we should have believed that the object was two." Every sensation induces the Imagination to

form a judgment, but the Imagination is often overruled by the Opinion. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορῶς ὁρᾶν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν δύνατον εἰσεῖσθαι δοκεῖν οὐ κινουμένην ὡς (for ὡς read ὅμως) ὁρᾶν φαμέν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἀφὴν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἐν δύο δοκεῖν. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως φησὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῆ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἡ μὴ κινήται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν. ib. 3. “The arrival of an impression from a particular organ to the central organ of sensation (the organ of the Primary Sense and Consciousness) is the cause that makes us when awake think we see, or hear, or have any other perception. And if we suppose the sight to be impressed when it is not, we believe we see when we do not; or if the touch informs us of two impulses we believe one object of touch to be two. For in general the information of every sense is accepted in the central sensation (Primary Sense, or Imagination) unless some other more credible witness contradicts. Or rather, it is always accepted by the Imagination, but not always by the Opinion, unless the higher tribunal is prevented from speaking, or does not perform its appropriate function.” The distinction between Imagination and Opinion appears in dreams, when the Intellect is not entirely inactive. Ὡσπερ οὖν εἴ τινα λανθάνει ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ δόφθαλμῷ οὐ μόνον φανεῖται ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἔν, ἀν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν, οὐ δόξει δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς ἀν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει καὶ τοῦ παθοῦς ἐν φῇ ἡ αἰσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φανεῖται μὲν, λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κόρισκος οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κόρισκος. πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύδων τις λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαινόμενον, ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντίφησι τῇ φαντασίᾳ. ib. “If a person is unconscious that a finger is pressing against his eyeball, a single object will not only “appear” to be two, but will be so judged by the intellect; if he is conscious, it will “seem” two, but not be pronounced two by Opinion. So in sleep, if a man is conscious of being asleep and of the general oppression of his faculties, an appearance may affect his Imagination, but something in him says, “It looks like Coriscus,

but is not really Coriseus. For often in sleep something in the soul pronounces an appearance to be a dream ; but if one is unconscious of being asleep the appearance is uncontradicted."

§ 4. The imagined form ($\tauὸ φανόμενον$) is always the predicate of a proposition of which the subject is an immediate sensation, whether of a particular sense or of the common sense. When I see an object at a distance it has a certain visible magnitude and figure, which vary as I approach or recede. That is, the common sense (for magnitude and figure are objects of the common sense) acting through the organ of sight receives a varying impression. If I speak of the "apparent" height and figure of the object, and say it "seems" to be square and twenty foot high, I do not refer to its visible magnitude and shape, for these are perpetually varying, and I mean something invariable. Excited by sight and the common sense, Fancy has produced from her storehouse an imaginary height and figure, which she judges really and permanently belong to the object. So when Aristotle says the sun seems to be a foot broad, he means that the immediate sensation it produces excites the imaginative estimate, that if we approached and handled, or otherwise measured it, we should find it a foot in diameter. Berkeley supposes that the predicates in such visual judgments are always sensations of touch, because he considers that what we have called the common sense (the perception of magnitude, number, figure, &c.) resides mainly in the organ of touch. He says truly that the tangible properties of bodies are the most important to sentient beings, as capable of hurting or benefiting them, and causing them pleasure or pain : and that, therefore, in vision we hardly notice the visible qualities, colour, visible magnitude, and visible figure, but at once imagine the more interesting tangible magnitude and figure, power of resistance, &c. of which the visible qualities are the signs. The fact, however, seems to be, that touch, like the other senses, does not immediately reveal, but only indirectly suggests to the imagination, the qualities that form the predicates of our sensuous judgments : that tangible magnitude and figure, like the visible, are only regarded as

signs of the real magnitude and figure attributed by Imagination to the objects we touch.

Aristotle's definition of Imagination is contained in the following sentence ; ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικὸν, τὸ δὲ εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἔτερον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γνομένη κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἶναι...φανερὸν δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἔστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δὲ ἡ τὸ φανταστικόν. *De Somniis* 1. "Since Imagination and Sensation are different acts of the same faculty, Imagination being the Sensuous movement propagated from an actual Sensation ; as dreams (which we said above belonged to the Sensuous faculty) are a kind of Imagination, it is clear that they belong to the Sensuous faculty so far as it is identical with the Imaginative." The word *κίνησις* is probably used to show the homogeneousness of Imagination and Sensation ; possibly also to exclude reflexion or ratiocination. The drift of the definition in other words appears to be : Imagination is the spontaneous interpretative movement of the soul occasioned by an actual immediate Sensation.

Is the Moral Imagination affected by Volition ? Can Pleasure be Imaginary or False ?

§ 5. The general state of the will, that is, its virtuous or vicious disposition and characteristic tone, it is generally allowed, affects the moral Sensations, or, as we have identified the faculty, the moral Imaginations. They are also tinctured by the transient sway of any powerful passion, or even the predominance of the more tranquil moods of feeling. It is not so clear whether, besides these influences, the moral perceptions are ever affected by individual acts of rational volition, or whether they are entirely exempt from its control, and necessarily determined by the state of the will and feelings. It is the established doctrine that they are necessary and beyond our control : τῆς φαντασίας ἡμεῖς οὐ κύριοι. *Eth. Nic.* 3. 5 : and there is no doubt that this is very near the truth. On the other hand, though teaching and advice have very little influence to change the character and moral perceptions, it is hardly true that they have none at all. Optical experiments have established that the geometrical Imagination, as we may call the sensuous estimate of figure, position, and dimen-

sion, under certain circumstances, where the faculty itself is in a state of indifference, may be determined by an act of volition. Under certain circumstances, for instance, it depends on an act of the will whether we shall seem to ourselves to be beholding the convex or concave side of a mask, and whether we shall seem to be looking obliquely at a regular cube in perspective, or directly at a solid of some different position and figure. So perhaps, occasionally, when the moral Imagination is in a state of indifference or oscillation between baser and nobler interpretations, it may depend on an act of the will prompted by the reason whether some action or course of conduct shall be regarded by it in its true moral colours.

But to return to the Philebus. We have seen that what the Imagination supplies in a judgment of sense is the predicate, the subject being some immediate sensation. Apparently Pleasure can never be such an imaginary predicate, but is always an immediate sensation. We can speak of *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγάθον*, or *τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν*, but no one, unless led to use such expressions in defence of a thesis, would speak of *τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ*. If so, in spite of the arguments of Socrates in this dialogue, Pleasures are not susceptible of distinction as true and false, real and imaginary.

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
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